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THE SCHOLIA VETERA TO PINDAR¹

BY HENRY THOMSON DEAS

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I. BEFORE ARISTARCHUS

IN THE first examination and classification of the treasures of the Alexandrian Library the epic and lyric poets were dealt with personally by Zenodotus of Ephesus, the first librarian. How far this examination proceeded in the case of Pindar has been open to considerable doubt.² Was it merely a sifting of the poems attributed to Pindar, a separation of the spurious from the authentic, and a collection of the latter? Or did it culminate in a thoroughgoing edition, a *διόρθωσις*? The citations of Zenodotus in the extant scholia are only three in number, and cannot be said to throw any light on this question. At sch. O. II, 7*a* he is cited for the orthography of *ἀκροθλία*, at sch. O. III, 52*a*, on the question of the horned hind, and at sch. O. VI, 92*b*, for a reading now unfortunately lost. None of these instances

¹ It will be observed that this study is definitely limited in scope: the *scholia metrica* have been disregarded, and no attempt has been made to deal with the *scholia recentia*. The history of the transmission involves a good deal of restatement of views long established, but it seemed worth while to endeavour to give a connected account in order that the modifications and additions upon which I have ventured might be placed in relation to the whole. I have endeavoured to indicate the sources used on particular points, mainly by means of footnotes, throughout my essay. References to the scholia are of course to A. B. Drachmann's standard edition (Teubner, Leipzig: vol. I, *Olympians*, 1903; vol. II, *Pythians*, 1910; vol. III, *Nemeans*, *Isthmians*, and Indices, 1927).

² F. Susemihl, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur in der Alexandrinerzeit* (Leipzig, 1891-92), I, 334; U. von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Euripides Herakles* (Berlin, 1889), I¹, 135, 138 ff.

in the least implies a regular "edition" of Pindar; and any possible edition by Zenodotus was superseded by that of his successor Aristophanes, to whom is attributed the division of Pindar into the seventeen books of the later tradition, and the separation of the text into κῶλα. It follows that the text in an edition by Zenodotus must have been written, after the primitive fashion, in the form of prose, and it was for this that Susemihl (*loc. cit.*) argued, as against Wilamowitz, who preferred to suppose that the foregoing references to Zenodotus were drawn from various Einzeluntersuchungen or συγγράμματα¹ of his. The latter would be the more likely view were it not for the evidence of the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of the Paeans,² in which on six separate occasions a reading in the margin is introduced by a contraction which can only mean Zenodotus, and which is universally accepted as referring to Zenodotus of Ephesus.³ In view of this perhaps rather surprising fact, Susemihl's opinion must be accepted as correct.

But however matters may stand as regards an edition of the text of Pindar, it may at least be said with some certainty that Zenodotus did not write a commentary. Of this latter there is no evidence whatever, and all analogy points in the contrary direction. Zenodotus may have referred, and doubtless did refer, in various writings to passages in Pindar (e.g. in the matter of the horned hind), and his remarks thereon may well have been incorporated in later commentaries, but it is now impossible to identify any such indirect contributions to the scholia.

In the next generation a second survey of the library was made by Callimachus and resulted in the compilation of his exhaustive catalogue or πίνακες in one hundred and twenty books. Doubtless this revision of the contents of the library effected some improvements in the analysis of its Pindar collection, and by a fortunate chance we have preserved to us in our scholia a single valuable reference to Calli-

¹ I use this convenient if not altogether accurate contrast of σύγγραμμα (= an article or book on some point or points of interest) as opposed to ὑπόμνημα (= a continuous commentary on a chosen text, but written separately from it). On this point see further p. 76, and cf. Gudeman in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. "Scholien," 627.

² Oxyrhynchus Papyri, v (Oxford, 1908, ed. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt), no. 841.

³ Cf. Grenfell and Hunt, *Op. cit.*, p. 15; Gudeman, *loc. cit.*, 651; Wilamowitz, *Pindaros* (Berlin, 1922), p. 3.

machus's activities in this connection.¹ This notice occurs in the inscription to *P. II*, which is concerned with the vexed question as to the identity of the games in which the victory there celebrated was won. Among the various answers given is that of Callimachus that the ode was a Nemean. From this remark Friedrich Schmidt² deduces, reasonably, that the poems of Pindar, besides being listed under group headings (e.g. ἐπίνικοι Ὀλυμπιονίκαις), must have been entered individually in the πίνακες under some such heading as Πινδάρου Ἱέρωνι Ὀλυμπιονίκη, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ Ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ, στίχων. . . . Probably, then, the πίνακες contained a fairly detailed examination into the nature and occasion of individual odes ascribed to Pindar. Of a critical edition, much less a commentary, by Callimachus there are no traces.

The next name is of much greater importance for the text of Pindar than for the scholia. The position of Aristophanes of Byzantium as the ultimate authority, not only for the constitution of our text but for its arrangement in metrical κῶλα and its grouping into books, is established beyond question and needs no emphasizing.³ To the supremacy of his text, and its virtual supersession of all that had gone before, are due the comparatively slight preoccupation of the scholiasts with textual matters and the almost complete disappearance from the scholia of Aristophanes' own name. There are now only two notes in the scholia which bear witness to Aristophanes' work on Pindar:⁴ one in the *Hypothesis Olympiorum* (Drachmann, I, 7), professing to give the reasons why *O. I* was set first in its book ὑπὸ Ἀριστοφάνους τοῦ συντάξαντος τὰ Πινδαρικά; and the other the valuable notice at sch. *O. II*, 48c,⁵ τὸ κῶλον τοῦτο ἀθετεῖ Ἀριστοφάνης· περιττεύειν γὰρ αὐτό φησι πρὸς τὰς ἀντιστροφούς: cf. 48f. περισσὸν ἐστι κῶλον . . . ὅθεν καὶ ὀβελίσκος αὐτῷ παράκειται.

¹ Callimachus's poetry is of course frequently quoted.

² *Die Pinakes des Kallimachos* (Berlin, 1922), *P. II*. inscr. is frag. 22 (p. 24); cf. pp. 75-78.

³ Cf. Wilamowitz, *Herakles I*¹, 138-144; *Textgeschichte d. griech. Lyriker* (Berlin, 1900), p. 17 ("die editio princeps ward codicis instar"); Gudeman, in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. "Scholien," 648-649; Cohn, *ibid.*, s.v. "Aristophanes Byzantius."

⁴ In the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of the Paeans, on the other hand, three readings are introduced by a contraction taken to represent his name.

⁵ Cf. A. Nauck, *Aristophanis Byzantii fragmenta* (Halle, 1848), p. 61 f.

This latter note introduces a further aspect of Aristophanes' work on Pindar, of some importance in connection with the scholia. His text was the first regular edition, and remained, broadly speaking, the definitive *διόρθωσις* of Pindar; therefore he is the earliest possible source for the metrical and critical *σημεία* of which several traces are to be found in the extant scholia — the single reference to the *ὀβελός* at sch. *O.* II, 48f., the mention of the *κορωνίς* in metrica *b.* to *P.* VI, and the frequent allusions to τὸ *σημεῖον* *χ*. The antiquity of some of the latter class of notes has been doubted, and the question will be more fully discussed later,¹ but it seems now generally agreed that this use of *χ* dates back, in some degree at least, to Aristophanes.² A *χ* marking points of interest or difficulty occurs also fairly frequently in the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of the Paeans, together with the *διπλή*, which, like it, was used for various purposes.

Thus Aristophanes of Byzantium was responsible for the first fully equipped critical edition of Pindar; whether he wrote a commentary also, is more than doubtful. It is difficult to resist the thought that he may have compiled for each ode, together with a metrical note, a short statement of its circumstances and date, something resembling an amplified excerpt from the *πίνακες*;³ one can only say that there is now no evidence of any such annotation by him, and it is hard to see how all traces of so great an authority could have been lost. In any case it is safe to assume that there was as yet no continuous commentary;⁴ such a work presupposes a thorough treatment of the text, which was now for the first time supplied. Henceforward the centre of gravity in Pindaric studies changes; up to this point it is of editions that we have heard, whereas from now on it is with commentaries that we are mainly concerned. It is necessary to stress this point if we are to arrive at a proper appreciation of the contribution of Aristarchus to the exegesis of Pindar.

But before we deal with Aristarchus one further note on the arrangement of the Pindaric odes falls to be considered. Apollonius

¹ See p. 72.

² Cf. Cohn in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. "Aristophanes Byzantius"; Susemihl, I, 435.

³ Cf. the fact that Aristophanes wrote a work *πρὸς τοὺς Καλλιμάχου πίνακας* (sch. Aristophanes, *Nubes*, 967; Athenaeus, IX, 408 f.).

⁴ Susemihl, I, 434.

ὁ εἰδογράφος, who is now known to have been librarian at Alexandria between Aristophanes and Aristarchus,¹ is cited in the same note with Callimachus (*P.* II, inscr.) on the question of the εἶδος of that ode. He declared it a Pythian — obviously the view that Aristophanes held, if the current opinion as to the permanent authority of his arrangement is true. The same Apollonius is perhaps cited at sch. *P.* I, 3,² where he interprets σύνδικον as σύντροπον. These citations explain and are in turn explained by *Etymologicum Magnum*, 295, 52: Εἰδογράφος Ἀπολλώνιος, ἐπειδὴ εὐφύης ὦν ἐν τῇ βιβλιοθήκῃ τὰ εἶδη τοῖς εἶδεσιν ἐπένειμεν· τὰς γὰρ δοκούσας τῶν ᾠδῶν Δώριον μέλος ἔχειν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συνῆγε, καὶ Φρυγίας καὶ Λυδίας, Μιξολυδιστὶ καὶ Ἰαστί — i.e. Apollonius drew up a classification of odes according to their musical kind; it is to this, and not to the scene of the victory, that his classification of *P.* II as Πυθική must have been meant to refer.

II. ARISTARCHUS

The contribution of Aristarchus to the study of Pindar has provoked more discussion than that of any other grammarian. He is cited in the extant scholia some sixty-nine times, slightly more often than Didymus himself, and incomparably more often than any other scholar. This is in itself abundant evidence of the fact that he wrote a continuous commentary; that he was responsible also for a critical text is proved by his references to his own readings, and by such a note as sch. *I.* VI, 47e, ἀ δὲ ὁ Ἀρίσταρχος σημειοῦται. Yet the notes given under his name, hardly less than his emendations of the text, provoke a feeling of disappointment, and have been adjudged unworthy both of his general reputation and of his performance in the field of Homeric criticism.³

This impression of failure may, however, be largely removed by a proper consideration, first, of the position of Aristarchus as regards his predecessors and the materials available to him and, secondly, of

¹ Ox. Pap. X, no. 1241 (from a chrestomathy of the second century A.D.). Wilamowitz (*Pindaros*, p. 108) places Apollonius next to Eratosthenes in the librarianship.

² So A. Boeckh, *Pindar* (Leipzig, 1819-21), vol. II, pt. 1, pref., p. xiv.

³ *Ibid.*, p. xiii; cf. Cohn, in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. "Aristarchos" "wir vermissen hier oft den gesunden Sinn und den Scharfblick den wir in seiner Homerexegese so sehr bewundern müssen."

the process by which his views have come down to us. The residuum of demerit — and it is by no means negligible — admits, I think, of a reasonable explanation.¹

The first point is that Aristarchus was, as I have endeavoured to show by a summary of the work of his predecessors, almost certainly the first to attempt a methodical commentary on Pindar.² The resources available were very much less valuable than in the case of Homer, and the difficulties confronting an innovator were bound to affect the value of his work; so that it was inevitable that more should be left for his successors. It would of course be a mistake to say that there was not in existence a certain amount of material on which he could, and no doubt did, draw; but this material was scattered and fragmentary, and its value is difficult to estimate with any precision. Aristarchus would have before him the texts of Zenodotus and Aristophanes, and the valuable matter contained in the bibliographical work of Callimachus. For the actual interpretation of the text there was doubtless a fairly large store of incidental contributions to be gathered from the articles and treatises, the *συγγράμματα*, of his predecessors, either specifically directed to passages in Pindar, or mentioning them in general discussions upon disputed points [e.g. Zenodotus on *κεροέσσης* (sch. O. III, 52*a*) and Eratosthenes on *τήνελλα καλλίνικε* (sch. O. IX, 1*k*)], or referring to Pindar in discussions upon the text of other authors. How much material there was available of this kind we do not know; but there was doubtless some, and the process by which it was incorporated in regular commentaries is known from the much better documented case of Homer. Behind all this, again, there no doubt lay a certain amount of information, though of a less scholarly kind, in the literary works of Stoics and Peripatetics — some less extensive counterpart to the *προβλήματα*, *ζητήματα*, *ἀπορήματα* 'Ομηρικά,³

¹ On Aristarchus and Pindar, see, besides the relevant pages in Susemihl and Pauly-Wissowa, the excellent treatise of E. Horn, *De Aristarchi Studiis Pindaricis*, Greifswald, 1883. Less valuable is P. Feine, *De Aristarcho Pindari Interprete* (in *Commentationes Philologicae Ienenses* II, Leipzig, 1883).

² Cohn, *loc. cit.*, "A. war der erste der eine vollständige Interpretation des schwierigen Dichters versuchte"; cf. Horn, p. 11, "Ab A. primo Pindari carmina coepta esse accuratius explicari."

³ Cf. Gudeman, *loc. cit.*, 626; K. Lehrs, *Die Pindarscholien* (Leipzig, 1883), pp. 116-117; Horn, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

of which we hear so much; but whether any such *ζητήσεις* or *ἀπορίαι* Πινδαρικαί would afford much help to the conscientious and scholarly commentator is perhaps uncertain. On the whole, then, we may conclude that in the case of Pindar Aristarchus had to depend very much on his own resources.¹

Secondly, it is only fair to remember that we do not get Aristarchus's views at first hand at all; for information about him we have to depend entirely on the extant corpus of scholia, and in consequence we know only so much of him as we can derive from what remains to us of the remarks of his successors. Didymus, through whom we learn almost, if not entirely, all we know of Aristarchus, was not here concerned to present a complete and faithful account of his views; the larger part of Aristarchus's results was presumably absorbed without acknowledgment, after the fashion of the time, and he himself usually brought into court only when his successor had occasion to differ from him. Hence it should be no surprise to find that a fair proportion of the notes attributed to him are erroneous, for in not a few cases, as we shall see later, Didymus had the best of reasons for venturing to differ. On the other hand, the number of times that Aristarchus is mentioned is in itself the clearest possible indication of the importance attributed to his commentary by later scholars; but in considering the extent and value of his work, from the indications which survive to-day, it is necessary to look before and after, and keep ever in mind both the difficulties of his position and the partial nature of the tradition by which alone we are informed.

An analysis of the notes² passing under his name shows the thorough nature of his work, but also reveals some notable limitations. On a dozen or so occasions he puts forward readings, or else his comment reveals him as supporting a reading different from his successors'. Sometimes he is right, e.g. sch. O. II, 177*d* (κρύφον); sch. P. v, 33

¹ There is one case where Aristarchus definitely cites his predecessors: sch. N. I, 49*c* (why does Pindar introduce the myth of Herakles?), ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀρίσταρχος φησιν ὅτι οἴονται τινες ὅτι . . . ὅπερ ἐστίν, ὡς καὶ αὐτός φησιν Ἀρίσταρχος, ἀπίθανον. cf. Horn, *loc. cit.*

² Horn (*op. cit.*, pp. 13-75) collects and edits these notes, together with a score of others which on internal grounds he thinks may be assigned to Aristarchus. These latter I deal with later (p. 10).

(φιλεῖν); sch. *N.* x, 114a (ἤμενον); sch. *I.* 1, 58b (ἀρετᾶ). At other times he blunders, e.g. sch. *O.* III, 45a (Ἰστρία); sch. *P.* III, 75 (τριτάτῳ — an unmetrical conjecture to preserve an Homeric parallel); sch. *N.* IV, 151a (οἶον); sch. *I.* 1, 11c (ἐξώπασεν). In some cases the question is merely as to the correct rewriting of the old orthography, e.g. sch. *N.* III, 16b; IV, 151a; *I.* 1, 58b. At sch. *O.* v, 54b Aristarchus would accentuate ὑγιέντα (as if from a verb); and at sch. *I.* VI, 47e he is revealed as having set a σημεῖον, the reason for which was subject to dispute. All these notes clearly imply a διόρθωσις of the text.¹

As regards his commentary, it is where matters of fact and questions of history or mythology, deserving and requiring special investigation, are involved, that Aristarchus shows in the worst light. Nearly always when his commentary is cited on points of this nature he seems to be at fault, and his comments are dismissed, usually by Didymus, as being either untrue in point of fact (e.g. sch. *N.* II, 19) or unsupported by evidence (e.g. sch. *O.* v, 20e, the matter of the flooding of the Hipparis — it is not, however, certain that Aristarchus was wrong here). To the former class we may add *I.* II, inscr. (Thrasybulus brother of Xenocrates), sch. *N.* VI, 21b and VII, 56a; to the latter belong several instances of more or less obvious guesses, sch. *I.* VII, 23a (τοῦτο λεγόμενον ὑπόνοιαν δίδωσιν); sch. *P.* v, 76b (Battus and the lions), and sch. *P.* VII, 18a. A further class of error is where Aristarchus appears as simply refusing to trouble about the matter, — sch. *O.* VI, 23a (the seven pyres at Thebes), ἰδιάζει καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὁ Πίνδαρος ὡς καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις — a cavalier method of explanation which is paralleled by sch. *O.* VII, 95a, where Aristarchus is reported as saying that Pindar is simply transferring to Rhodes the legend of Daedalus. Obviously Aristarchus was in this department unsatisfactory; and that he was found so by Didymus is shown by an interesting series of comments. Sch. *O.* II, 29d (Theron's ancestors: καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἀρίσταρχός φησι . . . ὁ δὲ Δίδυμος τὸ ἀκριβέστερον τῆς ἱστορίας ἐκτίθεται, μάρτυρα Τίμαιον . . . προσφερόμενος); sch. *O.* III, 1d (ὁ δὲ Ἀρίσταρχός φησι . . . ὁ δὲ Δίδυμος ἱστορικώτερον λέγει . . .); sch. *N.* I, 3 (a matter of mythology: καὶ ὁ

¹ Aristarchus is also credited with five readings in the margins of the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of the Paeans (v, no. 841). It must be remembered that after Aristophanes the texts of Pindar seem only to have altered in detail: all questions of authenticity and arrangement were closed.

μὲν Ἀρίσταρχος . . . ἔνιοι δὲ ἱστορικώτερον ἀκούουσι). To this body of evidence we must add the fact that of the scores of citations of ancient historians with which the scholia are enriched, not one appears in connection with Aristarchus's name. The caution against supposing that we have a complete account of Aristarchus's commentary holds good here as elsewhere, but I think that, considering the instances of positive error and general lack of interest in such matters, there are good grounds for supposing that he did not sufficiently allow for the fact that Pindar, in proportion as he himself threw light on history, was open to illustration from the works of historians. The judgment of Horn (*op. cit.*, pp. 9-10) on this matter, though perhaps unduly severe, yet seems on the whole justified and is worth quoting:—

Utpote qui multo plus studii ac laboris in rebus grammaticis posuerit in Pindaro interpretando adeo non ab hac ratione recedere potuit, ut saepis, sime in rerum interpretatione lapsus sit. Permulta enim quae ad res explicandas praesertim in hoc poeta prorsus necessaria sunt, aut omisit aut neglexit aut ignoravit . . . neque enim ubi opus erat fundamenta historica quatenus rebus subessent disquirebat, neque auctores historicos consulendos ducebat. Immo suam propriam sententiam conformabat id studens ut rei ipsi expediendae succurreret. . . . Nimirum haud aliter in Homero iudicavit.¹

But the case is different in the large class of notes which are concerned with matters of purely verbal scholarship, while questions of mythology, history, and the like, and matters of fact requiring special investigations, are not involved. Here, as would be expected, the work of Aristarchus is of the very greatest value, e.g. his notes at sch. *O.* II, 16*a*, 58*a*, *b*, 102*b*, 113*d*, 152*c*; exceptionally valuable is sch. *N.* I, 34*b*. Less frequently Aristarchus is demonstrably wrong, e.g. sch. *O.* III, 41*b* (*Κρονίου* rejected as a patronymic)²; *O.* VII, 19*d*; *N.* IV, 5; but in general it may be said that this section of his work seems to have been on a high level of excellence. It is interesting to note that Ho-

¹ But it is as well not to be too confident in condemnation: one of Horn's chief instances is the reference made by Aristarchus to the Neoptolemus Paeon (sch. *N.* VII, 70); on this Horn remarks: "amplam et non absurdam explicationem finxit nisus paeane nunc deperdito. Omnia vero haec quamvis facilia sunt, nihil nisi ficticia esse Hermannus recte contendit"!

² In accordance with Aristarchus's rules on this subject; cf. sch. *O.* II, 22*e*; *P.* VI, 5*a*.

meric parallels and usages account for some of the blunders, e.g. sch. *P.* III, 75 (textual); *P.* IV, 14 (on ἀργινόμεντι μαστῶ, where Aristarchus, ignorant or careless of the particular reference to the topography of Cyrene, was content to suppose a reference to the Homeric οἶθαρ ἀρούρης).

It should be noted that on more than one occasion Aristarchus is credited with a note which consists mainly if not entirely of paraphrase; a phenomenon which should not give rise to any astonishment,¹ but which both Lehrs and Horn are at great pains to avoid, by the downright expedient of presuming a lacuna after the occurrence of his name, at sch. *O.* VI, 153*a*; VII, 117; for other cases of paraphrase under Aristarchus's name, cf. sch. *O.* VIII, 5*b*, and sch. *I.* VII, 55*a*.²

Besides discussing those notes which bear the name of Aristarchus, Horn also prints others which because of similarity in subject matter he considers may be identified as belonging to the same scholar. It is of course perfectly true that there must be present in our scholia many notes derived from Aristarchus, but now nameless; and it is possible to make out a very strong case for recognizing certain classes of note as definitely Aristarchean; but it seems to me a hazardous experiment to proceed to identify particular instances as certainly his. A single example may make the danger clear: from Aristarchus's note on Ἐμμενίδαι at sch. *P.* VI, 5*a*, Horn urges that all similar treatment of patronymics comes from the same source, and makes a good case for claiming that at sch. *O.* III, 68*a* the οἱ προῦπομνηματιστάμενοι, who state the same doctrine as regards the same name, include Aristarchus or are identical with him.³ But at sch. *N.* VI, 30, a similar doctrine is propounded (with reference to Σωκλείδης) under the name of Didymus. Didymus may of course be borrowing, but it is futile to reserve a particular doctrine of this sort for one man.

There remains to be considered ⁴ a number of places where the make-

¹ See more fully on "paraphrase," *infra*, p. 65; and for Aristarchus as a paraphrast, cf. K. Lehrs, *De Aristarchi Studiis Homericis*³ (Leipzig, 1882), p. 153 f.

² Lehrs, *Die Pindarscholien*, p. 8; Horn, *op. cit.*, on sch. *O.* VI, 153*a*. They both suppose a lacuna at sch. *P.* II, 78*b* also: Drachmann (rightly) rejects their proposals in all these cases.

³ There are other reasons for believing this true; cf. sch. *O.* VI, 55*b*; *N.* III, 1*c*.

⁴ Horn's fragments 94-102 are a collection of notices referring to Aristarchus's

up of the note leads to a fair presumption that we have Aristarchus's views before us. I refer especially, but not entirely, to the many important passages in the scholia which are obviously the result of much dispute in antiquity, the so-called ζητήματα or "quaestiones,"¹ many of which are still in their present form introduced by some such formula as ζητεῖται (e.g. inscr. *b* to *N. 1.*). Doubtless Aristarchus and Didymus originally appeared as protagonists on most of these ancient battle-grounds (cf. sch. *O. 11, 29d*, where a full form is happily preserved, ζητεῖται, δι' ἣν αἰτίαν . . . καὶ ὁ μὲν Ἀρίσταρχός φησι . . . ὁ δὲ Δίδυμος . . .); but these passages throw little if any fresh light on the character of Aristarchus's individual contribution to the scholia.

The criticisms which must be passed on Aristarchus as an editor of Pindar have already been indicated. His services to Pindaric studies in compiling the first continuous commentary were very great, and the traces of his work which remain enable us to say with some confidence that so far as verbal scholarship was concerned, the chief step that remained was to free Pindar from an over-close enthrallment to Homeric vocabulary and syntax. But it is also clear that Aristarchus's commentary was very far from complete; on the historical side, where now we find so much of value in the scholia, it was lamentably deficient. "Er glaubte bei Pindar dieselbe Interpretationsmethode anwenden zu können wie bei Homer, nahm zu viel Rücksicht auf seine homerischen Beobachtungen und tadelte Pindar, weil er von der Darstellungsweise und Sprache Homers abwich."² The recognition of Pindar's right to a more individual, and in particular to a more historical, interpretation was what chiefly remained for Aristarchus's successors to accomplish; and the completion of their task marks the zenith of the Alexandrian study of Pindar.

III. BETWEEN ARISTARCHUS AND DIDYMUS

Between Aristarchus and Didymus we have the names of some dozen grammarians who seem to have contributed more or less to the ex-commentaries on other portions of Pindar's works, especially the Paeans and Dithyrambs.

¹ On these cf. Horn, p. 4; Lehrs, *Die Pindarscholien*, pp. 111 ff.

² Cohn in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. "Aristarchos"; cf. the more severe judgment of Susemihl, *op. cit.*, I, 461.

genesis of Pindar. But the remains of these scholars' work are so scanty that it is difficult to say much with certainty about them as individuals, or even to assert, where external evidence is lacking, that they actually composed complete commentaries on our poet. "Wir wissen nur zu wenig über die Arbeiten der Grammatiker; man kann auf ein paar Anführungen kein Urteil gründen."¹

But taken as a whole this period is one of great interest, and reveals steady progress along certain very necessary lines. The most important phenomenon is perhaps the appearance of the Pergamene school, which seems to have had a considerable effect on the future course of Pindaric studies. The leader of the Pergamenes, Crates of Mallus,² who exercised such an influence on the studies of his school, appears in our scholia only twice (sch. *P.* III, 102*b*, and *N.* II, 17*c*), and on both occasions meets with a hostile reception; in the latter instance this is no more than the unfortunate emendation *θερειᾶν* (for *ὀρειᾶν*) *Πελειάδων* deserved. His importance lies in the fact that under him the school of Pergamum developed an interest in a wide variety of studies, among which verbal scholarship held nothing like the pride of place which it had in the Alexandria of Aristarchus.³ Geography, topography, chronology, history — all these studies flourished at Pergamum, and, what is more important, were used freely in the commentaries compiled by members of the school. Thus it is a younger contemporary and pupil of Crates, Artemon of Pergamum, who seems to deserve the credit for having first fully recognised Pindar as an historical author, deserving of careful explanation and illustration on the historical side. Artemon is cited six times in the scholia, and his notes reveal, as was to be expected, a certain hostility towards Aristarchus; they all refer, with the exception of sch. *P.* III, 52*b*, to Sicily or Sicilian history, and hence it has been assumed that his commentary embraced only Pin-

¹ Wilamowitz, *Pindaros*, p. 3.

² On Crates, cf. Susemihl, II, 4-12. He was of course a contemporary of Aristarchus, but I take him later, as the influence of the Pergamene school on Pindaric studies is obviously subsequent to Aristarchus; cf. C. Wachsmuth, *De Cratete Mallota* (Leipzig, 1860).

³ The "school of Callimachus" had of course made extensive investigations into problems of mythology, history, and chronology; but the results of their work do not seem to have been brought to bear on Pindar till after Aristarchus: e. g. Istros is cited by Didymus, sch. *O.* VI, 55*a*.

dar's Sicilian odes, an inference which seems likely to be correct.¹ In none of the notes ascribed to Artemon is there anything of striking value, perhaps because later writers stole his thunder; what chiefly matters is the method and the recognition, which seems undoubted, of Pindar's historical importance, and of the necessity for an adequate investigation into the facts which might throw light on his text, or be in turn illustrated by it.

Meanwhile there continued to be great activity in Pindaric studies at Alexandria. Callistratus,² a contemporary of Aristarchus, and an upholder, as against him, of their common master Aristophanes, is mentioned six times in the scholia, and seems to have tended to break away from the Aristarchean devotion to verbal scholarship.³ He thought *P. II* was an Olympian (inscr. *P. II*), and discussed geography (sch. *N. III, 1c*) and Pindar's relations with his clients (sch. *N. VII, 150a*; *I. II*, inscr. *a* and *19a*; ⁴ *I. v*, inscr. *c*).

Menecrates,⁵ a pupil of Aristarchus, meets Artemon on the latter's own ground and refutes him in no uncertain terms (sch. *O. II, 16c*, *Μενεκράτης δέ φησι ληρείν τὸν Ἀρτέμωνα*). Ammonius, the successor of Aristarchus in the librarianship,⁶ and a staunch disciple of his master, is cited on seven occasions. Once his note seems to involve a reading (sch. *O. I, 122c*; cf. Lehrs, *op. cit.*, p. 10); he also discusses matters of mythology (sch. *P. IV, 44b*; *N. III, 16b*) and geography (sch. *P. IV, 93b*). Chaeris,⁷ another Aristarchean, contributes nine sensible notes to *P. IV* and one to *N. I* (sch. *49c*). His notes at sch. *P. IV, 61, 188b* (cf. *195a*), *258b, 446, 459a* involve textual questions; while in sch. *P. IV, 313a* he cites Menaechmus of Sicyon, an historian of Alexander's time. Chaeris is a good instance of the peculiarly spora-

¹ Cf. *I. II* inscr. *a*: Ἀρτέμων, σφόδρα τὰ περὶ τοὺς Σικελιώτας πεπολυπραγμονηκώς.

² On Callistratus, cf. Susemihl, I, 449 f., and R. Schmidt, *De Callistrato Aristophaneo* (1838, reprinted with Nauck's *Aristophanes Byzantius*, Halle, 1848).

³ Cf. Gudeman in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. "Kallistratos."

⁴ In sch. *I. II, 19a*, οἱ περὶ Καλλιστρατον is, as usual, merely a scholiastic periphrasis for Callistratus himself, as is shown by the reference to *I. II*, inscr. *a*.

⁵ For Menecrates, cf. Susemihl, II, 159 and Müller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum* (Paris, 1841-70), II, 344 f. He reappears at sch. *I. IV, 104g*.

⁶ Susemihl, II, 153; A. Blau, *De Aristarchi discipulis* (Jena, 1883), pp. 5-13.

⁷ For Chaeris, cf. Susemihl, II, 166; Blau, *op. cit.*, p. 57; R. Berndt, *De Charete Chaeride Alexione grammaticis* (Königsberg, 1902), p. 9.

dic way in which some of the grammarians of this period are cited in the scholia — his name is confined almost entirely to notes on the Fourth Pythian. So too Callistratus is never cited on the *Olympians*, and Chrysippus, after appearing once in the *Olympians* and once in the *Nemeans*, is cited eighteen times on the first four *Isthmians*. Whether this indicates any special attention to these parts of Pindar is extremely doubtful, for Didymus is not cited on the *Pythians* before sch. IV, 44b, nor on the *Isthmians* after sch. II, 19a, while the name of Aristarchus does not appear on the *Pythians* after sch. VII, 18a. These phenomena seem curious, and it is at first tempting to build hypotheses on them, but it is probably safest to assume that, if not entirely fortuitous, they are at any rate the result of processes beyond our knowledge.

The identity of Chrysippus is a matter of some dubiety and deserves rather fuller discussion. The note under this name at sch. I. II, 17 comes unmistakably from Chrysippus of Soli: *καθάπερ φησὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ παροιμιῶν*.¹ Boeckh (preface, II, xii) assumed that *all* the citations of Chrysippus in the Pindar scholia allude to the Stoic, and referred for support in this unwarranted assumption to this note at sch. I. II, 17 and to sch. O. II, 104b (on reincarnation) which, though directed to Pindar, might perhaps derive from the philosopher, as might sch. I. I, 56, which deals, like sch. I. II, 17, with proverbs. But the character of the other notes bearing the name of Chrysippus is sufficient in itself to invalidate any such identification. They one and all come clearly from a fairly close commentary on Pindar: thus in sch. I. I, 96c he proposes a reading (a strange one: *ἀλαοῖσιν* for *ἄλλοισι*); at sch. I. IV, 47c he explains the meaning of a *σημεῖον*; sch. I. IV, 104b is on the topography of Thebes, and sch. I. I, 81d on the games in Euboea. Of external evidence as to the identity of the grammarian whom these notes reveal, there is apparently little or none. He, or at least a Chrysippus, is thought to be cited in the margin of the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of the Paeans of Pindar,² and this Chrysippus is identified by Grenfell and Hunt with "the critic who is frequently referred to in the extant scholia." In their introduction (p. 15) they further describe him as "the pupil of Zenodotus and instructor of

¹ Cf. H. von Arnim, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1903), III, 202.

² Ox. Pap., v (1908), 841, frag. 84, 14. There is a possibility that this is a speaker's name, but that is less likely.

Aristarchus." Gudeman, however, in his article in Pauly-Wissowa (s.v. "Scholien" 651) makes him "ein Schüler des Aristarch"; and it will be obvious that if the sketch given above of the tradition is correct the latter description must be the true one. There seems no likelihood that such notes as sch. *I.* 1, 81*d* and *IV.* 104*b*, or indeed any thorough commentary, were written before the time of Aristarchus. Fortunately corroborative evidence may be drawn from the scholia themselves. Sch. *N.* 1, 49 is a long note on the purpose of the myth of Herakles in that poem, and gives, in chronological order (or what seems so), the views of Aristarchus, Chaeris, Chrysippus, and Didymus. The mere order of the citations may of course mean nothing, though it frequently does; but in this instance the form of the note is such as hardly to admit of Chrysippus being earlier than Aristarchus; and it seems equally clear that he comes before Didymus and is cited by him (. . . ὅπερ αἰτιώτατον τῆς παρεκβάσεως φησιν ὁ Χρύσιππος εἶναι· βέλτιον δὲ φησιν ὁ Δίδυμος ἐκείνο λέγειν. . .). A similar collocation of their names at sch. *I.* 1, 67 lends itself to a like interpretation. Chrysippus may thus be taken with some certainty as falling within the period under discussion.¹

This seems an appropriate place for dealing with some other names of fairly frequent occurrence, which in all probability refer to more than one person. The Asclepiades of sch. *P.* 11, 40*b*; *IV.* 313*a*; *N.* VII, 62*b* is cited in each case from his *Τραγωδοῦμενα*, and is obviously Asclepiades of Tragilus, the pupil of Isocrates;² the remaining twelve instances of this name (with the possible exception of sch. *O.* VII, 24*d*, *P.* III, 14, which are genealogical and might come from the *Τραγωδοῦμενα*)³ may safely be taken as coming from some one commentary, dealing not only with verbal scholarship (at sch. *O.* VIII, 10*e* a reading is proposed) but with other points of interest. The identity of this Asclepiades has been considered doubtful,⁴ but he is probably Ascle-

¹ The view above adopted is that of A. Körte, *Rheinisches Museum*, 55 (1900), p. 131. Körte would conjecturally identify this Chrysippus with the unsatisfactory freedman of Cicero, *Ad Q. Fr.* III, 4, 5; 5, 6; *Ad Att.* VII, 2, 8. This is of course a mere guess, though the dates agree well enough.

² Susemihl, II, 20100, 684; Müller, *F. H. G.*, III, 301 ff.

³ So Boeckh, *op. cit.*, II, pref., xv.

⁴ Susemihl, *loc. cit.*; Wentzel in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. "Asklepiades."

piades of Myrlea, a follower of Crates, who lived in the first century B.C. and wrote commentaries on Homer, Theocritus,¹ Apollonius Rhodius, and possibly Aristophanes.² Sch. *N.* II, 19 tends to show that our Asclepiades came between Aristarchus and Didymus in time, thus giving further support to this identification.

The name Aristodemus occurs a dozen times in the scholia. Boeckh and Susemihl³ agreed in considering that the reference in all these instances was to Aristodemus ὁ Ἀριστάρχου μαθητής (sch. *N.* VII., 1*a*), and to him only; but Schwartz⁴ has given good reason for thinking that the historian of Elis quoted at sch. *O.* III, 21*b* must be a different person. The remaining citations undoubtedly refer to the pupil of Aristarchus, whose work on Pindar is explicitly attested by Athenaeus (XI, 495*f.*, Ἀριστόδημος δὲ ἐν τρίτῳ περὶ Πινδάρου). He is cited in sch. *I.* I, 11*c* as ὁ Ἀλεξανδρεὺς, but seems to have left Alexandria, probably during the persecution of the grammarians by Ptolemy Euergetes II, and migrated to Thebes (cf. sch. Theocritus VII, 103, which refers to his commentary on Pindar's Hyporchemes). There he wrote on Theban history (from which work sch. *I.* I, 79*c* probably comes⁵) and obtained Theban citizenship. His commentary was apparently marked by a tendency to controvert Aristarchus, cf. sch. *O.* VI, 23*a*; *N.* VII, 70; *I.* I, 11*c*; at sch. *N.* VII, 150*a* he opposes Callistratus, while at sch. *N.* VII, 56*a* Didymus agrees with him against Aristarchus. His comments deal with questions of history and mythology, as well as more purely verbal and textual matters; at sch. *O.* X, 55*a* Aristodemus correctly restores ἄλτιν for ἄλιν.⁶

¹ C. Wendel, *Überlieferung und Entstehung der Theokrit-Scholien* [Abhandlungen der Königl. Gesells. d. Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, N. F., Band XVII, 2 (1920)] accepts this identification, and points out (p. 74) that, on Theocritus, the Myrleanus indulges in conjecture (cf. sch. Pindar *O.* VIII, 10*e*).

² Cf. J. W. White, *Scholia to the Aves of Aristophanes* (Boston, 1914), p. xxi; W. G. Rutherford, *A Chapter in the History of Annotation* (London, 1905), p. 671*o*, 43312; B. A. Müller, *De Asclepiade Myrleano* (Leipzig, 1903), p. 46.

³ Boeckh, II, pref., xiv; Susemihl, II, 1587*a*.

⁴ In Pauly-Wissowa, II, 926*f.*

⁵ Cf. Schwartz in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. "Aristodemus"; Müller, *F. H. G.*, III, 308-310.

⁶ At sch. *O.* VII, 154*a*, Wilamowitz (*Pindaros*, p. 365), thinks Ἀριστόδημος a certain restoration for the Ἀριστόνικος of the manuscript.

In this last passage his name is coupled with two others—οἱ περὶ Ἀριστόδημον καὶ Λεπτίνην καὶ Διονύσιον γράφουσιν Ἄλτιν. Of the former (a correction for *Λεπίνης), nothing seems to be known; he is mentioned also in the scholia to Homer:¹ the latter, one of several Dionysii cited in the Pindar scholia, is probably, in view of the textual character of the note, to be equated with ὁ Σιδώνιος of sch. *P.* I, 172. Dionysius ὁ Σιδώνιος, a scholar of Aristarchus's school, is frequently cited in the Homer scholia by Didymus and Aristonicus; it would seem that his activities also extended to Pindar.² Presumably it is the same Dionysius who is cited alongside Aristodemus at sch. *I.* I, 79c; possibly, however, that note comes from an historian. Dionysius ὁ Φασηλίτης is cited by name in *P.* II, inscr., and *N.* XI, inscr. *a*—both notes dealing with the "kind" of the ode. He wrote, obviously before Didymus (cf. *N.* XI, inscr. *a*), a book περὶ ποιητῶν; perhaps these notes point to a further work on Pindar.³ At sch. *I.* IV, 104g Διονύσιος ἐν πρώτῳ Κύκλων refers to Dionysius the Cyclograph⁴ who wrote in the third and second centuries B.C.; possibly sch. *P.* I, 109a (the Philoctetes myth) should belong to him also, but Boeckh would attribute it to Dionysius Sidonius. Finally, sch. *N.* VII, 35a cites a reading from an obscure grammarian Dionysius ὁ τοῦ Χαρμίδου, and sch. *N.* II, 1d an equally unknown historian, Dionysius ὁ Ἀργεῖος.

Agestratus (sch. *P.* x, 85a) is unknown; Aristocles (sch. *O.* VII, 66a) was a contemporary of Strabo (xiv, 655), and one of the grammarian-rhetoricians of Rhodes, slightly before the time of Didymus.⁵ Diodorus ὁ Ἀριστοφάνειος (sch. *I.* II, 54a) received his by-name not from actual schooling by Aristophanes (he lived in the first half of the first century B.C., cf. Didymus in sch. Homer *Il.* II, 865), but from the fact that he came from Tarsus (cf. Artemidorus ὁ Ἀριστοφάνειος), "wo vielleicht eine grammatische Schule bestand die sich nach Aristophanes von Byzanz benannte."⁶ Ptolemaeus ὁ Ἐπιθέτης (sch. *O.* v, 44c), so

¹ Cf. Boeckh, II, pref., xiii.

² Boeckh, *loc. cit.*, xvi; Susemihl, II, 176.

³ Boeckh, *loc. cit.*, would allot to ὁ Φασηλίτης both sch. *O.* x, 55a and (presumably) *I.* I, 79c.

⁴ Cf. Susemihl, II, 57; Müller, *F. H. G.*, II, 9-11. Athenaeus, XI, 481e, Διονύσιος ὁ Σάμιος.

⁵ Wentzel in Pauly-Wissowa, II, 935.

⁶ Cohn in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. "Diodorus Ἀριστοφάνειος."

called from his attacks on Aristarchus,¹ is also frequently quoted by Didymus in the scholia to Homer.

Lastly, there may be added here, for the sake of rounding off the period, the name of Aristonicus, who was a contemporary, but almost certainly a younger contemporary, of Didymus.² It is thus not certain that those citations of Aristonicus which appear in the Pindar scholia are really anterior to Didymus's edition; certainly Didymus *περὶ τῆς Ἀριστάρχου διορθώσεως* never quotes the parallel work of Aristonicus. So far, however, as regards the actual merit of the notes (four or five in number) current under Aristonicus's name, their history is of little moment; it has interest only in relation to the transmission of the scholia in the next century.³ He is cited at sch. *O.* I, 35*a*; III, 31*a* (a good note on ἄλσος); *O.* VII, 154*a* (where, however, Wilamowitz would restore Ἀριστόδημος), *N.* I, inscr. *a*, and 37.

The period which has just been passed under review, though complicated and uncertain in detail, presents, on a general survey, an impressive appearance of activity. Many of the names mentioned above are names and no more, but we can be fairly certain that commentaries (on greater or smaller portions of the text) were written by Crates, Artemon, Callistratus, Aristodemus, Chrysippus, Asclepiades, Ammonius, Chaeris, and Aristonicus. Whatever faults these grammarians possessed, singly or in common, there can be no doubt that an immense mass of information bearing on the text and interpretation of Pindar was now gathered in the Library. Relatively considered, the historical side of Pindaric exegesis had no doubt gained most; but it had had most leeway to make up.⁴

We may safely suppose that most of the materials were now gathered for a really complete and well balanced commentary. For Pindar, as for the classical Greek poets generally, the age of the first "Heroes"

¹ Suidas, *s.v.*: Πτολεμαῖος γραμματικός ὁ Ἐπιθέτης κληθεῖς, διότι ἐπέθετο τῷ Ἀριστάρχῳ.

² Strabo, I, 38, Ἀριστόνικος ὁ καθ' ἡμᾶς γραμματικός; cf. Susemihl, II, 214 and White, *Scholia to the Aves*, p. xlii.

³ See *infra*, p. 29.

⁴ It is interesting to note that some of the historians who are cited in the scholia had long ere this found for themselves that Pindar was distinctly worth study as an historical authority. The prime example is Timaeus, cf. sch. *O.* II, 15*a*; *P.* II, inscr., sch. *N.* I, 1; for Timaeus's studies in literature, cf. Susemihl, I, 571.

of scholarship was past; the needs of the time demanded compilation even more than original research, and the first variorum editor appears.

IV. DIDYMUS

With the edition of Didymus the Alexandrian study of Pindar reaches its highest point: never before had such a wealth of material been gathered together in a single commentary, and future work on Pindar was to consist mainly of a reshuffling of this material, during which the processes of abbreviation and selection, which were characteristic of the time, led to heavy and continuous losses. The supreme importance of Didymus as the chief, if not the sole, intermediary between his predecessors and his successors has long been recognised;¹ and there can be no dispute that, roughly speaking, we know of his predecessors only what later compilers chose to extract from his great commentary, and of this in turn only so much as has survived, after the wear and tear of centuries, in the margins of our medieval manuscripts. But while we must thus admit that we get only occasional glimpses of the treasures contained in this great storehouse of learning, there is fortunately a comparative abundance of evidence, which throws light on Didymus's sources and, hardly less important, his methods.

In the extant scholia Didymus is cited some sixty-six times: the only collection of these notices is that by Moritz Schmidt, which is unfortunately neither critically satisfactory² nor complete.³ I subjoin seven fragments which do not appear in Schmidt: sch. *O.* VIII, 41a; XIII, 17c; *P.* v, 34; *N.* I, 49c; IV, 32; VII, 1a; *I.* I, inscr. a. These are all good notes, and they should not be left out of account in estimating Didymus as an editor of Pindar. In particular sch. *N.* VII, 1a shows him at his very best.

¹ Cf. Boeckh, II, pref., ix-xviii: Wilamowitz, *Herakles*, I¹, 184 (cf. 157-168), *Pindaros*, p. 3: Horn, *op. cit.*, p. 3: Susemihl, II, 201.

² Cf. Cohn, s.v. "Didymos" in Pauly-Wissowa, v, 446, "Ein reiches Material ist darin angehäuft, allerdings auch viel überflüssiger Ballast zusammengetragen, eine gründliche Durcharbeitung aber und kritische Darstellung war gar nicht versucht."

³ *Didymi Chalcenteri Fragmenta* (Leipzig, 1854): the fragments from the Pindar scholia are on pp. 214-240. Schmidt would seem to have relied too much on the (incomplete) index in Boeckh's vol. II, part 2 (1821).

That Didymus produced an edition of the text as well as a commentary seems abundantly indicated by such textual notes as sch. *O.* II, 82*a*; *x.* 17*c*, 55*c*; *N.* IV, 95*b*; VI, 53*a*; VII, 47; *x.* 114*a* — in all of which Didymus seems wrong; and sch. *O.* II, 140*a*; *x.* 83*a* (a corrupt note), *P.* IV, 446; *N.* III, 16*b*; IV, 151*a*, where he seems, on the whole, in the right. It would appear, then, that if we are to take the surviving notes as a fair representation of the whole, Didymus's performance in the field of textual criticism was by no means specially distinguished; and it is rendered still less creditable by the fact that at sch. *O.* II, 82*a*; *N.* VII, 47; *x.* 114*a* he is controverting Aristarchus, while in sch. *O.* *x.* 55*c* he refuses to accept Aristodemus's excellent alteration of Ἰἄλιν to Ἰἄλτιν. It is interesting to note that on more than one occasion it seems to have been his historical and geographical studies which led him astray, e.g. sch. *O.* *x.* 17*c* where he hesitates over νέμει γὰρ ἃ τραχεῖα πόλις (for the correct νέμει γὰρ Ἀτρέκεια πόλιν); sch. 17*i* probably gives his reason: τραχεῖα δὲ εἰκότως ἂν λέγοιτο, λοφώδης οὖσα καὶ ἐπιθαλασσίδιος (of Epizephyrian Locris); cf. also sch. *N.* VI, 53*a*, where he makes an apparently wanton change from Βασσιδαισι to Βονδιδαισι, a name to which he had found a reference in Pythaenetus.

Didymus's commentary on Pindar is directly referred to in the inscription to *O.* V, ἐν τοῖς Διδύμων ὑπομνήμασιν, as well as in Ammonius, *De Diff. Verbb.* 70 (Valckenaer), Δίδυμος ἐν ὑπομνήματι τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Παιάνων Πινδάρου (cf. M. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 238); further references to the commentary on the Paeans seem implied in the four notes (sch. *O.* I, 26*g*; II, 70*d*; *P.* VI, 5*c*; XII, 44*a*) containing variations of the formula περὶ ἧς ἐν Παιᾶσιν εἴρηται.¹

As is to be expected, in view of the character of the tradition up till this time, a very large proportion of the notes given under Didymus's name deal with history, geography, and mythology. This explains, and is in turn explained by, the fact that Didymus seems to have taken the commentary of Aristarchus as the groundwork of his own, and to

¹ Cf. Boeckh, *op. cit.*, pref., xvii. The controversy as to whether these references are to Pindar's text or to a commentary thereon, seems to me slightly unreal (cf. Boeckh, *loc. cit.*, Schmidt, p. 238, and against them, Horn, *op. cit.*, p. 92); surely it is natural to suppose that *both* are referred to? Schröder makes sch. *O.* I, 26*g*; II, 70*d*; *P.* VI, 5*c* his fragg. 67, 68 and 69 respectively: for εἴρηται in the scholia referring to Pindar's text cf. sch. *O.* I, 41.

have drawn upon other commentators (or his own resources) where, as often, he considered it necessary to supplement or correct his great predecessor. In fourteen instances¹ the names of the two occur in close juxtaposition, and there can be no doubt that in many other instances where Didymus uses vague terms in referring to his predecessors, e.g. *ἐνίοι*, *passim*; *οἱ ὑπομνηματιστάμενοι*, sch. O. VI, 55*a*, *b*; N. III, 1*c*, the reference implies or includes Aristarchus. Now Aristarchus's commentary, as we have seen, was comparatively well supplied as regards linguistic interpretation; with such a scholar it could hardly have been otherwise. In this department, then, Didymus probably found little to correct or add. Hence there is good reason for assuming that the large preponderance of notes under his name, on other matters, is a fair representation of his own contribution to the explanation of Pindar. Sch. O. I, 35*c*; II, 29*d*; XIII, 17*c*, 29*b*; N. I, inscr. *a*; VI, 53*a*; VIII, inscr.; IX, 95*a*, all deal with history; sch. O. III, 1*a* (and 1*c*); VIII, inscr. *a*; P. V, 34; N. I, 7*b*, 49*c*; II, 19; VII, 1*a*, 56*a*; XI, inscr. *a*; I. I, inscr. *a* and 52*b*, refer to the circumstances of the ode's performance, or to the victor's history; sch. O. VII, 154; P. VIII, 113*a*; IX, 177-178; N. IV, 32, deal with the Games of Greece; sch. O. V, 20*e*; VI, 55*a* and *b*; VII, 34*a*, 160*c*; P. VI, 35*c*; N. III, 1*c*; X, 49*b*, are notes on geography or topography; and sch. O. III, 54*c*; VIII, 41*a*; IX, 44*a*; XIII, 27*a* and *d*; P. IV, 445*d*; V, 78*a* (80*a*); IX, 207*b*, involve questions of mythology and (as in sch. O. VIII, 41*a*; IX, 44*a*) Pindar's innovations therein.

In sch. P. X, 51*b* Didymus ventures on a rather petty piece of literary criticism: the occasion is Pindar's description (l. 36) of Apollo among the Hyperboreans — *γελᾷ θ' ὀρῶν ὕβριν ὀρθίαν κνωδάλων* — and Didymus remarks *ταῦτα μετὰ τοῦ γελοίου καὶ ἄσεμνά ἐσι· τίνα γὰρ λόγον ἂν ἔχοι ἡδεσθαι τὸν Ἀπόλλωνα τοῖς ὀρθιάζουσιν ὄνοις*; This scrap is notable only because of the anonymous parallels to it which are of fairly frequent occurrence, and which may, in part at least, derive from Didymus.²

On the other hand, only the textual notes cited above, and a few others which I give here, deal with purely verbal matters: sch. O. II,

¹ Sch. O. II, 29*d*, 82*a*, 140*a*; III, 1*a* (cf. 1*c*); V, 20*e* (cf. 27*c*); N. I, 38; II, 19; III, 16*b*; IV, 5, 151*a*; VII, 47, 56*a*; X, 114*a*.

² E.g. sch. O. XIII, 97*a*; P. IV, 371; N. I, 74*a*; I. VIII, 95*b*.

140a; VI, 115a (ἔθος δὲ τῷ Πινδάρῳ κατὰ τοῦ ἐνὸς τάσσειν τὸ πληθυντικόν); IX, 34c (μαλεραῖς = μαλακαῖς); N. I, 36 (where Didymus improves on Aristarchus); v, 10a; VI, 30; VII, 89b; I. I, 67. To these should be added sch. N. III, 72b; IV, 14a, 153; I. I, 60, where Didymus interprets by means of a paraphrastic rendering, or where his note virtually amounts to a paraphrase of Pindar's words. This was of course a perfectly natural and indeed inevitable method of explanation, but it is worth nothing here, as in the case of Aristarchus (p. 10), in view of certain assertions which have been made as regards the provenance of the paraphrastic notes which are such a prominent feature in our scholia.¹

Of course these sixty-six citations of Didymus's name are important merely as definite attributions of notes to him; it is certain that they represent only the merest fraction of the learned matter which comes down to us through him. Only where the credit for a note is given definitely to someone else, can we say with complete and absolute certainty that we do not owe it to Didymus. As has been pointed out already, his great variorum commentary is universally recognised as the only source from which comes the incomparably greater part of our scholia. All the grammarians must to some extent have taken account of the work of their predecessors, but it was not the usual fashion of the age to make definite acknowledgment of such indebtedness, and it is only in Didymus's case that we know of a resolution to give some account, however partial, of the sources from which he drew. In particular almost all the vast mass of quotations from, and references to, historians comes certainly through Didymus; how much of industry and learning on his part, how much of value to us this represents, may be seen by a glance at Drachmann's Indices.

This activity of Didymus as a compiler is, however, well known and universally recognised; but he has not, I think, been given enough credit for his own contributions. Many of these references to historians, geographers, and the like, were doubtless taken from the numerous commentators, especially perhaps those of the Pergamene school,² who came after Aristarchus; but some of them, and these not

¹ On "paraphrase," v, *infra*, p. 65.

² Their results would be fully available to Didymus, especially after the accession to the Alexandrian Library of the 200,000 books from Pergamum, as Antony's gift to Cleopatra (Plutarch, *Ant.* 58; 41 B.C.).

the least valuable, seem due to Didymus himself. Absolute certainty in this matter is of course not attainable; I select as the best authenticated, as well as perhaps the most valuable case, the historian Timaeus. He is cited fifteen times, and in every instance the form of the note makes it probable that Didymus is the citer: this is explicitly stated in four instances, of which the best are sch. O. II, 29d, ὁ δὲ Δίδυμος τὸ ἀκριβέστερον τῆς ἱστορίας ἐκτίθεται, μάρτυρα Τίμαιον . . . προφερόμενος, and sch. O. VI, 158c, ὁ δὲ Δίδυμος . . . καὶ παρατίθεται τὰ Φιλίστου καὶ τὰ Τιμαίου.¹ (Such phrases as προφερόμενος . . ., παρατιθέμενος . . ., παρατίθεται . . ., πιστοῦνται δὲ ταῦτα (sch. P. v, 34) constantly recur in connection with his name and his only). The same would seem to be true of Philistus (cf. *supra*) and Istros (e.g. sch. O. VI, 55a, Δίδυμός φησιν ὅτι πάντες οἱ ὑπομνηματισάμενοι . . . αὐτὸς δὲ φησιν . . . καὶ παρατίθεται Ἰστρον ἱστοροῦντα . . .); and there is a fair presumption that this holds good of others also, e.g. Polemon (cf. sch. O. VII, 153d with sch. N. IV, 32), Pythaeetus (sch. N. VI, 53a) and Theotimus (sch. P. v, 34).

It would appear, then, that the common view of Didymus as merely a compiler must, so far as Pindar is concerned, be somewhat modified. These citations from historians reveal fresh contributions of his to the commentary, and contributions of no little value; and that such evidence should appear within the limited number of definite citations of Didymus's name gives reasonable ground for believing that he introduced a fair amount of new matter. Again, many of the notes which are the best evidence for his industry as a compiler reveal him as having a mind of his own, and ready to discard a long list of authorities, in favour of a new explanation: e.g. sch. N. I, 49c, where Aristarchus, Chaeris, and Chrysippus are rejected and Didymus advances a view — and a good one — of his own; so too sch. O. VI, 55a and b (where he disagrees with πάντες οἱ ὑπομνηματισάμενοι); N. III, 1c; IV, 32.

Equally good evidence of his independence is given by the blunders into which he fell in controverting his predecessors, e.g. changes of reading, such as that at sch. N. VI, 53a (arising from a misuse of historical evidence) and the others noted above (p. 20). A capital

¹ Cf. Wilamowitz, *Pindaros*, p. 241 (on sch. O. II, 29); "Es scheint das erst Didymos den Timaios herangezogen hat, was sehr dankenswert war."

example of an absurdity put forward by Didymus with a wealth of ill-applied and irrelevant learning is sch. *O.* XIII, 27*a* and *d*. The remnants of Didymus's note here (on ἰππέλοις ἐν ἔντεσιν μέτρα) are sch. 27*a* *fin.*, and *d* (where his name appears), and probably 27*b* *init.*, *c* *init.*, as well. He finds occasion to quote Callimachus, Theophrastus, Homer, and Euripides; he takes ἐν = εἰς, governing μέτρα (cf. 27*d* τίς γὰρ τοῖς εἰς τὰ μέτρα ἰππέλοις ἔντεσιν ἐχρήσατο;), and makes the phrase refer to the introduction of measures by Pheidon, explaining that the ἔντεσιν are called ἰππέλοις,

(1) because Argos was Ἰππειον and Pheidon was an Argive (27*d*),

(2) because τροχός was both the potter's wheel and the chariot wheel; hence vessels for measures, being made on the wheel, were connected with horses (27*b*),

(3) because the potter's wheel was also connected with horses, because it was driven by a foot on either side (ἐκατέρωθεν ἐλάννεται, 27*a*) — all this in face of the plain fact that the context unmistakably points to the bridle, as the meaning of μέτρα; this latter explanation seems to have been, very properly, the final conclusion of the scholiasts; cf. 27*a* *init.*, 27*c* *fin.*, ὅτι δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὁ χαλινὸς εὖρηται δείκνυσσι τὰ ἐξῆς. Such perverted ingenuity as this, together with the instance of Βουδίδαι for Βασσίδαι in sch. *N.* VI, 53*a*, gives the necessary caution against attributing to Didymus's historical notes any supreme and final authority; but in estimating his character as a scholar they ought not to be allowed more than a subordinate importance. Such a note as that at sch. *N.* VII, 1*a* was certainly not written by a mere blockhead and pedant. No impartial critic can, at least so far as Pindar is concerned, agree with the extreme judgments of A. Römer,¹ who declares Didymus a "dummen und urtheilslosen Vielschreiber, welcher über Dinge redete, von denen er Nichts verstand," or Rutherford,² with his reference to "brutal spoliation in every province of ancient learning." Much more true are the remarks of J. W. White (*Scholia on the Aves*, p. xxvi): "Didymus, though professionally a collector of the results of abler men's labours, was at the same time a learned man of acute and discriminating mind."

The further task of indicating which classes of notes may with rea-

¹ Quoted by Susemihl, II, 208.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 432.

sonable certainty be ascribed to Didymus requires much more space than can be allowed in an historical survey, and is the less necessary because, as has been indicated above, there is good reason to believe that the extant citations of his name are a very fair sample of his contributions and of the character of his commentary. Further, the nature of the tradition (see pp. 22 and 33) gives him a first claim on practically every note which is not definitely assignable elsewhere; and the task of separating his original contributions from his borrowings is in most cases quite impossible. Two classes of note may, however, be indicated where the probability that Didymus is concerned is very high. In the first place, it follows necessarily from the close connection between Aristarchus and Didymus (see p. 21) that in most cases where Aristarchus is quoted and combated anonymously, Didymus is his opponent.¹ Secondly, wherever the note is unusually learned (especially in the case of the more important passages introduced by *σητεῖται*), and where a long list of authorities is quoted, we may be certain that Didymus is the source whence the note, in fuller or more abbreviated form, is drawn. Further indications of Didymus's presence depend on the character of the subsequent transmission, and will appear later.

For the present I would conclude this rapid survey of Didymus's work by a reference to the closest approach which we possess to the original form of a commentary by him. This is the Demosthenes Commentary, published from a papyrus in 1904² and certified by its *subscriptio* as being from the pen of Didymus. The editors date this papyrus fairly early in the second century A.D., a comparatively near approach to the autograph of Didymus. Unfortunately it is certain that what has been preserved does not pretend to be a complete copy of the grammarian's work (cf. introduction to the papyrus, p. xv ff.). This misfortune is, for our purposes, to a large extent compensated for by the fact that the compiler did not epitomize like a compiler of scholia, but selected certain notes and gave them practically, if not entirely, in full. Hence they are, so far as they go, an accurate representation of Didymus's method and style. "Wir können hier zum

¹ E.g. sch. P. III, 75; IV, 36c; N. I, 3: cf. Gudeman in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v., "Scholien," 650; Horn, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

² *Berliner Klassikertexte* I (ed. H. Diels and W. Schubart, Berlin, 1904).

ersten Male den Chalkenteros auch als Schriftsteller würdigen" (Diels and Schubart, *op. cit.*, p. xxix). The editors express surprise at the predominance of historical notes (introduction, p. xiii) and say that they should have expected to find more "grammatisch-kritisches als realhistorisches Interesse," but the appearance of the same feature in Didymus's commentaries on Pindar and on Aristophanes¹ probably shows that this was the usual trend of his exegesis; possibly, then, the Demosthenes Commentary is less incomplete than the editors think it.²

In any event, if we allow for the compression and distortion of our scholia, and for the more leisurely phrasing of a continuous commentary, the parallelism between this work and certain parts of the scholia to Pindar is sufficiently striking. We get the same wealth of citation from historians — Anaximenes, Androtion, Apollodorus, Demon, Philochorus; and quotations from Callimachus, Aeschylus, Stesichorus, Sophocles, and Aristotle; a paraphrase occurs (col. 9, 19 ff.), introduced by *καὶ ἔστιν ὅσα δοκεῖν ὁ βούλεται λέγειν τοιοῦτον*, and occasionally a grammatical note (col. 7, 1, *ὑπερβάτω κέχρηται τῇ φράσει*). Still more interesting is the occurrence of a comment in the form of question and answer (e.g. col. 13, 40, *χρόνον δὲ τοῦ λόγου συνίστοι τις ἂν τὸν μετ' Ἀπολλόδωρον ἄρχοντα Καλλίμαχον. τί δήποθ' ; ὅτι μνημονεύει, κτλ.*) — an artifice which is of fairly frequent occurrence in our Pindar scholia, cf. sch. O. II, 16c; III, 1b; IV, 18c (*ἥκει γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀχέων τοῦ Ψαυμίδος. τίς; ὁ ὕμνος*), and which Diels and Schubart (*op. cit.*, p. xiv) think may perhaps be identified as a characteristic of Didymus.

A comparison, then, of this Commentary, and the scholia to Pindar, tends to show that the influence of Didymus on the present form of our scholia is even stronger than might have been expected. It is interesting also to observe that signs of inconsistency and carelessness in the use of historical evidence are not entirely wanting in this Demosthenes Commentary (cf. *op. cit.*, introduction, p. xv), and that occasionally the author seems rather too prone to accumulate authorities

¹ White, *op. cit.*, p. xxviii, "His interest in linguistic interpretation is secondary."

² Gudeman, however (*loc. cit.*, 698), strangely wishes to see in this work a *σύγγραμμα* (as opposed to a *ὑπόμνημα*): cf. Paul Foucart, *Étude sur Didymos d'après un papyrus de Berlin* (Paris, 1906), p. 15.

and display his learning. Altogether it seems possible that the epitomators and copyists through whom Didymus's remarks on Pindar come down to us did their work somewhat better than the exasperated reader of the scholia is usually inclined to believe.

V. THE SECOND CENTURY EPITOME

1. *Its Nature and Date*

After Didymus we cease to have any clear and definite information about those responsible for the process by which the Pindar Commentary is transmitted to us. Citations of names appear very seldom, and still less seldom have we satisfactory evidence as to the authors concerned. The great work of Didymus overshadows everything, and our main concern is to find out what we can about the process by which it is abbreviated and epitomized throughout centuries in which the standard of learning steadily declines. Fortunately, however, there has been no dispute as to the next important stage in the transmission, since Wilamowitz first definitely described it in 1889.¹ As this description has remained unchallenged in all essentials, it seems most convenient to state it here before proceeding to enquire more closely into details.

Up to this time the text issued by Aristophanes had continued to be the standard arrangement of Pindar's works. Successive editors, including Aristarchus and Didymus, introduced fresh readings into the text, but quite clearly made no attempt to change its arrangement or its bulk. Throughout all this period the whole of Aristophanes' seventeen books had probably been commented on² and thus continued more or less in use. But now, as interest in, and care for, the ancient writers declined, Pindar, like most other authors, suffered heavy loss. In his case the portion chosen for preservation was the last four books of the complete edition — the books of ἐπινίκια; for these a new commentary, suited to the needs of the time, was put together,

¹ *Herakles* 1¹, 184; "im zweiten Jahrhundert hat jemand die vier letzten Bücher der aristophanischen Ausgabe für die Schule bearbeitet"; cf. his *Pindaros* (1922), p. 3; Gudeman in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v., "Scholien" 650-651.

² See, for Aristarchus, p. 10, n. 4; and for Didymus, p. 20.

based on the great commentary of Didymus, which then, together with the other commentaries (if any) on which the new editor drew, speedily perished. A like fate in due course awaited the abandoned portion of Pindar's text, for it was, unhappily, the rule in this age that each successive edition or compilation superseded its predecessors, which accordingly fell out of sight and use, and were heard of no more.¹

The purpose of this new compilation on Pindar is quite clear from its contents, or rather from so much of them as is now extant. It was intended for practical use in the schools, as an aid to the interpretation of Pindar, and was thus probably of a much more strictly exegetical and utilitarian character than the large variorum commentary whose place it took. So far then as his main authority was concerned, the editor's task was probably almost entirely selection, abbreviation and compression. Many citations and quotations, together with much learned matter not strictly necessary for the understanding of the text, were doubtless jettisoned, but, fortunately for us, this process was not ruthlessly carried out. The losses must, however, have been great, for doubtless manageable size was a first essential for this Companion to Pindar; and a certain amount of room had to be made for new material, especially for what was probably a completely continuous paraphrase,² linking up the paraphrastic notes, which were already present, into what must have been practically a running translation of the whole of the four books into the κοινή.

The epitomator's name is unknown, but his date may, from internal evidence, lie somewhere in the second half of the second century A.D.³ This is suggested by the few citations later than Didymus⁴ in our scholia — Aristonicus (possibly) and Theon (sch. O. v, 42a), who lived

¹ Wilamowitz, *Herakles* 1¹, p. 179.

² *Ibid.*, p. 184: "der Herausgeber war nicht im Stande etwas gelehrtes zu leisten . . . er hat sich begnügt das gelehrte Material von Didymos zu übernehmen, mythographische Auszüge und vielleicht vereinzelt anderes hinzuzufügen, wahrscheinlich auch irgendwoher die metrische Erklärung der Kola zu nehmen, und endlich eine vollständige Paraphrase zu verfertigen."

³ *Ibid.* p. 184; Gudeman, *loc. cit.*, 650.

⁴ In default of any more certain dating for Didymus, I rest content with Suidas: γεγονώς ἐπ' Ἀντωνίου καὶ Κικέρωνος καὶ ἕως Αἰγούστου: Susemihl, II, 197²⁶⁴, gives 65 B.C.—10 A.D.

under Augustus and Tiberius; Hephaestion (*I. v*, inscr. *a*), who, if he be the teacher of L. Verus,¹ lived under M. Aurelius, to whom Herodian (sch. *O. i*, 18*a*; *P. iii*, 65) and Amyntianus (sch. *O. iii*, 52) dedicated their respective works. All these citations have been, by one authority or another, pushed aside as later insertions; but the general agreement in date of the last three makes that supposition less likely for any of them. Amyntianus at least seems to me quite certainly to belong to the original make-up of the note in which he is quoted.² Wilamowitz would also identify δ 'Αλικαρνασσεύς of *N. ix*, inscr., with Dionysius, the author of the *μουσικὴ ἱστορία*; and the nature of that note (on the Pythian Games at Sicyon) suits the ascription quite well.

2. *Its Sources*

Such, then, is the agreed date for the second century epitomator, and such the general character of his work. The citations which are definitely subsequent to Didymus are remarkably few in number; and it is a fair inference that Didymus was, in the last resort, the compiler's main stand-by, from which he regularly and usually drew. But it is hardly credible that these few notes represent fully the extent to which he availed himself of the work (whether directed specifically to Pindar or not) of others who stood nearer to him in date. It thus becomes important to arrive at some conclusion, if possible, as to what is implied by Wilamowitz when he says (*op. cit.*, p. 184), "er hat sich begnügt . . . mythographische Auszüge und vielleicht vereinzelt anderes hinzuzufügen" — especially as regards work done on Pindar since Didymus's date.

In the first place, the possibility has already been mentioned that the notes extant under the name of Aristonicus did not come through Didymus. This hypothesis depends primarily on the question of dates, and here we are unfortunately not on very sure ground. The two scholars were admittedly to some extent contemporary, and it is just possible that, though Didymus did not quote Aristonicus on

¹ Boeckh, *op. cit.*, pref., xix and xxiv is very doubtful. Wilamowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 185, flatly denies the identification, but gives no reason. The note (on the order of Pindar's poems) may quite well be a metricist's.

² So Wilamowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 185; against him, see Gudeman, *loc. cit.*, 650.

Homer, he did so on Pindar. On the other hand, a consideration of the two passages where Aristonicus appears in connection with Didymus does not lend much colour to this suggestion. Sch. O. i, 35c runs as follows: . . . εὐήθεις δέ φησι Δίδυμος τούτους· τότε γὰρ ὁ Ἰέρων ἦν Συρακούσιος καὶ οὐδὲ ἦν Αἰτναῖος, ὥς φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος. ὁ δὲ Ἀριστόνικος ἀξιοπίστως Αἰτναῖον ὄντα Συρακούσιον ὀνομάζεσθαι. Now it is surely not likely that Didymus said Aristonicus's suggestion was ἀξιοπίστος; for, if his own chronology was right, the suggestion was not only unnecessary but untrue. Again, in sch. O. vii, 154a (ἐν μὲν Θεσπιαῖς Ἐρώτια· ἐν ταῖς Πλαταιαῖς τὰ Ἐλευθέρια. ταῦτα Ἀριστόνικος. ὁ δὲ Δίδυμος Βασίλεια καὶ Ἀμφιάρεια καὶ Δήλια ἐπὶ Δηλῷ καὶ Τροφώνεια ἐν Λεβαδείᾳ) the notes are complementary, giving a list of the ἀγῶνες ἔννομοι Βοιωτῶν; and it is hardly probable that Didymus gave two names on Aristonicus's authority and then added four himself. There is also another point: Didymus is mentioned some sixty-six times in the scholia, but never, it so happens, in any of the fairly frequent notes referring to τὸ σημεῖον χ. This σημεῖον seems, however, to be ascribed to Aristarchus (sch. I. vi, 47e), and we know that Aristonicus's great work on Homer, περὶ τῶν τῆς Ἰλιάδος σημείων, was connected with precisely this point in the Aristarchean tradition. It seems, therefore, at least a possibility that the notes explaining σημεία in our Pindar scholia come through Aristonicus. In this connection it is perhaps worth noting that the papyrus of the Paeans preserves the χ a dozen times in the margins of its text, and that among the names introducing readings there is no mention of Didymus. The extent of the papyrus, and the number of its marginal notes, is of course far too small for this to be a very effective argument; but it is curious that Aristophanes, Aristarchus, Chrysippus, and Theon should be mentioned, but never Didymus. It may even be that some of the four contractions Ἀρ, Ἀρις, Ἀν, Ἀρν, which are taken to refer to Aristarchus and Aristophanes, allude to Aristonicus; and this possibility is admitted by Grenfell and Hunt in their note on Pa. ii, 61-75. So far as it goes (admittedly not far), the papyrus does seem to show that at its date (the earlier decades of the second century A.D.), the tradition of the Pindaric text was not exclusively bound up with the name of Didymus.

The second commentator, subsequent to Didymus, on whom the

Epitomator may have drawn is Theon.¹ This grammarian, the son of Artemidorus, lived under Augustus and Tiberius, and is best known as "the Didymus of the Alexandrian poets"; indeed so fixed is the belief in his devotion to the Alexandrians that it is only grudgingly allowed that he paid attention to anyone else. A Theon is cited at sch. O. v, 42a, and on this Boeckh (*op. cit.*, preface, p. xxiv) remarked, "in tanta Theonum copia quis sit, haud facile quisquam invenerit." The note in question is as follows:² Ἰδαῖον ἄντρον ἐν Ἡλιδι Δημήτριος ὁ Σκήψιος νέων διακόσμου ἱερὸν Διός. ἔνιοι δὲ νομίζοντες μὴ τῶν ἐν Ἡλιδι χωρίων αὐτὸν μεμνήσθαι ὑπέλαβον μνημονεύειν Ἰδης τῆς ἐν Κρήτῃ ἢ τῆς ἐν Τροίᾳ. οὕτως Θεὸν φησιν. The last three words might almost seem a later addition; but Demetrius is quoted again for the Ἰδαῖον ἄντρον in the scholia to Apollonius Rhodius, III, 134.³ Now Theon is admitted to be the original source for the Apollonius scholia; and this is the only occasion on which Demetrius is cited in the Pindar scholia. Surely the inference is sound that it is Theon, son of Artemidorus, who is responsible for this whole note and who here corrects and supplements his predecessors (ἔνιοι).⁴ So long as this note was the only evidence for Theon's work on Pindar, it used to be doubted whether it was legitimate to infer a commentary;⁵ but Theon now appears as responsible for a reading in the papyrus of the Paeans (Ox. Pap., v, no. 841: Pa. II, 37), and it must be assumed that he did edit Pindar. Moreover, this chain of argument leads naturally to the identification as the same man of the Theon whose edition is mentioned a dozen times in the papyrus of the *Ichneutae*,⁶ which, though a little later than the Paeans papyrus, is of the same type, equipped with the same form of brief marginal an-

¹ On Theon see Susemihl, II, 215-217; C. Giese, *De Theone Grammatico eiusque reliquiis* (Münster, 1867).

² Another note (42b), in the Vatican recension, records merely the suggestion of the Cretan Ida, quoting Callimachus.

³ Cf. R. Gaede, *Demetrii Scepsii quae supersunt* (Greifswald, 1880).

⁴ Cf. Susemihl, I, p. 682, n. 234. Demetrius is six times mentioned in the Apollonius scholia and once in the Theocritus scholia (which also go back to Theon).

⁵ Cf. Susemihl, II, p. 217, n. 347: Giese, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁶ Ox. Pap., IX (1912), no. 1174. Cf. A. C. Pearson, *The Fragments of Sophocles* (Cambridge, 1917), I, 224. Wilamowitz (v. Pearson, *loc. cit.*, n. 2) considers it useless to attempt to identify this Theon, but the conclusion reached above is supported by Wendel, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

notations. When we remember that a *ὑπόμνημα* by Theon on the *Odyssey* is already known from the *Etymologicum Magnum*, s.v. Πύελος, and that he, as well as Didymus, seems to have written a *κωμικὴ λέξις*, it would appear that the scope of this grammarian's activities has been somewhat underestimated.¹

As regards Pindar, the appearance of Theon's name in the papyrus, in such a small group of citations, would seem to show, if it be not pure chance, that he was of some importance as late as the second century A.D. If his works were thus in use at Alexandria, he was doubtless taken into account by our Epitomator; it is even possible to urge, though this may at first seem an extreme view, that the Pindar commentary of Didymus had passed through Theon's hands, and that it remained in use only in his rehandling of the original. Is there, then, any evidence that the second century editor made use, to any appreciable extent, of authorities other than Didymus, or, alternatively, that he used Didymus only at second-hand? The answer, it would seem, must be yes.

Wilamowitz (*Pindaros*, p. 3) describes the work of the Epitomator thus:

Die erhaltenen vier Bücher waren die letzten der antiken Gesamtausgabe: ein Grammatiker des zweiten Jahrhunderts n. Chr. hat sie für den Schulunterricht ausgewählt und erklärt. Dabei zog er die älteren Erklärungsschriften zu Rate, vielleicht nur so weit sie Didymos in seinen Hypomnemata zusammengetragen hatte.

Now when a grammarian of this date is making an epitome of an earlier scholar's work, without adding any important amount of new matter, or citing to any extent from other authorities, he naturally does not cite his source by name throughout the work; that would be quite superfluous. All that happens is that, as in the case of the Demosthenes Commentary (see p. 25), the source is named in the *subscriptio*. If the *subscriptio* perishes, as, in its exposed position at the end it very easily may, the name is lost and the commentary becomes anonymous. So, for instance, Theon's name has vanished com-

¹ For such underestimation, compare our ignorance of Aristarchus's work on Herodotus, till the appearance in 1901 of *Amherst Papyri II* (ed. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, London, 1901) 3 f. no. 12 — a fragment of 'Ἀριστάρχου Ἡροδότου ᾧ ὑπόμνημα.

pletely both from the Apollonius and from the Theocritus scholia, of which his work admittedly forms the basis.¹ It would seem, then, that however the Epitomator proceeded to work, two facts are certain: (1) Didymus was not his sole first-hand authority; (2) the commentary which he compiled did not pass under Didymus's name, i.e. its *subscriptio*, if it had one, was not like that of the Demosthenes Commentary.² The single and sufficient reason for both statements is that Didymus's name appears constantly throughout our scholia.

It must, further, be considered extremely unlikely that the Epitomator contributed from his own resources sufficient material to render it desirable for him to change Didymus's first persons (as seen in the Demosthenes Commentary) to third persons in so many instances. He was, in Wilamowitz's phrase, "nicht im Stande etwas gelehrtes zu leisten"; that he did introduce a certain amount is shown by the quotations of Amyntianus and Herodian, but it is highly probable that this individual contribution was severely limited in quantity, and that the Epitomator's main addition was the extension and completion of the paraphrastic portions of the commentary.

Two hypotheses now remain: (1) he may have combined with the Didymus commentary material drawn from some other (and necessarily later) commentator or commentators; or (2) he may have used a commentary based mainly on that of Didymus, but compiled by a scholar whose standing was just sufficiently independent for him to insert Didymus's name throughout rather than reproduce his comments in their original first person, i.e. the Epitomator may not have had before him at all the commentary of Didymus in its original form.

Against the first supposition (and I think this conclusive) is the overwhelming evidence of the scholia as a whole, and their entire character and tendency, that we depend in the last resort on Didymus, and on Didymus alone. This is the opinion of all who have treated of these scholia, from Boeckh to the present day (cf. the authorities cited on p. 19), and it is hardly open to doubt; there is no

¹ Wendel, *loc. cit.*

² The only possible alternative is that a scholar later than the second century A.D. combined the second century epitome with material from other sources. Any such later accession of new material is, however, very unlikely, and there is no evidence of it, i.e. there was no subsequent variorum edition.

room in the scholia for an independent commentator of such importance as to make the Epitomator turn aside from the great commentary of Didymus, had he had that before him. The problem that remains is to reconcile this almost unfailing ubiquity of Didymus and his methods with the frequent mention of his name in the body of the scholia; and I can find no better solution than that contained in the second hypothesis noted above. The existence of such a commentator, depending entirely or almost entirely on Didymus for his materials, and basing his whole work on him, yet exercising at times an independent judgment, is of course by no means impossible or even improbable. Both his date and the nature of his work make it unlikely that the Epitomator at the end of the second century was the man: it is not necessary to suppose that he is a known scholar; there may have been someone who held in the Pindar scholia some such position as Symmachus did in the scholia to Aristophanes,¹ but whose name is lost to us through lack of a *subscriptio*.

It is possible that the scholar concerned was Theon. This suggestion, which is a suggestion and no more, is not easily susceptible of proof; opposed to it are the fact that Theon is cited by name in our scholia, though this one occurrence may easily be due to chance, and the graver difficulty involved in the supposition of a second edition of Didymus's Pindar commentary so soon, comparatively, after the original. Yet if Theon wrote on the *Odyssey* and on Sophocles, and compiled a *κωμικὴ λέξις*, he evidently considered it worth while to follow in Didymus's footsteps, and there is nothing startling in the assumption that he wrote on Pindar. It should be added that this attribution to Theon of a commentary on largely, or wholly, Didy-

¹ Cf. White, *op. cit.*, introd., p. lii: "These comments (of Symmachus) are strikingly similar to those of Didymus, as we should expect. Didymus was Symmachus's greatest single source of information . . .": p. liii, "he (Symmachus) evidently achieved a large and accurate command of existing sources of information. They were practically those which Didymus had used, but Symmachus made them the subject of detailed and careful study and frequently found occasion to disagree with the conclusions of Didymus." The appearance of Symmachus's name both in the body of the scholia and in the *subscriptio* is due to the fact that the final redaction of the Aristophanes scholia, unlike the second century, or any later, edition of Pindar, was a variorum edition: cf. the *subscriptio* to the *Aves*, παραγέγραπται ἐκ τῶν Συμμάχου καὶ ἄλλων σχολίων.

mean lines is rendered easier by the fact that the scholia on Alexandrian authors, in which Theon is the primal source and Didymus had no hand, contain (the Apollonius scholia are a good instance) certain very strong reminiscences of Didymus's manner, and show, for example, the same learned use of historical and mythological authorities.¹ There is, further, no reason to suppose that Didymus's contemporaries and successors were content to abide by his judgment in all matters pertaining to Pindar; while at the same time his voluminous commentary would contain almost all the material necessary for its own correction. Theon's name seems to me the most probable for an intermediate source, but my main contention is that it is extremely improbable that the second century Epitomator worked on Didymus's commentary at first hand. The evidence advanced for this conclusion so far depends on parallels drawn from other scholia and on consideration of the general circumstances of scholarship at this time. There is, however, in the Pindar scholia themselves further evidence in support of my submission.

In the first place, a considerable proportion of the direct citations of Didymus by name betray no little independence of view-point in the citer. In judging this matter we are justified in including the evidence of the paraphrastic renderings which are still so plentiful throughout the scholia and which, it is agreed, probably covered the whole of the text in the second century edition. The peculiar *στίγματα* of this paraphrase and the various introductory formulae will be dealt with later;² but the nature of the Epitomator's edition was such that he must, where necessary, have recast it to suit the view which he adopted. Now, at sch. *O.* VI, 55*d* the paraphrase clearly adopts a different view from Didymus (sch. 55*b*); at sch. *O.* IX, 34*c* Didymus interprets *μαλεραῖς* = *μαλακαῖς*, but the paraphrase of the line in question, like all the other notes on it, renders that word by *ἐκδήλοις* (cf. *λαμπραῖς*, 34*a*, which explains the metaphor from fire); in sch. *O.* X, 55*b* (55*c*) Didymus definitely rejects the conjecture "*Ἀλτιν*", which, however, is implied in the paraphrase (sch. 57*b*); at sch. *N.* IV, 95 the paraphrase (sch. 95*a*) rejects Didymus's view that the ref-

¹ Cf. Diels and Schubart, introd. to the Demosthenes Commentary, p. xiv.

² See *infra*, pp. 65 ff.

erence to the sword is literal; in sch. *N.* iv, 151 the paraphrase (sch. 151c) follows Aristarchus's *οἶον* and has nothing whatever to say to Didymus's *οἶον*; so at sch. *N.* vi, 53b, Didymus's conjecture *Βουδίδα* is passed over by the paraphrase. Elsewhere than in the paraphrase other views seem to be preferred to those of Didymus: cf. sch. *O.* i, 35c, where Aristonicus is said to have made *ἀξιοπίστως* a conjecture inconsistent with Didymus's explanation; sch. *O.* x, 17, where Didymus's suggestion *τραχεία πόλις* is (very properly) accorded no special respect (so at sch. *O.* xiii, 17, with his statement that Aletes was thirty years later than the Dorian invasion). At sch. *O.* xiii, 27 Didymus's extraordinary blunder over *ἵππεια μέτρα* evidently carried no conviction (cf. 27a *τούτεστι τὰ ἵππεια μέτρα τοῦ χαλινοῦ — Δίδυμος δὲ φησι . . .*); cf. sch. *P.* vi, 35c; ix, 185a and 207b. In sch. *I.* ii, 19a, *γελοῖως*, after Didymus's view, seems almost certainly a criticism of him.¹ Even where Didymus's rendering is clearly accepted, the acceptance is often by an independent judge; cf. sch. *N.* vii, 47; *πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἀκουστέον, καὶ γραπτέον . . . ὡς Δίδυμος, ὃς καὶ . . .*; sch. *O.* iii, 1a, *τῇ Ἀρισταρχείῳ ἀποδόσει ὁ Δίδυμος μᾶλλον προστίθεται*; sch. *P.* v, 80b, *καὶ τοῦτο ἐαυτῷ συνάδων ὁ Δίδυμος ἀποδίδωσιν*. Occasionally an independent view seems superadded; cf. sch. *O.* iii, 1d, *ζητεῖται δὲ διὰ τί . . . καὶ φάμεν πρῶτον . . . ὁ δὲ Ἀρισταρχὸς φησι . . . ὁ δὲ Δίδυμος ἱστορικώτερον λέγει*: cf. sch. *N.* xi, 10a, *καθὼς καὶ προείπομεν*.

The use of the first person in these last two instances introduces a further point, of interest for the present discussion. As has been said above, ancient grammarians never referred to themselves by name in their commentaries. Many, if not most, of their notes were written in an impersonal form (cf. the Demosthenes Commentary); and these when borrowed or copied would most often remain impersonal and therefore nameless. But sometimes a grammarian used the first person² (e.g. Didymus, *op. cit.*, col. 13, 16 ff.); and this when borrowed or excerpted might remain in the first person, or be cast in the usual anonymous form, or have added to it the name of the author copied. The first persons found in the extant scholia have most of them survived this process at least once; some are doubtless due to the second

¹ So Boeckh and Schmidt: cf. sch. *I.* iv, 47c, 63a, where *γελοῖως* comes after remarks by Chrysippus; and *γελοῖον* after a remark of Agestratus, sch. *P.* x, 85a.

² On this point, cf. White, *op. cit.*, introd., pp. lxx-xxi.

century editor or his immediate authority; a few may go further back, e.g. the introductory phrase in *P. II* inscr. (διεστασίασται οὐ μετρίως τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν), which may well have stood in Didymus; but such instances are probably few. Sometimes, as in sch. *O. III, 1d* (noted *supra*), the first person plural introduces both Aristarchus and Didymus; but generally speaking such phrases are likely to be subsequent to their time and many are doubtless not nearly so old as the second century A.D. There are some twenty-five instances of this first person in the Pindar scholia, and it is safe to assume that most of these derive from editions subsequent to Didymus; after the second century, again, the scholia seem to have suffered mainly from selection and abbreviation, not from additions, so that some of these first persons probably originated at that time. Thus sch. *O. III, 1d* is clearly part of the make-up of that note (a ζήτησις); cf. sch. *P. IV, 119*, ζητεῖται δέ . . . καὶ φαμεν; sch. *P. IX, 16a*, ζητεῖται διὰ τί . . . οὐκ ἔχομεν γὰρ ἐξ ἱστορίας δεῖξαι; sch. *N. I, 49b*, ἐπαπορήσειεν ἄν τις, διὰ τί . . . καὶ φαμεν. Often these first persons refer back or forward to another note: sch. *O. II, 65c*, πῶς δὲ συγγενὴς ἐστίν, ἐροῦμεν ἐξῆς (a promise not now fulfilled in the manuscripts in which this phrase occurs); sch. *I. IV, 6a*, προείπον δὲ ὡς τῆς βασιλείας ἐξέπεσόν ποτε (a reference to a note not now extant); sch. *O. I, 1e*, ἀπεδείξαμεν; sch. *O. II, 82a*, ὡς προείρηκα (referring to the previous acceptance of a view said to have been recommended by Didymus); sch. *O. VI, 143b*, πῶς δέ, ἐπιόντες δείξομεν (the explanation now occurs before this point, at sch. 140d); sch. *O. XIII, 58d*, εἰ δὲ ὀνόματα λάβοιμεν . . . ἔσται τὰ τῆς διανοίας ὡς εἶπομεν; sch. *P. IV, 381b* ὡς προείπομεν; sch. *N. I, 2b*; *XI, 10a*. These instances all go to show a certain amount of independence in judgment and arrangement, and I doubt if it is permissible to ascribe them all to the Epitomator himself.

Again, a recurrent feature of the scholia is the use of a comparative (usually βέλτιον δέ, less frequently ἄμεινον δέ, μᾶλλον, and the like) to indicate a preference for one among several suggested explanations. This formula, which is, of course, natural in a variorum commentary, seems sometimes to come from Didymus, e.g. sch. *N. II, 19*, Δίδυμος δὲ φησιν ὅτι ἴσως ἄμεινον λέγειν; cf. sch. *N. IV, 5*, ἄμεινον δέ, φησὶν ὁ Δίδυμος, but at other times it quite clearly expresses the judgment of someone later than he; cf. sch. *O. V, 27b*, βέλτιον οὖν οὕτως τινές,

introducing the view found under Didymus's name in sch. 20e, *fin.* Probably this latter is the more usual case,¹ that is to say, someone else indicates his approval of a certain view; and the character of the tradition ensures that this view will usually be that of Didymus, e.g. sch. *N.* III, 16*b*; IV, 5; V, 10*a*; *I.* I, 60; cf. sch. *O.* VII, 19*d*; *N.* I, 34*b* (both disapproving of Aristarchus). At sch. *O.* IX, 134*d* this formula occurs in close connection with a paraphrase, and at sch. *N.* II, 17*c* immediately after the use of the first person in a comment.

All these points, though in themselves small, go to indicate the presence in the history of our scholia of a commentator who, though Didymus bulked by far the largest in his eyes, had sufficient independence to treat him sometimes as only one among many previous commentators: on occasion he does not hesitate to differ from his main authority, while the very fact that he indicates a preference for Didymus, and often cites him by name, is in itself a further proof of a certain individuality in his very borrowing. These are not the characteristics one would expect to find in the work of an educationist cutting down the classic commentary on his author for purely practical purposes. Either, then, we must adopt an entirely different view of the activities of our Epitomator, and credit him with a second variorum edition, or we must presume that these signs of an independent version of Didymus's work were already present in the exemplar which formed the groundwork of the second century edition. As I find it hard to believe that Didymus's commentary would not have furnished materials galore for such an epitomator, and left him no reason for going outside it, I fall back on the other alternative, which has the advantage of accounting better for the presence in our scholia of references to Aristonicus, and signs of the work of Theon.

That Theon did work on Pindar must be regarded as fairly certain (cf. p. 31); the character of the commentary which I suggest may be ascribed to him has been outlined above (p. 34). It was very possibly in the main a restatement of Didymus's results in a handier and more compact form, with such additions and alterations as might be

¹ Other instances of this *βέλτιον* which I have noted are sch. *O.* I, 16*c*, 36; II, 161*a*; V, 1*b*; VII, 98*b*, *e*, 161*a*; VIII, 10*d*; IX, 3*l*; *P.* IV, 4; XI, 12*e*; *N.* VI, 71*a*; VII, 1*a*, 35*a*; *I.* I, inscr. *a*; II, inscr. *b*; *ἄμεινον*, sch. *N.* III, 1*a*; *I.* III, 29; IV, 29*c*; *μᾶλλον*, sch. *O.* III, 21*b*, 22*a*; *I.* I, 60; *καλλίων*, sch. *P.* X, 85*c*; *I.* I, 23.

desired by one who, though a commentator of the same kind as Didymus, and a fairly close follower of his methods, was yet capable on occasion of independent judgment. That there were blunders to correct we know, that there was a good deal of unnecessary learning to be cleared out of the way is highly probable; indeed, it may be doubted, on general grounds, if such a commentary as that of Didymus would survive untouched and unabbreviated till late in the second century. This hypothesis has thus certain virtues, and I believe it to be on the whole easier than any other; but it remains merely a suggestion. For it is clear that Theon, as we know him from the scholia on the Alexandrian poets, followed much the same methods as Didymus and used much the same sources, as a glance at the indices to these collections will show; the regular stock-in-trade of a grammarian was becoming so standardized, and ready to hand in so many learned compilations, that this community of sources can hardly be surprising. Hence it is next to impossible to lay one's finger on any one statement and say definitely that it must come from Theon rather than Didymus. Yet the amount of matter common to the Pindar scholia and to the scholia which are undoubtedly due to Theon is large, as Drachmann's continual references to the Apollonius and Theocritus scholia show, and occasionally there are instances where the coincidence is rather more striking than usual, or where some curious information, some novel doctrine, is common to these three compilations (which have Theon for their only common source), and does not elsewhere recur.¹

In sch. *O.* III, 54 the presence of Theon is suspected by Wendel:² the three explanations in 54*b* are all traced to Apollodorus, who was interested in such "Beinamen" and was one of Theon's great sources; Apollodorus is named in 54*a* and at the end of that note a further remark from Didymus is added. As Wendel remarks, it certainly looks as if Apollodorus and Didymus were both cited by some third person. The statement about Κοτυρώ in sch. *O.* XIII, 56*b* reappears in sch. Theocr. VI, 40*a-c*, where it is probably due to Theon (Wendel, p. 94), he being responsible for most of the mythological matter in these

¹ The following instances from the Theocritus scholia are drawn mainly from Wendel's *Überlieferung* (for which see p. 16, n. 1).

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 93-94.

scholia. A very close parallel to sch. *O.* x, 78g, ἀπὸ Μιδέας κώμης Ἀργο-
λικῆς· ἐνιοὶ δὲ πόλεως, is found in sch. Theocr. xiii, 20, Μιδέα πόλις Ἀρ-
γους· οἱ δὲ κώμην αὐτὴν φασιν (Wendel, p. 120). Sch. *O.* ix, 88c derives
the name Maenalus from the son of Lycaon; cf. sch. Theocr. i, 124a
(Wendel, p. 117); while sch. *O.* ix, 88b, on the other hand, exactly
reproduces the beginning of sch. Apoll. Rhod., i, 168, Μαίναλος ὄρος
Ἀρκαδίας καὶ πόλις, ἀπὸ Μαινάλου τοῦ Ἀρκάδος, οὗ πατὴρ Λυκάων. In sch.
O. v, 42a; *N.* x, 132a the Trojan and the Cretan Ida are brought to-
gether: the same thing occurs in sch. Theocr., i, 105/06 f.; sch. Apoll.
Rhod., iii, 134; sch. Callim., *H.* i, 6 — parallels which in themselves
point to Theon; but he is actually mentioned in sch. *O.* v, 42a, and
there, as in sch. Apoll. Rhod., iii, 134, Demetrius of Scepsis is cited.
Sch. *N.* x, 132a further mentions the doctrine that ἰδη = ὄρος, which
reappears in sch. Theocr., xvii, 9/12a, and twice in the scholia to Ni-
cander. Sch. *P.* i, 126; ix, 27a both say, Πίνδος ὄρος τῆς Περραιβίας;
so too sch. Theocr., i, 67c, on which Wendel (p. 122) remarks:

Diese ungewöhnliche Verwendung des Namens findet sich sonst nur in
den Scholien zu Kallimachos (H. IV. 319), den Scholien zu Pindar und bei
Plinius (N. H. IV § 2). . . . Das ganze Pindos-Scholion stammt m. E. aus
einer guten . . . geographischen Quelle, als seinen Urheber dürfen wir . . .
Theon vermuten.

Sch. *P.* iv, 99 cites the iambic poet Parmenon, who appears elsewhere
only in sch. Theocr., vi, 2/3d; sch. Nicander, *Ther.*, 805, and Athenaeus,
iii, 75f; v, 203c, 221b; so in sch. *P.* iii, 14 an Aristides is cited (here
only in the Pindar scholia) who appears also in sch. Theocr., xvii,
68/9d b, where he is quoted, as Wendel (p. 128) thinks, by Theon.
The relationship between the scholia to Pindar and to Theocritus, re-
vealed by these instances as being, to some extent at least, due to the
common authorship of Theon, may throw light on a rather curious
note, sch. Pindar, *O.* v, 27a (27c), which introduces a statement con-
cerning the salt and fresh streams of the Hipparis. This fact, though
interesting, seems, unlike the remarks of Didymus and Aristarchus
(cf. 20e, 27b), quite irrelevant to the words of Pindar, except as a rather
far-fetched explanation of his σεμνοῦς ὄχετούς (line 12); but the same
curiosity is related (appositely,) of the Himera in sch. Theocr., v,
123/4d-f.

Again, of the many resemblances between the scholia to Pindar and to Apollonius Rhodius, some are of more than common interest: sch. *N.* v, 67a, Αἶγαί δὲ νῆσός ἐστι πρὸς τῇ Εὐβοίᾳ, καὶ ἀπὸ ταύτης τὸ πέλαγος Αἰγαῖον προσαγορεύεται, is a blunder which is repeated in sch. Apoll. Rhod., I, 831, τὸ Αἰγαῖον πέλαγός φησιν. ἐκλήθη δὲ ἀπὸ νήσου Αἰγῶν καλουμένης. Similarly, sch. *P.* ix, 43c gives as one explanation of Pindar's παῦρον ἐπὶ γλεφάροις ὕπνον ἀναλίσκοισα ῥέποντα πρὸς ἁῶ, the suggestion that Cyrene hunted all night and slept by day. The obvious objection is οὐχ οἶόν τε νυκτὸς σκότους ὄντος θηρᾶν (43b); but Theon had occasion twice elsewhere to point out that Endymion hunted at night, by aid of the moon: sch. Theocr., III, 49/51a-c, κατὰ τὰς νύκτας δέ, λαμπούσης τῆς σελήνης ἐθήρευε, διὰ τὸ τὰ θηρία κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ἐξίεναι; cf. sch. Ap. Rh., IV, 57. . . . νύκτωρ πρὸς τῇ σελήνῃ κυνηγεῖν διὰ τὸ ἐξίεναι τὰ θηρία κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ἐπὶ τὰς νομάς. A similar introduction of matter perhaps originally used elsewhere is possibly to be traced in sch. *P.* iv, 303b, where the discussion as to why Heracles was left behind by the Argonauts has no immediate relevance to Pindar's words: the scholium quotes Ap. Rh., I, 1167 (μεσσόθεν ἄξεν ἐρετμόν) and goes on, οἱ δὲ, ὅτι ἐφ' οὗ ἂν ἐκαθέσθη μέρους, ἐκεῖ ἡ ναὺς ἔκλινε; with which compare sch. Ap. Rh., *loc. cit.*, διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν φασὶ καταλελειφθαι τὸν Ἡρακλέα ἐν Κίῳ. . . . ἐπειδὴ ἐτεροκλινῇ τὴν Ἀργὴν ἐποίει. Again, sch. Ap. Rh., I, 1289 quotes on this subject Antimachus ἐν Λύδῃ, from which work sch. Pind. *P.* iv, 298c quotes (of Aeetes' bulls) the word Ἡφαιστοτεύκτους, adding Ap. Rh., III, 409-410; and the scholium on these lines likewise quotes Ἡφαιστοτεύκτους. The probability of connection would seem strong. So too at sch. *O.* I, 122 we have a long quotation from Ap. Rh., I, 752-758, and the scholiast on these lines in turn quotes Pindar; at sch. *O.* II, 150c Theocritus is quoted as ὁ Βουκόλος; the same occurs in sch. Ap. Rh., I, 1289 (where Pindar is also mentioned), and in sch. Pind. *I.* II, 68, in conjunction with a quotation from Parthenius (possibly too late a writer for Didymus to have used). Sch. *P.* iv, 61 is a close parallel to sch. Ap. Rh., iv, 1562, which refers to Pindar for confirmation of the story of Euphemus receiving the clod: similarly sch. *P.* iv, 57 refers to Ap. Rh., iv, 1552 and 1561 for Eurypylus, and goes on, like the scholium on the latter line of Apollonius, to quote Acesander. Sch. *O.* vi, 149f. (on Ἦραν Παρθενίαν) runs thus: καὶ ποταμὸς

Παρθένιος, ὃς Ἰμβρασος ἐκλήθη. Καλλιμάχος. ἀντὶ γὰρ ἐκλήθη, Ἰμβρασε, Παρθενίου; cf. sch. Ap. Rh., I, 187; II, 867 on the same subject, both quoting Callimachus. Further coincidences are sch. Pind. *P.* I, inscr. *b* (sch. Ap. Rh., I, 207); sch. *P.* III, 120c (sch. Ap. Rh., IV, 308); sch. *P.* IX, 27*b* and 45 (sch. Ap. Rh., IV, 1561).

Here the matter must rest: we know that Theon worked on Pindar; and the above are notes which may, with varying degrees of certainty, be ascribed to him. On the other hand it is universally recognised that our scholia derive almost wholly from Didymus. How then did Theon's influence come in? It is agreed that the second century Epitomator was not a man of independent learning and judgment who put together materials from more than one source; and if he had used Theon alongside Didymus, we might expect the former's name to occur as well as the latter's, and to occur more than once. The simplest explanation of these phenomena seems to be that the Epitomator's one main source was a refashioning of Didymus's commentary by his pupil and successor Theon; thus Theon, as the immediate authority, would normally be named, if at all, only in a *subscriptio*, and no *subscriptio* is now preserved.

3. *Its Form and Later History*

The approximate date for this epitome has already been indicated — some time in the latter half of the second century (p. 28). Besides the internal indications supplied by the quotations of Amyntianus and Herodian, there is additional evidence to be drawn from Plutarch, Aristides, and Heliodorus,¹ who clearly know nothing of the restriction of ἡ λεγομένη περίοδος of Pindar to the four books of *Epinicia*. No more does Lucian, who (*Icarom.* 27) cites the first *Hymn*, not the first *Olympian*, as the first of Pindar's poems.² When the selection had been made, the rest of the commentary to Pindar would soon perish, and the unprotected portion of his works would rapidly become unknown. Pindar was a difficult author, and he suffered swiftly from the decline of learning.

Of the nature of the Epitomator's work little remains to say. So

¹ Wilamowitz, *Herakles*, I¹, 184: Heliodorus, fragg. 34-35, 116-117, 177.

² Cf. Gudeman in Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* "Scholien," 647.

far as the ancient material went, his task was that of abbreviation and selection; quite possibly he rearranged some of the notes in fitting them for the less instructed reader, and so some of the first personal notes (see p. 36) may descend from him. Here and there he added little scraps like the quotations from Amyntianus and Herodian, and last but not least, he contributed what was necessary to make the paraphrase¹ continuous, and so gave his readers the benefits which a modern student of Pindar derives from a translation.

As to the form of his edition there can be now no doubt; his commentary was a substantive work, written continuously on papyrus rolls of its own, equipped with lemmata, but quite separate from the text. Since the existence of full marginal scholia on papyrus rolls was conclusively disproved by J. W. White,² no one denies that the union of commentary and text in one work did not take place till the parchment codex began to displace the papyrus roll, some two centuries after this date. The second century edition, then, consisted of four books of text, in four or more rolls,³ with *ὑπομνήματα* thereto in rolls of unknown number. On the analogy of the Demosthenes Commentary of Didymus, we may suppose these rolls connected by numbers at the ends. The question as to the *subscriptions*, if any, which linked and identified these portions of the commentary is one of interest, but admits no certain answer.

To begin with, the name of the Epitomator is unknown: very possibly he remained anonymous, as was the case with the scholar who was responsible for the first parchment codex of Aristophanes (White, *op. cit.*, p. lxix). Wilamowitz (*Herakles*, p. 179) remarks:

Der unbekannte Mann, der für Pindar den entscheidenden Schritt tat, war auch kein an sich bedeutender Mann, so dass wir an seinem Namen nicht viel verloren haben. Er würde selbst staunen über den Erfolg seiner Schulausgabe. Aber das ist eben das Charakteristische für die Zeit des Verfalles, dass die letzte Leistung, wie sie auch ist, kanonisch wird, weil keine weitere kommt, und so die Folgezeit beherrscht.

¹ It seems more convenient to reserve all discussion of the paraphrase till later (p. 65).

² *Scholia to the Aves of Aristophanes* (Boston, 1914); see later, pp. 49, 78.

³ Probably more: the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of the Paean occupied more than one roll (cf. Grenfell and Hunt, introd., p. 13).

The only suggestion as to his identity is that made, only half in earnest, by Wilamowitz himself,¹ that he may be one Palamedes, who is credited in Suidas with a *ὑπόμνημα εἰς Πίνδαρον τὸν ποιητήν*. This person is never mentioned in our scholia, which is a point in his favour, but it seems to be the only one.² He is identified with the *Δειπνοσοφιστής* in Athenaeus who is described (ix, 397) as *ὁ Ἑλεατικός Παλαμήδης ὀνοματολόγος*; thus he comes just about, or a little after, the time of our Epitome. Suidas calls him *Παλαμήδης Ἑλεατικός γραμματικός* and ascribes to him, besides the work on Pindar, a *κωμικὴ* and a *τραγικὴ λέξις* and an *ὀνοματολόγος*; while in the *Et. Mag.*, s.v. *ἄρμάτειον μέλος*, he appears as *Παλαμήδης ὁ τὴν κωμικὴν λέξιν συναγαγών*. These notices are not particularly informative, and Boeckh doubts whether Elea could at this time have produced a Greek grammarian. He would regard *Ἑλεατικός* as a nickname conferred on a grammarian Palamedes "ob acumen et sollertiam in glossis explicandis aequalibus comprobata" — a nickname whose origin he traces to Plato, *Phaedrus*, 261 D, where Socrates calls Zeno³ *τὸν Ἑλεατικὸν Παλαμήδην*, and the scholiast *a. l.* says this was *ὅτι δὴ πανεπιστήμων σχεδὸν ἦν ὁ ἀνὴρ, ὡς καὶ Παλαμήδης*. Whether this ingenious explanation of Boeckh's is correct or not, it seems clear that all that was certain about this shadowy figure was his activities as a lexicographer and glossographer; and with this idea of him, the few notes under his name in the Aristophanes and Apollonius scholia⁴ agree very well; they certainly afford no ground for thinking that he wrote specific commentaries on these authors. The case is probably much the same with his work on Pindar. The formula *ὑπόμνημα εἰς . . .* may mean something very different from a continuous commentary directed to the systematic explanation of a

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 185: "Bezeichnend ist, dass Palamedes ein *ὑπόμνημα εἰς Πίνδαρον*, das letzte von dem wir wissen, geschrieben hat, und nicht vorkommt. Das war eine Concurrentarbeit, wenn er nicht selbst unser Scholiast ist."

² The best discussion of this elusive personage seems to be in Boeckh's vol. II, introd., xix. The *Ἑλεάτης* to which Boeckh objected in Suidas is, in most manuscripts, *Ἑλεατικός*: and the *ιστορικός* of the *E. M.* is now read *ιστορεῖ*.

³ Quintilian, III, 1, 10 seems to have taken the reference as being to Alcidas Elaites, a pupil of Gorgias. Palamedes was regarded as the prototype of the sophist: but *Ἑλεατικός* was appropriate to both Zeno and Alcidas.

⁴ Sch. Aristoph. *Pax* 916, *Vesp.*, 710, 1108, 1122; sch. Ap. Rh., I, 703; III, 107; IV, 1563.

text, e.g. Heracleon's *ὑπόμνημα εἰς Ὀμηρον καὶ εἰς τοὺς λυρικοὺς*.¹ Thus, in default of more precise information, there is no reason to see in Palamedes' *ὑπόμνημα εἰς Πίνδαρον τὸν ποιητὴν* (a title in itself rather vague) any allusion to a regular commentary; it may have been any of half-a-dozen sorts of compilation — on the dialect, on rare words, on any matter connected with Pindar. It is rather improbable, then, that Palamedes had any influence on our scholia, for if his "Concurrenzarbeit" had been used to any extent in the Epitome, his name would probably have survived on at least one occasion; we have the consolation of knowing that our loss is, to all appearances, but slight.

If, then, the *ὑπομνήματα* current after the second century were attested in their *subscriptions* by any name, it was not that of Palamedes, perhaps not that of the Epitomator at all. Further, since Didymus was frequently cited in the body of the work, it is very unlikely that the commentary passed under his name, or at any rate his name alone. This point happens to be of importance in connection with one of the two references to the commentary on Pindar which form our only direct evidence for its contents and history, till its remnants appear in the margins of our manuscripts. This reference is in Lactantius, who had occasion (*Div. Inst.*, I, 22, 19) to quote a note of Didymus on Pindar. Lactantius lived in the latter half of the third century A.D., and from what is known of the history of scholarship in this age (cf. Wilamowitz, quoted on p. 43) it is extremely improbable that he had access to Didymus on Pindar in any other form than this second century Epitome. As it happens, the note in question,² on Melisseus and his daughters Amalthea and Melissa, is not extant in our scholia; it is referred by Boeckh and Schmidt, with great probability, to sch. P. IV, 106a (on *μελίσσης Δελφίδος*), where the extant note may originally have been much longer. The point of interest for us is the manner of Lactantius's citation, "Didymus in libris ἐξηγήσεως Πινδαρικῆς αἰτ . . ." This has usually been taken³ to mean, "Didymus in *his* ἐξήγησις Πινδαρική," but it may equally well mean "Didymus in *the* ἐξήγησις Πινδαρική — in the rolls of the 'Pindaric Commentary,'" that is, the reference may be to a note under Didymus's name in a recognised

¹ On *ὑπομνήματα* see more fully on p. 76, *infra*.

² Printed in Schmidt, *Didymi Fragmenta*, pp. 220–221; cf. Boeckh, II, pref., xviii.

³ Schmidt and Boeckh, *l.l.c*; Gudeman in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. "Scholien," 649.

(perhaps anonymous) ἐξήγησις Πινδαρική. This explanation, which is made desirable by the facts outlined above, gains further strength from the curious fashion in which the citation is elaborated in the Epitome of the *Divinae Institutiones*, which is known to proceed from Lactantius himself.¹ There (*Epit.*, 19, 2) it runs, "Didymus in iis libris qui inscribuntur ἐξηγήσεως Πινδαρικήs . . . tradit," which would be a remarkably roundabout way of citing, in an epitome, a commentary bearing Didymus's name. It is much more natural to translate "Didymus in the rolls inscribed ἐξηγήσεως Πινδαρικήs . . ." (the number of the roll presumably following in each case, e.g. ἐξηγήσεως Πινδαρικήs α),² and to suppose that the ἐξήγησις was anonymous.

This supposition is supported by the second reference to our Pindar commentary, which shows that, whatever may have been the case with Lactantius's copy, the ὑπομνήματα to Pindar, or some of them, were at one time anonymous. The scholium on Euripides, *Medea*,⁹ quotes (with only slight verbal changes, and an abbreviation of the quotation from Eumelus) the note O. XIII, 74f. in our scholia, adding ταῦτα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνεπιγράφου ὑπομνήματος τοῦ εἰς Πίνδαρον ἔγραψα. This quotation would seem to have been made before the ἐξήγησις became marginal scholia;³ that the note is preserved in such complete form in both collections is merely evidence for the well known fact that compilers and epitomators worked not only by abbreviation and compression, but also, to some extent, by selection.

Apart from this quotation, and the notice in Lactantius, we know nothing further of the fortunes of these ὑπομνήματα in the generations that elapsed before the compilation of the first codex with marginal scholia. How often they were copied, how many copies were in existence, what losses they suffered, we cannot tell. One thing seems fairly clear, not very much was added; for, in sharp contrast to the similar collection on Aristophanes, our scholia contain no single ref-

¹ Cf. (in *Corpus Script. Eccl. Lat.*) Brandt, *Lactantii opera*, I, lxxiv; Lietzmann in Pauly-Wissowa, XII, 354. Schmidt and the others seem to overlook this citation in the Epitome.

² Cf. the *subscriptio* to the Demosthenes Commentary of Didymus, ending Φιλιππικῶν Γ̄ (Diels and Schubart, *op. cit.*, introd., p. xviii).

³ Any more precise dating is of course impossible; cf. the additional note on ὑπόμνημα, p. 76, *infra*.

erence to any writer later than Amyntianus. In fact, it is probably safe to say that from Didymus down to Byzantine times the scholia flow in one main stream, whose tributaries, if any, are few and comparatively unimportant. Yet the clearly proven fact that the *ὑπομνήματα* were contained in separate, independent rolls must leave a suspicion that their individual histories may not all have been the same. Very possibly the marginal scholia were compiled from a homogeneous set of *ὑπομνήματα*, all descended from their original by the same stages; but it seems equally possible that this was not the case. There is no necessity to suppose that every man who possessed the commentary on, say, the *Olympians*, therefore had those on the other books also; hence some of the *ὑπομνήματα* used by the final redactor in his compilation of the marginal commentary may have had a somewhat different history, and borne in consequence a somewhat different character from their fellows. All that can be said is that there is no clear sign of such a differentiation in quantity or quality between the four books, as would necessitate the supposition of such an origin. Such differences as there are probably took their rise at a later time than this, and even such a remarkable phenomenon as the entire absence of any reference to the *σημείον* χ in the scholia to the *Nemeans* is probably due rather to the idiosyncrasies of individual manuscripts.

VI. THE FIRST PARCHMENT CODEX

Transference from papyrus rolls to parchment codices is a process¹ through which all ancient authors passed; where commentaries explaining the texts were available, as much of them was rescued from the papyrus rolls as the margins of the parchment pages could accommodate. The remainder, where there was any, naturally and inevitably perished. Of the date when this work was done for Pindar we learn only by inference and analogy. Parchment did not definitely supersede papyrus for literary writings till the fourth century A.D.; probably, then, the process of transference was not in full swing till some time round about 400. As the exact time is neither known nor important, this rough dating will serve our purposes.

By this time Alexandria had been succeeded as the centre of learn-

¹ Best described in White, *op. cit.*, pp. lxiii ff.

ing by Constantinople, where scholars and books gathered rapidly after its foundation in 330. Probably, then, it was here and at this time that the ancient commentary on Pindar underwent its second important redaction. The compiler, like his predecessor of the second century, is unknown, and beyond the familiar and necessary processes of selection and rejection, abbreviation and rearrangement, we can only guess at the nature of his work. His original contributions, if any, are now quite unidentifiable; and the only point at which we can with certainty trace his hand is the order of the books. The nature of the case makes it clear that it must have been during this period of transition that the arrangement adopted by Aristophanes, and now about 600 years old, suffered its second and final change.

We know that the last four books in Aristophanes' edition were the *Epinicia*, *Olympians*, *Pythians*, *Isthmians*, and *Nemeans*, in that order.¹ To the *Nemeans* as the last were attached three nondescript odes (*N.* ix, x, xi) which could not be fitted in elsewhere, and of this arrangement clear traces remain in several passages in the scholia, e.g. *N.* ix, inscr., αὐται αἱ ῥοδαὶ οὐκέτι Νεμεονίκαῖς εἰσὶ γεγραμμέναι διὸ κεχωρισμένοι φέρονται: cf. *N.* xi, inscr. a, where Didymus remarks that the ode is so little epinician in character that it should have been set elsewhere; yet so firmly established was the tradition that he apparently never thought of acting on his opinion. Further evidence of the old order is to be found in the introductory matter to the *Olympians* (Drachmann, I, 6), γέγραπται δὲ αὐτῷ ἑπτακαίδεκα βιβλία, ὧν τέσσαρα ἡ λεγομένη περίοδος λέγει τάδε, Ὀλυμπιονίκαῖς, Πυθιονίκαῖς, Ἰσθμιονίκαῖς, Νεμεονίκαῖς.² Compare the ὑπόθεσις Ἰσθμίων (Drachmann, III, 192) which begins, ἐτελοῦντο μὲν οἱ παλαιοὶ πάντες ἀγῶνες ἐπὶ τισι τετελευτηκόσιν, and then mentions the *Olympians*, *Pythians*, and *Isthmians* only. Probably the *Nemeans* were not mentioned at all;³ if a lacuna is to be supposed, it should clearly come *after*, and not *before* the mention of the *Isthmians*. Possibly there is another hint at the old arrangement in the ὑπόθεσις Πυθίων (Drachmann, II, 1), which begins, ὁ τῶν Πυθίων

¹ Cf. Wilamowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140.

² So three manuscripts: two (modernizing) give O. P. N. I.; three omit the *Nemeans* altogether.

³ Wilamowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 184; "da sie für die alte Ausgabe geschrieben ist, fehlen die Nemeen."

ἀγῶν ἐτέθη μὲν πρότερος τῶν Ἰσθμίων πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν — perhaps an indication also that the old order of the books followed the sequence of the foundations of the games.

How and for what reasons this long standing arrangement — O. P. I. N. — came to be altered was a question of difficulty for Wilamowitz,¹ believing as he did that the fashion of marginal commentaries came in with Didymus. But knowing as we do now that the commentary continued in separate rolls down to the fourth century, we need have no dubiety in the matter. There was nothing at this late date to preserve the order of the books, and of the commentaries pertaining to them, unless perhaps the presence of numbers in the *subscriptions*, and incidental references in the commentary. But by this time these *subscriptions*, if ever present, were probably lost (their exposed position would render them particularly vulnerable), and the redactor would have very little evidence on which to rely. Thus, the *Isthmians* as the shortest book might easily be put last. In any case this alteration in order² cannot well have taken place later, when the four books followed one another in the same codex; such a change could not have been introduced without some good reason, and in this case there was none. Up till the transference to the codex, on the other hand, it is hardly possible to talk at all of an order among the four books; when they were set in order, the order happened to be different from the original one, but that may fairly be ascribed to carelessness or chance.

Beyond this we have no evidence as to the nature of the materials which were available for the redactor. Probably there was much more than he could find room for, and it is safe to suppose that some of the shorter notes were set between the lines over the words to which they referred. Thus there may have begun at this early stage the process of splitting up, and inserting in different positions on the page, portions of longer notes which in the *ὑπομνήματα* had run continuously: the constant interchange of such short notes from and to the margins is one of the reasons for the dishevelled and disordered appearance of many of the comments in our manuscripts. In particular, snippets of the paraphrase, rendering the more difficult words and phrases, would

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 184: "Warum aber die Nemeen vor die Isthmien gerückt sind ist nicht zu erkennen"; cf. pp. 166–168.

² Wilamowitz also now assigns it to this date, *Pindaros*, p. 1.

be peculiarly suitable for use as interlinear glosses, and thus the coherence and continuity of this portion of the commentary began to be destroyed. Lemmata, too, were doubtless severely cut down; the interlinear notes required none at all. Further, the omission of names of authorities, and of quotations, also gave opportunities for economizing space, and many of the longer notes must at this time have suffered severe curtailment.

The evidence, however, for all this lies mainly in the condition of the scholia in our medieval manuscripts; and it must be remembered that these are seven or eight centuries away. They are farther distant from our "final redactor" than he is from Aristophanes and Zenodotus; and through all these centuries went on the processes of copying, reshuffling, and abbreviating, with all that they imply of misunderstanding, confusion, and loss. The first marginal commentary must have been a collection of considerably greater value than the mangled remains of it which we now possess. But the fortunes of the scholia (as we must now call them) throughout this long period may best be considered in retrospect from the date of our extant manuscripts, on whose evidence we chiefly rely.

VII. THE MANUSCRIPTS

The *scholia vetera* to Pindar are preserved in several manuscripts where they have fortunately escaped contamination by the work of the late Byzantine editors, Thomas Magister, Moschopoulos, and Triclinius. The scholia in these uninterpolated manuscripts are divided into two recensions:

- (i) the Ambrosian (A), preserved only in Ambrosianus C 222 inf., of the thirteenth century, and in a copy thereof (so far as the scholia are concerned ¹), Vratislaviensis Redigerani 40 (first part). This recension of the scholia is unfortunately extant only for O. II-XII. For practical purposes MS. A is our sole authority for recension A.
- (ii) The Vatican (V), contained in numerous manuscripts of various dates and covering various portions of the whole four books;

¹ The remarks in this section on the manuscripts are directed of course to the scholia, not the text of Pindar.

its chief representatives are Vaticanus 1312 (B) of the twelfth century, and Laurentianus XXXII, 52 (D) of the fourteenth century. These cover the four books in their entirety, though B has some considerable lacunae.

1. *The Archetype*

Leaving aside for the present the individual characteristics of these recensions, let us consider them in their relationship to one another, with a view to ascertaining what we can about their archetype.

In the first place, it is plain that this archetype was compiled from more than one exemplar: for a prominent feature of the scholia throughout is the repetition of the same note in the same manuscripts in two or more different versions. This applies to A as well as to the several manuscripts of the Vatican recension, and to paraphrastic renderings of the text as well as to notes of other kinds. Further, the formulae often used to introduce alternative versions of the same note (ἄλλως, ἦ, ἦ ἄλλως, etc.) are of course not descended from an ancient homogeneous body of scholia; there they could have no place. These formulae are merely the method by which copyists distinguished between different notes, or different versions of the same note, drawn from different manuscripts; that is, ἄλλως originally = ἐν ἄλλῳ (sc. ἀντιγράφῳ).¹ These alternative versions and combinations must have stood already in the archetype, in which we may thus recognise a compilation and conflation of the scholiastic material found in several earlier manuscripts. To this fact is due one of the most irritating features of our corpus of scholia, their frequent and apparently meaningless repetitions.

Variations of a slightly different kind throw fuller light on the nature of this archetype. Some short scraps of notes appear in some manuscripts among the marginal scholia, in others as interlinear glosses (e.g. sch. O. IX, 57a, b appear in A in the main body of scholia, in B as glosses; conversely, sch. O. II, 55a is a gloss in A, and in V is a note with lemma). This diversity of position could hardly have arisen if the scholia in the archetype had been written as one continuous whole;

¹ Cf. Lehrs, *Die Pindarscholien*, p. 16; C. Wendel, *Theocriti Scholia* (Teubner, Leipzig, 1914), introd., p. 29. ἐν ἄλλῳ actually appears in these scholia.

probably then the parent manuscript was equipped with interlinear glosses. Quite possibly some of the short scraps which now appear only in the margins, scattered about among longer notes, derive from this source: for though in some cases they are provided with a lemma, in others they have none.

Thirdly, it must have been a large book, for the two recensions (in so far as A is extant) exhibit, besides the overwhelming amount of common matter which witnesses to their common origin, a proportion of individual notes sufficient to justify us in the assertion that their archetype contained a collection of considerably greater richness than either presents to-day. Doubtless, of course, a certain amount has been added, and borrowing from other copies may have increased the number of alternative versions; but there must also have been losses, such as almost invariably accompany the copying process. When we strike a balance between the possibilities of loss and gain, it is clear that the archetype must have contained substantially more than any of our extant manuscripts. The supposition of such a considerable book, compiled from various sources and equipped with every kind of note, in itself affords some probable indication of date.

Drachmann's edition provides the material for discussing the history of our manuscript tradition by reference to two outside authorities. The Pindar scholia are definitely quoted on several occasions by the *Etymologicum Magnum*, which was compiled in the twelfth century. Most of its materials, however, are drawn from the *Etymologicum Genuinum* (and to a less extent from the *Gudianum*) and so date back to the ninth century.¹ The manner of citation is often precise, e.g. *E. M.*, 450, 41 (sch. *O.* vi, 144*d*), ὡς εὔρον εἰς τὸ σχόλιον τοῦ Πινδάρου ἐπινικίῳ ὕμνῳ Ἀγησίᾳ Συρακουσίῳ. Sometimes, as we should expect, the quotations are clearly drawn from a much fuller note than is now extant [e.g. *E. M.*, 588, 46 (sch. *O.* ix, 125*e*)] and thus throw no light on the question of the recension, or recensions, which the compiler had before him. *E. M.*, 743, 25 is, however, a fairly close rendering of a note which stands in A at sch. *O.* ix, 150*a*, but of which no traces now survive in V; on the other hand *E. M.* 159, 48 (sch. *O.* ii, 146*g*) and 322, 43 (sch. *O.* xiii, 56*e*) bear a sufficiently definite resem-

¹ R. Reitzenstein, *Geschichte der griechischen Etymologica* (Teubner, Leipzig, 1897).

blance to notes preserved in V and not in A. It would seem, then, that the compiler of the *Etymologicum* drew from both recensions,¹ that is, presumably he excerpted before they separated. Probably then the archetype is not earlier than, if so early as, the ninth or tenth century. This evidence is of course by no means conclusive; it would be easy to argue that at the date in question V was more complete and so might contain notes now extant only in A. This, however, is a less likely explanation.

The other authority is Eustathius, who wrote his commentaries on Pindar and Homer in the second half of the twelfth century. Of his work on Pindar only the preface survives;² both it and his Homeric commentaries concern us here only in so far as they are evidence for the Pindaric scholia which were in Eustathius's possession. Unfortunately the indications they afford are rather indefinite; all that is clear is that Eustathius's collection of scholia was rather fuller than our own; cf. sch. *P.* I, 29a (Eust. *Il.* I, 783, p. 346, 2); *P.* II, 78e (*Il.* II, 756, p. 338, 19). Drachmann cites his works to illustrate notes now standing in A only, at sch. *O.* II, 7a, 19a; VI, 1e, 130c; VII, 110g; VIII, 48a, 51, 94, 106g; but in no case are these notes of marked interest or individuality, nor do they imply a use of A. So far then as regards Eustathius the evidence is entirely negative; but this is really all that is required, for general considerations make it unlikely that the archetype was as late as this. The dissimilarity between the two recensions is too great to have arisen in the comparatively short time which separates Eustathius from our manuscripts.

On the other hand, it seems equally certain that the archetype does not lie very far back. A and V still retain a considerable number of notes so verbally alike that they coalesce without difficulty in a critical edition. Among notes thus common to both recensions may be instanced sch. *O.* III, 53a, b; v, inscr. b, 19c; VI, 1a, 124b; VII, 1a and b (a paraphrase of ten lines of text); VII, 76, 91a, 117, 151; VIII, 1b, c, 101a, 111a, b; IX, 8c, 15b, c, 18c, d (paraphrase), 44a, 57a, b, 113a, 115b; X, 1b-e, 62a, 72d, 106a; XI, 7a, b, 13c, 14a; XII, 8, 10a, b. Many

¹ So Wilamowitz, *Herakles*, I¹, 185; "(A) von der auch das E. M. Spuren bewahrt." Boeckh, II, pref., xxiv-xxv wrongly supposed that the *Etymologica* drew from A only.

² Printed in Drachmann, III, 285 ff.

other notes appear in very similar form in the two recensions; often the difference between the recensions is no greater than frequently occurs between the manuscripts of V: e.g. sch. O. II, 1*d* (A) = 4*a* (V); VI, 106*a* (A) = 106*e* (V); VII, 60*a* (A) = VII, 60*b* (V); VIII, 106*b* (A) = 106*i* (V); IX, 70*b* (A) = 70*c* (V); X, 13*a* (A) = 13*e* (V); XI, 6*b* (A) = 6*c* (V); XI, 21 (A) = 19*d* (V); XII, 20*a* (A) = 20*b* (V). These are the more striking examples; a short search will reveal many others. It is not likely that so many passages would have remained identical, or so many have retained so great similarity, over any extended period of time, when there was nothing to guard them against the same freedom of treatment as produced in a shorter time the private differences that exist on every page among the manuscripts of the V recension.

As regards the date of the archetype, these separate bodies of evidence or suggestion, while in themselves somewhat vague, do in conjunction converge upon a fairly definite time. It was a time when the compilation of a substantial codex, drawing a wealth of scholiastic material from several sources, was a possibility, a time not earlier than the ninth century, when the *Etymologica* excerpted, but earlier than Eustathius, — these two latter vague indications being reinforced by the consideration that the source common to our two recensions cannot in view of some striking similarities between them lie relatively very far back. The cumulative effect of all this is to enable us to suggest with some confidence the tenth or eleventh century (preferably the latter) as the date of the archetype of our scholia. This period, too, is eminently suitable in view of the history of scholarship during these centuries. The early period of Byzantine learning, which had seen the transference of the Pindar commentary to the margins of the first parchment codex, came to an end in the middle of the seventh century, and it was not till the middle of the ninth, after a lean period of some two hundred years, that scholarship revived. In this period of revival are dated historic codices of Homer and Aristophanes, and it is no difficult supposition which credits it with a similar achievement for Pindar. Such a work would perform a very necessary service in gathering together the ancient material which had survived the rigours of the "Dark Age," in the margins of various manuscripts of Pindar; and it might fittingly serve as a basis for future editions. This satisfac-

torily answers to the evidence, such as it is, both internal and external, and seems in all respects a justifiable hypothesis.¹

2. The State of the scholia in the Manuscripts

The uncontaminated manuscripts in which the *scholia vetera* are preserved seem singularly free from even incidental interpolations. Distortion and corruption there are in abundance, and the lamentable effects of the long ordeal through which the scholia had passed since the fourth century are to be seen on every hand. In dealing with scholia copyists felt no need for any such care as was exacted for the accompanying text, but altered and adapted and rewrote both consciously and unconsciously; so that there can be little doubt that a good deal of the scholia was, so to speak, "refaced" during these hundreds of years. The results of this process of surface-change are of course not usually clearly identifiable; but a few unmistakable instances may be adduced.

One such point is the substitution of the past tense for the present used by the old commentators in referring to the customs and rites of the old Greek world, which was still with them, but had by this time passed away.² This appears quite clearly in sch. *P.* iv, 338, where sch. *a* begins, in D.E.G.Q., εἰώθασι δὲ διὰ κλήρων μαντεύεσθαι, whereto B feels constrained to add τὸ πρῖν; the rest of sch. *a* in all manuscripts uses presents, but later the same manuscripts give in sch. *b* an alternative version of the same note, in which past tenses appear; for a similar contrast cf. sch. *O.* ix, 137*a* and *b*. That the copyists belonged to a new world is shown also by the introduction in sch. *O.* i, 157*c* of a clear quotation from *Exodus*, iii, 8, ὁ νικῶν δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν αὐτοῦ βίον διάγει ἐν τῇ γῇ μέλι ῥέουσα.

Again, geography sometimes betrays the copyists, the Ister is to them the Danube—sch. *O.* iii, 25*b*, ὃς νῦν Δάνουβις λέγεται—and they can say that Cumae lies off Sicily (sch. *P.* i, 34*a*), following the Byzantine nomenclature. (This extension of the meaning of the term Sicily occurs in the sixth century). Similarly, in sch. *P.* vii, inscr. *b*

¹ Wendel has, on other grounds, arrived at a similar date for the archetype of the Theocritus scholia; cf. his edition, pref., p. xix.

² Cf. Boeckh, ii, pref., xxvi.

the words οἱ εἰσιν ὑποδήματα Διονυσικά have been inserted, to explain *κοθόρρους*, in the middle of a fairly close quotation of Herodotus, vi, 125. To this time, too, probably belong such absurdities as sch. *P.* i, 146*b*, which speaks of Pindar studying Ephorus; such notes are best explained as a bungle of some originally sensible remark. There are also two longish notes preserved in manuscripts of the V recension, which are clearly Byzantine in origin: sch. *O.* iii, 81*c* (in C. Q. only) and sch. *O.* x, 1*i* (in Q alone).¹

Lehrs² notes likewise the use of the third person perfect, singular and plural, instead of the aorist; this is fairly common; e.g., sch. *O.* vii, 111*a* (ἐκέλευσε . . . πεποίηκε); sch. *N.* viii, 28 (ἐπλούτισε καὶ εὐδαίμονα πεποίηκε); sch. *O.* xiii, 1*a*; *P.* iv, 63; *N.* x, 46*b*; the pluperfect is used in the same manner in sch. *P.* iv, 61. Once only (sch. *P.* v, 35*f*) occurs ἡ σύνταξις, the regular Byzantine formula introducing a paraphrase (instead of the ὁ δὲ νοῦς and the like of the *scholia vetera*); and once we get the Byzantine πρώην ποτέ for πρόσθε ποτέ (sch. *O.* x, 36*c*).³ The formula ἰστέον ὅτι . . . seems to me to occur mainly in notes which look late, e.g., sch. *P.* v, 168 and *P.* iv, 338*b*.

Another, and more serious, phenomenon is the progressive decline of the commentary, both in quantity and in quality, as we draw near the end. This increasing fatigue and carelessness of copyists as the work proceeded was observed by Galen:⁴ πάντες οχεδὸν οἱ προγράψαντες ἐξηγήσεις τῶν Ἀφορισμῶν ἐν ἀρχῇ μὲν ἐπὶ πλέον ἐκτείνουσι τοῦ χρησίμου τὸν λόγον, ἐκλύονται δὲ προϊόντες ὥστε πρῶτον μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ χρήσιμον προεῖναι μόνον, εἰθ' ἐξῆς ἐλλιπέστερον τούτου, καὶ τελευτῶντες ἐσχάτως συντέμνουσι τὰς ἐξηγήσεις. There is no doubt that this habit had very serious effects on our scholia; it is noticeable, though not so clearly for

¹ Drachmann prints these in small type.

² Lehrs, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–48.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 37 and p. 49.

⁴ 18 (1) 101; quoted by Rutherford, *op. cit.*, p. 34. The V MSS. alone show traces of a device they adopted to shorten their task: in these manuscripts lemmata are not infrequently cut down by mentioning only first and last words, connected by ἕως, e.g., sch. *O.* vi, 111*c*; viii, 74*a*; ix, 43; the same method is used in abbreviating a quotation in sch. *P.* iii, 139*a*. In sch. *O.* xiii, 94, the first words only of the lemma are given, followed by καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς. A piece of paraphrase, too, is thus summarily cut short in B at sch. *O.* ii, 22*b*, ὦ Ζεῦ τὸν οὐρανὸν κατοικῶν καὶ τὸ καὶ τὸ, ἡσθεῖς . . . : the full form appears in the other V MSS. at 22*c*.

the *Olympians* and *Pythians*, at the end of each book, and it is very evident, for the scholia as a whole, in the comparative poverty of the scholia to the later Isthmian odes. A clear estimate in this matter is of course hardly practicable, as A is extant for part of the *Olympians* only, and the number of manuscripts containing scholia becomes steadily fewer for the *Pythians*, *Nemeans*, and *Isthmians* in order. We must also bear in mind the possibility, already hinted at, that the *ὑπομνήματα* from which the first codex was compiled may have varied somewhat in value. But allowing for these considerations, we may say that the scholia decline steadily from book to book, in quality as well as in quantity. *P.* I, II, IV, and IX are very well annotated, and the scholia to both *Isthmians* and *Nemeans* contain long and valuable notes, but the ends of all the three latter books are perceptibly poorer, and the scholia to the *Isthmians* are very scrappy indeed towards the close. A noteworthy fact is that the paraphrase, which for the primary task of rendering the text intelligible was very *χρήσιμος* indeed, is the last part of the commentary to suffer when the flow of notes begins to run dry: thus the scholia to the *Nemeans* and *Isthmians* contain a substantially greater percentage of paraphrastic notes than the two earlier books; but even these notes become, towards the end of the *Isthmians*, intermittent and perfunctory.

3. *The Ambrosian Recension*

The main point of interest which the manuscripts present is the nature of the Ambrosian Recension, its origins and its relationship to V. The MS. A unfortunately contains the text of *O.* I–XII only, and the scholia to *O.* I are of the Vatican recension, presumably copied in from some V MS. to make the commentary complete¹ for those odes which A contained. The question presents itself, whether this recension of the scholia ever covered the whole four books? The answer must probably be no; it seems more likely that A is the descendant of some manuscript of the *Olympians* defective at both ends, than that it is the salvage of a small portion of what was originally a complete

¹ Cf. Boeckh, *op. cit.*, introd., p. iv; for an undoubted instance of this process, compare the case of the Neapolitanus manuscript of Lycophron: there lacunae in the *scholia vetera* have been filled up from the commentary of Tzetzes; cf. A. W. Mair, *Lycophron* (Loeb, 1921), p. 490.

manuscript of the four books. The supposition of a manuscript containing the *Olympians* only is paralleled by the known fact that Moschopoulos apparently devoted his attention to this book alone; at least it forms the sole contents of most of the forty-three manuscripts which Tycho Mommsen¹ took to represent Moschopoulos's edition. When we compare with this custom of studying one book only the loss of text and scholia which had already begun at the end of the *Isthmians*, and the small number of manuscripts which contain the whole four books, it would appear that Pindaric studies were in serious danger of suffering still further restriction, and that the *Isthmians* at least might soon have disappeared.

This hypothesis of a battered manuscript somewhere in the ancestry of A is supported by the peculiar character of the very individual recension of scholia it contains. These scholia are on page after page disordered, corrupt, and fragmentary, but yet of quite exceptional value — "entsetzlich verdorben, aber sehr wertvoll";² moreover, they are particularly rich in citations of the names of ancient authorities, not only comparatively, but absolutely, richer than the Vatican scholia, for those odes in which A is present. Yet further, they are weakest, just where V is most rich, in the matter of paraphrastic notes,³ a very practical, but elementary and unlearned, method of commentary; and this in face of the fact that when in V the scholia become fragmentary and interrupted, it is the paraphrase which (as we should expect from the point of view of ordinary utility) is the last to be allowed to suffer. It seems worth while to give at some length the plentiful evidence on which these statements are based.

When we compare A with V, our expectation at the outset must necessarily be that the latter will contain more of every kind of note. The scholia in A are more fragmentary and corrupt than those in any one manuscript of the V recension, and moreover it is but one manu-

¹ In his critical edition of Pindar (Berlin, 1864), p. xxiv f.

² Wilamowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

³ One example: Lehrs, *Die Pindarscholien* (Leipzig, 1873), p. 23 has extracted from the scholia a continuous paraphrase covering the whole of *O. ix*: this process required much patching together of fragments from notes in various manuscripts; yet Lehrs uses only four short scraps from A (8c, 18d, 115b, 122a), all but the last being notes common to both recensions.

script against many. It is thus well-nigh inevitable that there should be valuable notes in V which do not appear in A, and particularly that some names of authorities (which afforded an easy opportunity for economising space) should appear in V and be missing in A. Thus at sch. *O.* II, 15, A cites Timaeus; while the corresponding note in V (15 and 16) cites Hippostratus, Aristarchus, Artemon, and Mene-crates. At sch. *O.* II, 177*d*, V cites Aristarchus for his reading, which A (177*a*) presents anonymously; the same thing occurs at *O.* IX, 1*k* (Eratosthenes) and 3*g* (Aristarchus); while at *O.* X, 84, A is frag-mentary, and the note in V (83) cites Didymus, Aristodemus, and Diphilus.

Further, valuable notes drawing on the following eminent sources appear in V and have no counterpart in A.

Sch. <i>O.</i> III,	5 <i>a</i>	(Zenodotus and Amyntianus)
V,	1 <i>b</i>	(Aristarchus and Artemon)
VI,	129 <i>e</i>	(Philostephanus)
	152	(a Pindar dithyramb and Cratinus)
VII, inscr.		(Gorgo)
	19 <i>d</i>	(Aristarchus)
	24 <i>d</i>	(Asclepiades)
	24 <i>f</i>	(Epimenides)
	95 <i>a</i>	(Aristarchus and Polemon)
	119 <i>b</i>	(Homer and Hesiod)
	153 <i>d</i>	(Polemon)
VIII, inscr. <i>a</i>		(Didymus)
	29 <i>a</i>	(Asclepiades)
IX,	86 <i>e</i>	} (Aristotle)
X,	17 <i>i</i>	
	34 <i>g</i>	(Mnaseas)
	46 <i>f</i>	(Hesiod)
	55 <i>c</i>	(Didymus)
XII,	10 <i>c</i>	(Philochorus)

This is not surprising; but it *is* surprising that when such a com-parison as this is instituted, A is found the richer in such important notes by fully 3 to 2. Valuable notes depending on ancient authorities appear in A alone, as follows:

Sch. <i>O.</i> II,	7 <i>a</i>	(Zenodotus)
	8 <i>a</i>	(Hippostratus)
	140 <i>a</i>	(Aristarchus)

III, 21 <i>b</i> , 22 <i>a</i>	(Aristodemus and Hellanicus)
28 <i>a</i>	(Phanodemus, Philostephanus, and Hecataeus)
33 <i>a</i>	(ὁ τὰ περὶ Ἑλλείων συντάξας)
54 <i>a</i>	(Didymus and Apollodorus)
66 <i>b</i>	(Aristarchus)
V, inscr. <i>c</i>	(Polemon)
42 <i>a</i>	(Demetrius of Scepsis)
44 <i>c</i>	(Ptolemaeus ὁ ἐπιθέτης)
54 <i>b</i>	(Aristarchus)
VI, 23 <i>a</i>	(Aristarchus and Armenidas)
26	(Asclepiades)
158 <i>b</i>	(Aristarchus)
179 <i>c</i>	(Homer)
VII, 33 <i>a</i>	(Theotimus)
34 <i>a</i>	(Didymus)
49 <i>a</i>	(Agias and Dercylus)
146 <i>a</i>	(Istros)
154 <i>a</i>	(Aristonicus and Didymus)
VIII, 41 <i>a</i>	(Euphorion)
IX, 15 <i>a</i>	(Autesion)
34 <i>a</i>	(Didymus)
62 <i>a</i>	(Hellanicus)
129	(Ibycus and Stesichorus)
143 <i>a</i>	(Cleophanes)
X, 80	(Hesiod)
84 <i>e</i>	(Aristippus)
XI, 15 <i>a</i>	(Alcman)

Still more remarkable and more characteristic is the long list of notes which appear in both recensions in recognisable form, but which are nameless in V, the name of the authority cited appearing only in A. In the following list the references on the left are to the note in A, in the middle comes the name of the authority cited, on the right the reference to the corresponding (nameless) note in V.

	A		V
Sch. O.	II, 48c	Aristophanes	48f
	58a	Aristarchus	{ 58fg 60b
	70b	{ Pindar's Paeans Mnaseas }	16
	102b, 106a	Aristarchus	104c
	113b, d	Aristarchus	113e, i
	140a	Didymus	138b
	152c	Aristarchus	153a
III,	21b, 22a	Asclepiades	22b, c
	31a	Aristonicus	31b
	41c	Aristarchus	41f
	45a	Aristarchus	46a
	68a	οἱ προῦπομνηματισάμενοι	68d
VI,	23a	Aristodemus	23d
	50a	Sosibius	46b
	115a	Didymus	115c
	119	Heracleides	111e
	153	Aristarchus	148a
	154a	{ τὰ Ἀρχιλόχου ὑπομνήματα }	154c, d
	158c	{ Didymus Philistus Timaeus }	160d
VII, inscr. b		Apollas	inscr. c
	60c	Pherecydes	60b
	66a	{ Musaeus Sosibius }	66b
	117	Aristarchus	117
	160c	Didymus	159f, g
VIII,	5b	Aristarchus	4d (?)
	30d	Aristotle	30e
	41a	Didymus	44b, c
	70a	Acusilaus	68a
IX,	87a	Pherecydes	86c
	104a	Pythænetus	106b
X,	15a	Aristarchus	13e
	17a	Didymus	17f
	55b	{ Leptines Dionysius }	55c

This is a notable list. A, we find, preserves for us on ten occasions the name of Aristarchus, on six that of Didymus, when their views appear anonymously in V. One instance among those given above is outstanding as a typical example of the procedures of A and V in regard to such citations: in sch. O. x, 55c, where V introduces the reading "Ἄλτιν by Ἀριστόδημος γράφει . . . , A (55b) has retained the fuller form, οἱ περὶ Ἀριστόδημον καὶ Λεπτίνην καὶ Διονύσιον γράφουσιν

Still more curious and typical is a third list, of places where A retains the name of an ancient authority, although the note under that name is fragmentary, or altogether absent: e.g.:

Sch. O. III, 50b: θήλειαν δὲ εἶπε καὶ χρυσοκέρων ἀπὸ ἱστορίας· ὁ γὰρ
(τὴν) Θησηίδα γράψας τοιαύτην αὐτήν. καὶ
Πείσανδρος ὁ Καμιρεὺς καὶ Φερεκύδης. καὶ τὸ παρὰ
'Ανακρέοντι· κεροέσσης λειφθεὶς ἀπὸ μητρὸς [ληφθεὶς]
ἐπτοήθη. . . . ὅτι αἱ θήλειαι κέρατα οὐ φύουσιν.
ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ ἡ ἔλαφος Κερυνία.

(These fragments are undoubtedly salvage from the wreck of the learned matter introduced here from Zenodotus, who is named in the corresponding note in V [52a]).

Sch. O. VI, 7b: τοῦ δὲ μαντείου τοῦ ἐν Ἥλιδι καὶ Δικαίαρχος μέ-
μνηται.

23a: ὁ δὲ Ἀριστόδημος φησι τὰς ἐπτὰ πυρὰς ἀπολο-
μένων.

92b: Ζηνόδοτος γράφει ἀντὶ τοῦ βεβρεγμένος

Sch. O. VII, inscr. b: περὶ τοῦ Διαγόρου εἶπε μὲν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης . . .
καὶ Ἀπόλλας μαρτυροῦσι

Sch. O. IX, 143a: Κλεοφάνης ἐν τῷ περὶ ἀγώνων is cited, but no infor-
mation from him is given.

One such instance might be chance, but half a dozen require more particular explanation. This feature of A had been noted by Lehrs,¹

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 6-8. It may be remarked here that, except as regards the paraphrase and the ζητήσεις, Lehrs's work is disappointing as an aid to present-day study of the scholia. He depended on Boeckh, and much of his book is taken up with a polemic against the latter's editorial methods; all this part of his work is now necessarily obsolete, as is the large number of pages dealing with the text; for Drachmann has thence incorporated in his edition all that was of value. The same editor

from whom one of the foregoing instances (sch. O. VI, 92b) is taken. Lehrs knew the Ambrosian recension only in the badly written copy of A, which he calls Vrat. A; and his explanation of the "ausserordentlich Verderbniss" of this recension was simply that it was due to bad and careless copying. In face of the above-mentioned facts, however, this explanation naturally breaks down, especially as regards the last list of instances. These Lehrs refers to as follows (*op. cit.*, p. 7):

... eine ganze Anzahl zu verschiedenen Stellen hier allein noch auftauchender Autornamen, meist berühmter, deren Ansicht aber dann vielfach entweder ganz ausgelassen oder in einer solchen Gestalt geschrieben ist, dass sie nicht zu enträthseln. Es ist dies so bedeutend, dass man sich wol einmal die Frage vorlegen darf, ob wir es hier mit einer Mystification zu thun haben: das ist jedoch nicht der Fall.

This supposition is of course absurd; but it is perfectly true to say that these last examples from A must appear of deliberate intention; in some of them (e.g. sch. O. VI, 7b, and IX, 143a) the mere citation of the authority as a sort of reference seems all that is meant. There seems to have been a deliberate attempt to preserve as many names of authorities as possible; and so we get the tantalizing instances last enumerated, as well as the preceding long list of notes where A, in opposition to V, has preserved the reference to the source whence the note comes. The names must have been considered as of value for their own sake.

Again, we now know that Lehrs's supposition that the Vratislaviensis A was a bad copy is incorrect in point of fact; it is an accurate copy of the scholia in Ambrosianus C 222. There is no reason to suppose that the Ambrosianus is not also a faithful attempt to reproduce what was found in its exemplar. Neither corruption nor mutilation nor carelessness would have shown especial favour to these names of ancient sources; on the contrary they might be expected to result in an exceptionally heavy loss. In the first place, then, the character of the notes in A points clearly to a deliberate attempt to preserve as much learned matter as possible from some imperfect and mutilated exemplar. Whether this was A's immediate parent or not is immaterial; likewise nullified much of Lehrs's complaints against the obscurity and disorder of the scholia; and with the sections of his book dealing with the *scholia recentia* we have here nothing to do.

somewhere between A and the common archetype of our two recensions must have stood a manuscript that had suffered somewhat severely, from ill-treatment, or age, or both. The corruptions and lacunae of A are a witness, not to bad copying, but to faithful copying, unmarred by improvised additions or emendations.

Secondly, this line of argument carries us a step further back. This battered ancestor of A contained, even when it had fallen upon evil days, an unusual proportion of learned matter, especially of names of authorities, and comparatively little of the sort of note (e.g. paraphrase) which was most essential for the severely practical purpose of explaining the text. If we presume, as we have a right to do, that the misfortunes that befell this "learned" ancestor of A worked indiscriminate havoc with its whole body of scholia, it becomes obvious that in its original state this valuable manuscript must have been of very different purpose and content from its contemporaries or contemporary of the Vatican recension. Quite possibly, then, A is descended from a copy of the archetype, which, in contradistinction to the ancestor or ancestors of our V manuscripts, laid greatest stress on what was learned in the collection before it, and found room for much scholarly matter by a comparative neglect of purely exegetical notes, such as paraphrases. This suggestion is quite in accordance with the fact that the Vatican recension, preserved in many manuscripts, obviously represents the main line of Pindaric studies in these times. The Ambrosian recension, on the other hand, seems to have lain definitely off this beaten track; it was probably unknown to Eustathius, and it was quite certainly unknown to Callierges when he produced the *editio princeps* of the scholia at Rome in 1515. To this neglect of this recension are due both its imperfect condition and its freedom, despite the late date of the Ambrosianus (thirteenth century), from interpolation. Preserved in only two manuscripts, it remained unedited till Boeckh's edition in 1819.

I suggest, then, that A derives from a "scholarly" copy of the archetype; that this recension was little used and fell into a state of decay, from which it was rescued by someone who must have been sufficiently interested in such matters to preserve what could be preserved from a battered and probably old manuscript. Else why were scraps, even learned scraps, retained? Why this care for the names of ancient au-

thorities, even when isolated from their context? These notes must have been preserved of set intention, not for "Mystification", but for quite opposite reasons. Hence comes A, at once valuable and defective.

PART II. ADDITIONAL NOTES

I. Paraphrase (p. 65). — II. τὸ σημεῖον χ (p. 72). — III. ὑπόμνημα (p. 76)

I. PARAPHRASE

IT IS on this class of note that Lehrs has done his most serviceable work. In the sections indicated below ¹ he has sketched the history of paraphrastic renderings as an aid to the understanding of Greek poets, and shown that paraphrases are one of the most notable features of our scholia on Pindar. Further, he has pointed out that the scraps of paraphrase, scattered and divided as they are among a diversity of notes of different kinds, are yet in the case of several odes so plenteous that a practically complete paraphrase of the text can still be constructed from the *disiecta membra*. He has actually done this, employing, it must be confessed, no little ingenuity, for three odes, O. ix, P. iv, P. ix; and whatever question there may be as to the expedients to which he resorts in filling up some of the gaps in his chain, his demonstration must be accepted as sufficient proof that at one time the commentary probably included, as one of its constituent parts, a complete, though not necessarily continuous, paraphrase of Pindar's text. Lehrs argues that this paraphrase was complete in the Old Commentary — the second century "Schulausgabe" or Epitome — and also in the First Codex.² As regards the former, Wilamowitz (*op. cit.*, p. 184) tacitly accepts his view, and it has been embodied in the history of the transmission given above; as regards the fourth-century redaction, the matter is more doubtful. It is impossible on the limited evidence we possess either to prove or to disprove Lehrs's assertion;

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 22-35 (continuous paraphrase for O. ix); 49-72 (the development of paraphrases in commentaries on poets); 120-158 (continuous paraphrases for P. iv and ix).

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 16-17. This seems to be the proper translation into the terms of my account of the transmission; but Lehrs's own phraseology is rather vague.

but it is perhaps worth pointing out that there is a possibility that the redactor of that date, confronted with heavy demands on his space, may have cut out the paraphrastic renderings of some of the easier phrases.

With Boeckh's edition before him, comprising both *scholia vetera* and *recentia* intermingled, Lehrs was able to point out that the characteristics of the paraphrases in the *scholia vetera* were quite different from those in the *recentia*. In the *vetera* the predominant marks of the regularly recurring paraphrastic renderings are, in Lehrs's view, these:

(1) They are introduced by a formula which is usually ὁ δὲ νοῦς, but which admits of considerable variations — τὸ δὲ σαφές, τὸ δὲ ὅλον, ὁ δὲ λόγος, ἡ δὲ διάνοια, and so on; and these variations sometimes appear at the same place in various manuscripts (e.g. sch. *P.* iv, 1b, 496c), showing that they were subject to the copyist's whim. Sometimes these introductory formulae are entirely absent, and φησί is introduced parenthetically in the midst of the paraphrase: sometimes even this fails (Lehrs, pp. 37-43).

(2) The paraphrases regularly introduce Pindar's own word (or a slightly more prosaic form of it, or some word closely, often etymologically, connected with it) and subjoin by means of καὶ another word which is a freer rendering of that used by Pindar; e.g. sch. *O.* ix, 17c, ἔει καὶ πρόπεμπε renders ἔει in Pindar; sch. *ibid.*, 85b, ὁ αἰὼν καὶ ὁ χρόνος renders αἰών; sch. 152c, κράτιστον καὶ ἐξάϊρετον renders κράτιστον; sch. 98, ὑπερφυᾶ καὶ μέγαν (for ὑπέρφατον); sch. 1g, φωνηθέν καὶ προλεχθέν (for φωνᾶεν). Sometimes, however, the resemblance between the first word and Pindar's is small, so that we get merely two paraphrasing words (of which the first is the closer paraphrase), linked by καὶ: sometimes, but rarely, Pindar's word comes after the καὶ; e.g. sch. *O.* ix, 1g, χορεύοντι καὶ κωμάζοντι (rendering κωμάζοντι).

But this use of two words linked by καὶ is not invariably present in the paraphrases, and there are long stretches where it does not occur at all. (Lehrs, p. 23).

The paraphrase which Lehrs has extracted from the scholia to *O.* ix is given by him as an excellent example of these uses, "und sie ist überhaupt die hervortretende Paraphrase in den Scholia Vetera, und nicht blos in den Olympischen, sondern auch in den übrigen" (p. 23).

But in order to get anything like a full and continuous paraphrase, Lehrs has to admit certain modifications in the usual meaning of that word:

(1) Occasionally short amplifications of the text are inserted (sometimes amounting to short explanatory notes).

(2) Positives in the text are frequently rendered by superlatives.

(3) Compound epithets are rendered (i) by several separate adjectives + ὤν, ἔχων, etc; (ii) by other compounds; (iii) by simple words, e.g. βαρυνγδούπων by ἡχητικῶν, λευκίππων by ἱππικῶν.

(4) Often epithets present in the text are omitted altogether in the paraphrase (perhaps because they were more fully treated in other notes).

(5) The paraphrase often "polarizes" the expression, rounding it off by adding the opposite: e.g. sch. O. IX, 54a, ἐχθρὰ σοφία is rendered by ἀλλότριον τοῖς σοφοῖς, ἀνοήτοις δὲ οἰκεῖον. Sch. P. IV, 7a, οὐκ ἀποδάμου Ἀπόλλωνος τυχόντος is rendered by οὐκ ἀποδημοῦντος τοῦ θεοῦ ἀλλὰ παρόντος.

Sometimes μή τοί γε δῆ is used, e.g. sch. P. IV, 484 (ῥάδιον . . . ἀφαιροτέροις) τοῖς ἀσθενεστέροις ῥάδιόν ἐστι, μή τοί γε δῆ τοῖς ἐν δυνάμει κειμένοις.

This is an accurate and candid statement of the nature of the paraphrases which Lehrs sets out. It should be noted, however, that these divagations from a strict paraphrastic rendering may imply a good deal. A study of the three paraphrases, which he prints continuously, shows this; and the cumulative effect of all these variations, and of the exceptions he records to the regular recurrence of his characteristic signs, does away with a great deal of the homogeneity which he stresses so much. When ὁ δὲ νοῦς may be supplanted by a wide variety of formulae, or when these, together with the characteristic use of καί, may be for long periods altogether absent, when "amplifications" may occur, positives become superlatives, epithets be omitted and expressions "polarized," we may, and do, get something very different from consistency even in the paraphrases Lehrs has chosen to exhibit. It must be remembered, also, that these are, naturally, the best examples for his purpose; and even in them allowances must constantly be made for occasions when the paraphrases are of a very superficial and perfunctory kind.

When Lehrs goes further, and tacitly assumes that the same sort of thing (with only minor variations in quantity) occurs regularly throughout the whole of the scholia, he is more difficult to follow. When he proceeds to ascribe all this large portion of the scholia to a single individual whom he calls "the paraphrast," it is time to call a halt. In Chapter VIII he prints what he regards as a "final and complete example of the management of the tradition," and sets forth for *P. ix*, in one column the paraphrase (the actual extracts from which are inset) and the commentary belonging to it ("the paraphrast's commentary"); in the other, the remainder of the scholia, insignificant in amount, which he regards as drawn from other sources. The uselessness of the method is at once apparent; for the process of jettisoning whatever cannot, by hook or by crook, be brought into agreement with the paraphrase involves the rejection of notes (207*b*; 214*b, c*; 217) which embody, or refer to, a view which in 207*b* is ascribed to Didymus by name. Now in point of fact Lehrs's "Paraphrast" is simply our second century Epitomator. His edition, as we have seen, was an abbreviation of materials drawn largely (almost entirely) from the edition of Didymus; but probably not at first hand, so that the Epitomator did not always or necessarily follow Didymus's view. Lehrs is quite wrong when he says that we have anything of Didymus which did not pass through this editor's hands.

And, while we have seen that it is probable that this second century edition contained a complete paraphrase, it is quite impossible to maintain that "the paraphrase" as we have it, all derives from this time; such an assertion disregards the long-continued processes of rewriting, rearranging, and reshuffling which the scholia have passed through since then. In reality, there is no such homogeneity throughout the paraphrastic renderings as would render this assumption of one common origin desirable; they suffer from book to book, and from ode to ode, great variations both in quantity and in quality, while the introductory formulae vary almost indefinitely: e.g. sch. *N. II, 9a* (in a note from Aristarchus), οὕτω γὰρ τὰ ἐπόμενα συναρμοσθήσεται . . .

This last instance introduces a further point where Lehrs has erred. He does not say that his "Paraphrast" found no paraphrases already in the scholia; on the contrary his Chapter V is a detailed account of

the growth of paraphrastic renderings of the poets. But he makes no proper allowance elsewhere for the extent to which our paraphrastic notes may be descended from sources earlier than the second century. As Lehrs himself shows, it was a natural and common method of explanation — Didymus uses it even for Demosthenes¹ — and several such notes in our Pindar scholia bear the names of Didymus and Aristarchus. Further, Lehrs himself (pp. 54–56) points out that there are extant continuous paraphrases of Homer, which employ the same trick with *καί* as he has identified in the Pindar scholia and which render positives by superlatives also. The *στίγματα* which he is at pains to point out serve to distinguish paraphrastic renderings from other notes in our corpus of scholia, but there is nothing to distinguish these paraphrases from those made to illustrate other authors. Pindar was a difficult writer, with an intricate word order and puzzling connections of thought;² so that there was probably a fair amount of paraphrase in the commentaries existing before the second century. Thus, any one portion of paraphrase may draw its origin from almost any point in the tradition, and the form in which we find it is probably due mainly to the copyists. Lehrs's "Paraphrast," except in so far as he may be identified with the second century Epitomator, or the fourth century Redactor, vanishes into thin air.

The whole difficulty really arises from the making of a sharp distinction between paraphrastic notes and other kinds of comment. The word is convenient for alluding to that kind of note, but if the distinction is pushed at all far it becomes fundamentally unsound. As Wendel remarks,³ "alle antike Interpretation hat zwei Grundelemente — Paraphrase und Einzelerklärung," and further, "in der Art der Überlieferung kein grundsätzlicher Unterschied zwischen paraphrastischen und glossematischen Scholien vorliegt." The two merge easily and naturally into one another, and both are found in close con-

¹ Demosthenes Commentary, col. 9, 19 ff.

² The scholiasts found him so: sch. O. II, 153b (on φωνάεντα συνετοῖσιν) . . . οἶδε γὰρ ὅτι πολλῇ ἱστορίᾳ κέχρηται καὶ σχήμασιν . . . ἔχει γὰρ ὑπέρβαρα πολλά: sch. O. I, 58, θερμός τις ὢν καὶ πολύνους περὶ τὰ νοήματα.

³ Überlieferung d. Theokrit Scholien, p. 84. Cf. C. Degenhardt, *De veterum grammaticorum scholis* (Münster, 1909), p. 81 ff., and (with Degenhardt) Quintilian, I, 8, 13; 9, 2.

junction and combination with other exegetical matter. Every scholiast is more or less a paraphrast and must be so; when we talk of "paraphrases" in the Pindar scholia, it is merely a short and convenient term for "scholia of a paraphrastic kind."

Lehrs has, however, done work of value in emphasizing the important rôle which such notes play in our Pindar scholia, and in investigating the methods of explanation which they employ. I have given a summary statement of his position above; but as this class of note has been widely used as a basis of inference as to the text — an attractive but often dangerous proceeding — some further remarks on this matter may not be out of place.

The introductory formulae, being liable to alteration at the pleasure of the scribe, are not very safe evidence for anything; but in general it may be said that τὸ ἐξῆς¹ is followed by a fairly close version of the text (sometimes merely a rearrangement of Pindar's words in prose order, e.g. sch. *O.* vii, 86*d*; *P.* ix, 1*c*: cf. τὸ ὑπέρβατον, so used in sch. *P.* i, 84); while ὁ δὲ νοῦς and its variants introduce a much freer rendering, it may be an expansion, of the text. An excellent example of this opposition is sch. *O.* i, 1*b*, ὁ δὲ νοῦς τοῦ προοιμίου ὅλου τοιοῦτος . . . as compared with *ibid.*, 1*d*, τὸ δὲ ἐξῆς τοῦ λόγου. . . . Sometimes, however, ὁ δὲ νοῦς introduces a fairly literal paraphrase; sometimes it is followed by notes which can only be called paraphrastic in the broadest sense of the term: e.g. sch. *O.* v, 1*b*; *P.* iv, 491; viii, 10*b* (ὁ δὲ νοῦς ὅλος . . .); *I.* vi, 10*b*. Sometimes in these paraphrastic renderings there occur curious reminiscences of other portions of Pindar's text: e.g. sch. *I.* iv, 1*c* where ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὕτως introduces a paraphrase of ἔστι μοι θεῶν ἑκατὶ μυρία παντῶ κέλευθος in the following terms:—τῶν Μουσῶν ἐπιτρεπουσῶν ἐστὶ μοι πανταχοῦ οὐ προσάντης ἀλλ' εὐμαρῆς ἢ τῶν ὕμνων ὁδός — a clear throw-back to *I.* ii, 33, οὐ γὰρ πάγος, οὐδὲ προσάντης ἀ κέλευθος γίνεται: cf. sch. *N.* x, 87 where, in a rendering of Λύκαιον παρ Διὸς θῆκε δρόμῳ there occur the words παρὰ τοῦ Διὸς βωμῶ,² a reminiscence of *O.* xiii, 108 Λυκαίου βωμὸς ἄναξ. Similar is

¹ Distinguish this technical use from τὰ ἐξῆς = etc.; for examples of this latter cf. sch. *O.* i, 20*a*; xiii, 27*c*.

² The absurdities which have been deduced from this paraphrase have been rightly condemned by O. Schröder in his critical edition of *Pindar* (Teubner, Leipzig, 1900), n. on *N.* x, 48. The scholiast took δρόμῳ = σὺν ποδῶν σθένει, and παρ

sch. *P.* II, 131*b*, where γένοι' οἶος ἐσσι μαθῶν appears as μαθῶν δέ, φησί, τὸ γεγραμμένον, γενήθητι οἶος εἶ, σοφός, καὶ σύνες τὸ λεγόμενον. . ., obviously reminiscent of the hyporcheme quoted just previously (sch. 127) Σύνες ὃ τοι λέγω. . .

These passages are only particular instances of a general truth which cannot be too strongly emphasized. The paraphrastic notes, even when introduced by the characteristic formulae, are not necessarily to be trusted as faithful renderings of the text which they represent; the attempt to deduce from their waywardnesses, both in omission and in addition, some variant in the text which the "paraphrast" *must* be trying to render, has been responsible for a good deal of wasted ingenuity. It is no doubt true that sometimes the paraphrase preserves a reading not referred to in other notes, but that is, as would be expected in view of the nature of the tradition, very seldom the case. When a paraphrase is the only note available, the attempt to extract readings from it should proceed with great caution: e.g. in sch. *O.* VII, 60*c* the words (line 32) ναῶν πλόον εἶπε . . . εἰθὺν ἐς ἀμφιθάλασσον νομόν are rendered (after ὁ δὲ νοῦς) by εἰθῆναι τὴν ναῦν εἰς τὴν νῆσον τὴν 'Ρόδον: the practically unanimous evidence of the manuscripts is for ναῶν in the text, yet Schröder thought it necessary to mention this ναῦν in the paraphrase, and cite Homer and Apollodorus to refute it. διὰ πλοίων is the version of another paraphrastic rendering (56*b*); and if the words of 60*c* are to be treated with such respect, the substitution of εἰς τὴν νῆσον τὴν 'Ρόδον for ἐς ἀμφιθάλασσον νομόν ought to cause alarm. There is a considerable number of such fictitious variants in Schröder's footnotes. In face of the fact that the paraphrases frequently make no attempt at an accurate rendering, it is absurd to treat them as if they were always exact. There are countless places where they take liberties with the text; e.g. sch. *O.* XIV, 28*a*, where the trick of two words joined by καὶ is applied even to a proper name — ὦ Φήμη καὶ 'Ηχώ (rendering Pindar's 'Αχοῖ); sch. *P.* III, 18*b*, after ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἐξῆς οὕτως, and while reproducing Pindar's exact words in prose order, suddenly omits 'Αρτέμιδος altogether; sch. *P.* IV, 113*a* deliberately inserts an ἐν (113*b* shows that there was no preposition before παισί), and ἐν intrudes again in a paraphrastic note at sch. *P.*

Δίως = "at the temple of Zeus"; in the rendering of this latter phrase the words of *O.* XIII, 108 came into his mind.

x, 12a. Sch. N. x, 1b, c omits all mention of ἀγλαοθρόνους; sch. N. x, 153, πάντων τε τῶν καλῶν βούλει αὐτῷ ἀπομερίσασθαι τὸ ἴσον, is the rendering of line 85, πάντων δὲ νοεῖς ἀποδάσσεσθαι ἴσον. τῶν καλῶν is an intelligent supplement which has no place in the text; but Bergk, while disregarding it, was willing to use the paraphrase as evidence for τε. This fickleness of the paraphrases does no harm whatever when it is plain and unmistakable; but when it is not quite so obvious, or when there is any possible doubt about the text rendered, it is as well to be cautious in using the paraphrase as evidence for the exact words of Pindar.

II. τὸ σημεῖον χ

An Alexandrian critical edition (a διόρθωσις) was a text equipped with a variety of metrical and critical signs (σημεῖα) designed to ease the reader's path. The metrical signs do not concern our scholia, except for the κορωνίς, which appears in the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of the Paeans,¹ and is referred to in P. vi, metrica b, where it is noted that the ode is μονόστροφος, and that there is therefore no need of the usual κορωνίς to mark the beginning of each strophe — διὸ οὐδὲ κορωνίσι χρῶνται ἐπ' αὐτῶν διὰ μέσον.

The critical signs of the Alexandrians are best known, as they were probably most elaborate, in connection with Homer. So far as the scholia on Pindar are concerned, we need mention only two. There was small scope for the obelus in Pindar, and it appears only once (sch. O. ii, 48f), on the famous φιλέοντι δὲ Μοῖσαι which Aristophanes (cf. 48c) rejected.²

With these exceptions, all the many references to τὸ σημεῖον seem to involve the same sign — the χ. This is either referred to by name, e.g. sch. P. viii, 142, τὸ χ, ὅτι ὑπερβάτως εἴρηκε: or as τὸ σημεῖον, e.g. sch. P. ix, 64a, τὸ σημεῖον ὅτι μεταφορικῶς εἴρηκε: or by vaguer phrases, σημειῶσαι ὅτι . . . (sch. O. vii, 35c; one manuscript has τὸ δὲ σημεῖον ὅτι . . .), σημειωτέον ὅτι . . . (sch. O. xiv, 45c, cf. sch. P. iv, 135d, where B has σημειωτέον, the other manuscripts τὸ δὲ σημεῖον

¹ V. 841: Grenfell and Hunt, introd., p. 14.

² In sch. O. viii, 10g a σημεῖον at a difficult passage is noted, and MS. B has an obelus beside the text; but this is not the usual meaning of τὸ σημεῖον used thus, and the obelus is probably a mistake.

χ ὅτι . . .), σεσημείωται ὁ τόπος (sch. *I.* IV, 47*c*), or simply ὅτι prefixed to the note, e.g. sch. *O.* VI, 21*c* ὅτι ἐκ παραλλήλου τέθεικε τὰς ἀντωνυμίας; once a place so marked is said κεχιάσθαι (sch. *I.* VI, 47*e*).¹ A full list of all these instances is to be found in Drachmann, vol. III, Index XX (*Sermo Technicus*) under the foregoing headings; it cannot be doubted that they all refer to the same sign, especially as under each mode of reference the sign marks a wide variety of subjects which had been thought worthy of notice. These subjects may be grouped as follows:

- (i) A large group dealing with matters of vocabulary, phraseology, expression. Cf. sch. *I.* IV, 47*c*, Χρύσιππος δὲ, σεσημείωται, φησίν, ὁ τόπος διὰ τὴν φράσιν: such notes are sch. *O.* VI, 78*i*, 90*d*; *O.* VII, 3*d*, 159*b*, 161*c*; VIII, 10*g*, 33*d*, 61*b*; *P.* I, 127*a*; III, 18*c*; IV, 135*d*, 144, 149*b*, 194*b*, 215*b*, 365*b*; *P.* V, 16*b*, 124*g*; VIII, 26*a*; XI, 46*c*; *I.* I, 58*a*; IV, 47*c*.
- (ii) The use of figures: σύλληψις, sch. *P.* III, 160; IV, 305; metaphor, *P.* IV, 381; IX, 64; hyperbaton, *P.* VIII, 142; σχῆμα Ἀλκμανικόν, *P.* IV, 318*a* (cf. *b*).
- (iii) Syntactical points: κῶλα ἀσυνάρτητα, sch. *P.* III, 18*a*; *I.* VI, 47*e*; ἀντωνυμία περισσὴ, *O.* VI, 21*c*; anacoluthon, *I.* V, 18*a*.
- (iv) Matters of fact: geography, sch. *P.* IX, 14*a*; *O.* VII, 35*c*; concerning the victor, *O.* VI, 130*a*; VIII, 152*e*; XIV, 45*c*.
- (v) To mark a borrowing (from Homer and Hesiod): sch. *P.* IV, 507.
- (vi) Points of Mythology (especially Pindar's sources, or his innovations), sch. *O.* III, 52*a*; VI, 23*e*, 48*d*; IX, 70*d*; X, 78*f*; XIII, 82*d*; *P.* IV, 15*b*, 431; V, 35*d*; IX, 185*a*; X, 51*a*; XI, 22; *I.* IV, 104*f*.

It should be noted that four of the above-mentioned instances, sch.

¹ Lehrs, *op. cit.*, p. 106, rebuked Boeckh for saying this is a reference to χ and declared it to be a rhetorical word, referring to the κῶλα ἀσυνάρτητα here noted. That Boeckh was right can be shown by a reference to sch. *P.* III, 18*a*, where οἱ ὑπομνηματισάμενοι are said to have set a χ to mark such κῶλα ἀσυνάρτητα, and to sch. Eurip., *Medea*, 1346, ὅτι δοκεῖ τὸν στίχον τοῦτον εἰπῶν Εὐριπίδης ἐκβεβλήσθαι διὸ κεχίασται.

P. iv, 135^d, 144, 194^b (all on φράσις) and 507 (the borrowing) connect and compare Pindar's words or usages with those of Homer.

The incidence of these references to χ is also remarkable: 20 instances on the *Olympians*, 26 on the *Pythians*, none at all on the *Nemeans*, and 5 on the *Isthmians*; 11 are found in the scholia to *P.* iv alone. At first sight this seems rather remarkable; but it will be noticed that the frequency of these notices roughly agrees with the quality of the scholia in which they occur; where these are very good, there are many references to χ, as in *P.* iv. Where the scholia decline in quality, and the manuscripts are fewer, χ vanishes almost altogether, as in the *Nemeans* and *Isthmians*. In the latter book, 3 of the 5 references are in the barest form — a mere ὅτι; the other two (sch. *I.* iv, 47^c; vi, 47^e) are διαβεβημένα ζητήματα.

Further, the χ sign is noted in one or two instances in the *scholia recentia*, where it does not appear in the *vetera* (e.g. sch. *P.* iv, 381^b: v. Drachmann *a.l.*), and, in the *vetera*, the variations among the manuscripts are most peculiar. The recension A has the reference to the athetizing at sch. *O.* ii, 48^c, and a χ-note introduced by ὅτι at sch. *O.* vi, 21^c, but that is absolutely all; yet the V recension for the same odes has 17 references to the σημείον. Among the manuscripts of the V recension, B preserves references to χ more often than any other manuscript in the *Olympians*, but after sch. *P.* iv, 135^d it has not a single instance in the *Pythians*, while its fellow manuscripts have 22; for the *Isthmians*, again, it has all 5.

Lehrs¹ argued, from these extra instances in the *scholia recentia*, and from the apparent carelessness of our manuscripts as regards these notes, that they were dropped or added at will by later scholars. He denied that "die Anwendung des χ als einziges Zeichen für alles, welches alle andern Zeichen verdrängt" is early; on the contrary, it must, he said, be "ziemlich neu." He did not of course deny that χ itself is an old sign; indeed he quoted Diogenes Laertius iii, 65 (on the usage in texts of Plato), τὸ χ λαμβάνεται πρὸς τὰς λέξεις καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ ὅλως τὴν Πλατωνικὴν συνήθειαν, a sufficiently varied use.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 106 ff. His arguments from the *Editio Romana* have now no force: for we know that the manuscript basis of that edition was wider than Lehrs thought; cf. Drachmann, i, xix; ii, x.

It is, however, now established¹ that this use of χ as a "general utility" sign, to call attention to any point of interest or difficulty, dates back to Aristophanes of Byzantium. It occurs frequently in the Euripides scholia,² and also in those on Aristophanes. Whether Aristarchus so used it or not, is not so certain;³ it occurs in notes, of differing character, bearing his name, in sch. Pindar *I.* vi, 47e and sch. Aristoph. *Aves*, 76. In any case its age and authenticity are beyond doubt;⁴ the sporadic nature of its appearances in the manuscripts of the Pindar scholia admits of explanation.

For even in early times the meaning of these signs was often controversial; cf. sch. *I.* vi, 47e (where the reason for the presence of χ is disputed), and sch. *I.* iv, 47c (where Chrysippus's reason for it is treated with scorn). In later days, when the χ began to disappear from the texts, and the introductory formulae in the commentary had been cut down to σημειώτεον ὅτι . . . σημείωσαι ὅτι . . . or simply ὅτι . . . , the reference was evidently sometimes unintelligible; the copyist then dropped the ὅτι, or expanded it in other ways. Thus, at sch. *P.* v. 35d, MS. B omits the short sentence introduced by ὅτι . . . , E retains it as it stands, G.Q. write *ιστέον ὅτι* . . . ; at sch. *P.* ix, 185a, E again reads simply ὅτι . . . , D.G.Q. have *σημείωσαι ὅτι* . . . , and B has *ἐνιοι γάρ φασιν ὅτι* . . . ; at sch. *P.* xi, 22, E has simply ὅτι . . . , D.G.Q. *τὸ σημείον ὅτι* . . . , and B has *ιστέον ὅτι* . . .

Hence, probably, the remarkable absence of these χ -notes in B for the *Pythians*, hence their absence in A. The reference formulae were omitted, or cut down, and the resultant obscurities were dealt with by each copyist after his own fashion. The number of references which thus disappeared was probably large and would grow with every copy-

¹ Cf. Gudeman, in Pauly-Wissowa, s. v. "Scholien," 668; White, *Scholia to the Aves*, p. 216, sch. 1178.

² v. Index in E. Schwartz's edition (Berlin, 1887-91); U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *De Rhesi Scholiis* (Greifswald, 1877).

³ A cross sign, presumably χ , occurs, side by side with Aristarchus's διπλῆ, in the margins of the Paeans papyrus. This sign also appears in the Corinna Papyrus (*Berliner Klassikertexte*, V [xvi]), where Wilamowitz (p. 64) says it seems no more than a *nota bene*.

⁴ For a full treatment of the question, see F. Osann, *Anecdotum Romanum* (Giessen, 1851), and H. Schrader, *Notatio critica a veteribus grammaticis in Poetis Scaenicis adhibita* (Bonn, 1864).

ing; hence the appearance of χ , occasionally, in the *scholia recentia* and in the *editio Romana*, where it is not now found in the *scholia vetera*: for both of these collections drew on manuscript sources not now available. There is thus every reason to assume that unattached $\delta\tau\iota$. . . beginning a clause marks a reference to χ ; and it may well be that in some cases *ιστέον ὅτι* in the scholia has superseded such a reference.

III. ὑπόμνημα

ὑπόμνημα was a word of very varied application. It was used to signify notes or memoranda of all sorts, such as a tradesman's day-book (Dem. 1193.2), public records (Plut. 2.867 A), or compilations of any kind, such as the *Commentarii* of Caesar. In the more restricted field of learned compilations, it had originally the same breadth of reference, and we hear, for example, of ὑπομνήματα ἱστορικά by Aristotle. Later, however, it acquired the more definite technical meaning of a "commentary" on a text, and seems to have been so used in Alexandrian times in distinction to σύγγραμμα, the latter being regarded as an article or pamphlet, either on some particular point or on some general subject of interest, — a monograph which might deal in generalities, or in details, without the necessity, imposed on a commentary, of retaining some proportion to the extent of text annotated. The number of such συγγράμματα was large, and they were regularly used in preparing ὑπομνήματα; cf. Didymus in sch. Homer *Il.* II, 111, εἰ γὰρ τὰ συγγράμματα τῶν ὑπομνημάτων προτάττοιμεν.¹

It is thus clear that such a distinction was drawn in antiquity; indeed, it was natural and convenient. There is, however, evidence that the distinction was not completely exclusive, and that the word ὑπόμνημα never entirely lost some of its early breadth of meaning. Otherwise what are we to make of such titles as Heracleon of Egypt's ὑπόμνημα εἰς "Ὅμηρον καὶ εἰς τοὺς λυρικοὺς, Zeno's ὑπόμνημα εἰς Ξενοφῶντα, εἰς Λυσίαν, εἰς Δημοσθένη, Sallustius's ὑπόμνημα εἰς Δημοσθένη καὶ Ἡρόδοτον? These can only be what would, in contrast to line by line commentaries, be classed as συγγράμματα.

It will be noted that in all these titles the formula is ὑπόμνημα εἰς.

¹ On this cf. Gudeman, in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. Scholien, 628.

ὑπόμνημα followed by a genitive always, I think, refers to a commentary strictly so called, e.g. Amherst Papyri II (ed. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, London, 1901), 3 f., no. 12 (third century), Ἀριστάρχου Ἡροδότου ᾧ ὑπόμνημα; Ammonius *de diff.* 70, Δίδυμος ἐν ὑπομνήματι τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Παιάνων Πινδάρου; *ibid.*, 80; Δίδυμος ἐν ὑπομνήματι β' Ἰλιάδος; sch. Theoc. X, 18, Ἀρίσταρχος ἐν ὑπομνήματι Λυκούργου Αἰσχύλου; Harpocration *s.v.* ἐνθρυπτα, Δίδυμος ἐν ὑπομνήματι τοῦ λόγου ("the speech"); *s.v.* γαμήλια, Δίδυμος ἐν τοῖς Ἰσαίου ὑπομνήμασιν. Further, this construction with the genitive never occurs in such prodigious titles as those given in the last paragraph. It would thus seem to be the usual method of reference to a "commentary"; and when in sch. Pind. O. vi, 154a we find, περὶ δὲ τῆς σκυτάλης καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἀρχιλόχου ὑπομνήμασιν εἴρηται, there is little doubt that the reference is not to Aristophanes's famous σύγγραμμα, περὶ τῆς ἀχνυμένης σκυτάλης, but to a commentary on Archilochus which had used it.

It would be satisfactory to round off the matter by saying that ὑπόμνημα εἰς . . . can never refer to such regular commentaries. It certainly is of comparatively rare occurrence in this connection; but it does appear once or twice, e.g. Harpocration *s.v.* γαμήλια, Δίδυμος ἐν τοῖς εἰς Δημοσθένη; *s.v.* ὀξυθύμια, ἐν τῷ ὑπομνήματι εἰς τὸν κατὰ Δημάδου (the reference in both cases is quite clearly to a commentary). With this we may compare the instance, comparatively late, no doubt, of sch. Eurip., *Medea*, 9, ἐκ τοῦ ἀνεπιγράφου ὑπομνήματος τοῦ εἰς Πινδαρον ἔγραψα — an extract from our Pindar commentary.

Thus it would seem that, though we cannot be quite sure that Palamedes' ὑπόμνημα εἰς Πινδαρον τὸν ποιητὴν (see p. 44 *supra*) was not a commentary, the probability is that it was not; his other work is of a different kind, and that title may quite well indicate a σύγγραμμα of some sort.

It should be added that Musurus in the *editio princeps* of the scholia to Aristophanes (1498) uses ὑπομνήματα as the name for the source from which he drew. The *Etymologica*, too, sometimes cite from ὑπομνήματα, e.g. *Etymologicum Gudianum*, 348.20, οὕτως εὑρον ἐν ὑπομνήματι Ἰλιάδος. The manner of citation may of course be taken over from earlier compilations; but such instances seem to point to a possibility that the citation from sch. Euripides, *Medea*, 9 (see above, and on p. 46, *supra*)

may merely refer to a borrowing after our Pindar commentary had become marginal scholia. It is not, however, likely that ἐκ τοῦ ἀνεπιγράφου ὑπομνήματος could mean "from marginal scholia."

To sum up, it will be seen that the ordinary meaning of ὑπόμνημα in the strict Alexandrian usage seems to have been a commentary, directed to the continuous interpretation of a text and following it fairly closely. I have adopted (p. 43) the now accepted view that these ὑπομνήματα were separate entities, written continuously, apart from the text, and in separate papyrus rolls, until the fourth or fifth century A.D. The old opinion, that they were marginal notes, from the time of Didymus, if not earlier, was put forward by Wilamowitz, *Herakles*, I¹, p. 165 ff., and Susemihl, II, p. 201. Its falsity was recognised by Diels and Schubart in their introduction (1904) to the Demosthenes Commentary of Didymus (*Berliner Klassikertexte*, I, p. xxvii). W. G. Rutherford, in *A Chapter in the History of Annotation* (1904), p. 22, had already given an outline of the correct view: conclusive proof was furnished in 1914 by J. W. White in the introduction to his *Scholia on the Aves of Aristophanes*; and Wilamowitz, who so late as 1907 (*Kultur der Gegenwart*, I, viii,² 96) had maintained the contrary opinion, finally (*Pindaros* [1922], p. 3) accepted this demonstration.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS AND THE ARTS¹

BY A. PHILIP McMAHON

IN describing the quest of *Marius the Epicurean* for the true philosophy, Walter Pater borrows from the *Hermotimus* of Lucian to present some of the arguments of Scepticism.² He makes a young Stoic illustrate a point by saying: "To make it clear, then, let us suppose that two men had entered a temple, of Aesculapius, — say! or Bacchus: and that afterwards one of the sacred vessels is found to be missing." It would be necessary to search only one of them to ascertain which one had the stolen treasure. By a similar process he has arrived at the conclusion that Stoicism is the only true philosophy. Consequently, he asks: "Why trouble ourselves further?"

"No need," Lucian replies, "if something had indeed been found, and you knew it to be the lost thing: if, at the least, you could recognize the sacred object when you saw it. But truly, as the matter now stands, not two persons only have entered the temple, one or the other of whom must needs have taken the golden cup, but a whole crowd of persons. And then, it is not clear what the lost object really is — cup, or flagon, or diadem; for one of the priests avers this, another that; they are not even in agreement as to its material: some will have it to be of brass, others of silver, or gold. It thus becomes necessary to search the garments of all persons who have entered the temple, if the lost cup is to be recovered. And if you find a golden cup on the first of them, it will still be necessary to proceed in searching the garments of the others; for it is not certain that this cup really belonged to the temple. Might there not be many such golden vessels? — No! we must

¹ This treatment is chiefly directed to the plastic arts, which most clearly illustrate and test the Sceptical attitude. Discussions of literature are sometimes led to unreliable conclusions through a confusion of words, the materials of that art, with its meaning, but this is less likely to be the case with sculpture, painting, and architecture. I am indebted to the Librarian of Columbia University for access to the necessary books.

² Walter Pater, *Marius the Epicurean* (Modern Library, n.d.), pp. 328 ff. Cf. *Luciani Samosatensis Opera* (ed. C. Jacobitz, Leipzig, 1884), I, 334 f.

go to every one of them, placing all that we find in the midst together, and then make our guess which of all those things may fairly be supposed to be the property of the god.”¹

Yet in the very chapter preceding the one in which he states the views of Lucian, Pater had said: “The more highly favored ages of imaginative art present instances of the summing up of an entire world of complex associations under some single form, like the *Zeus* of Olympia, or the series of frescoes which commemorate *The Acts of Saint Francis*, at Assisi, or like the play of Hamlet or Faust.”² Pater had then shown how Marius was confronted with the Christian liturgy, a dramatic statement of one of the two great answers which late antiquity gave to the Sceptical questions.

Without pausing at this moment to discuss the implications of Pater’s remarks, we should note the significance which he attaches to works of art. It is one which, though a commonplace in modern³ thought, does not seem to have been generally accepted in antiquity, but it was indeed made possible through Neoplatonism. In what follows I hope to indicate the general importance of the references to works of art made by philosophical writers, systematic thinkers rather than composers of philosophical novels. But instead of preceding the Sceptical questions, as in Pater’s pages, the philosophy which made his evaluation of art possible did so as a part of its reply to methodical negation.

THE AIM OF SCEPTICISM⁴

By way of preface to an account of the development and characteristic doctrines of Scepticism,⁵ one significant passage in Sextus Empiri-

¹ Lucian himself, according to his *Somnium sive Vita*, 1 f., began as an apprentice to his uncle, a sculptor, but turned to literature after he broke a marble slab and was beaten for it.

² *Marius*, p. 303 f.

³ This term was, apparently, first used with regard to art by Cassiodorus, while referring to the architect as, “antiquorum diligentissimus imitator, modernorum nobilissimus institutor.” (*Var.* IV, 51; Migne, P. L., vol. LXIX, col. 642.) Cf. Karl Borinski, *Die Antike in Poetik und Kunsttheorie*, I (Leipzig, 1914), 57.

⁴ Cf. M. Pohlenz, “Das Lebensziel der Skeptiker,” *Hermes*, XXXIX (1904), 15-29.

⁵ A. W. Benn, *The Greek Philosophers* (New York, n.d., 2nd ed.), pp. 421-422: “In modern parlance, the word scepticism is often used to denote absolute unbelief. This, however, is a misapplication; and, properly speaking, it should be reserved,

cus¹ may be quoted, to show the intimate association between Scepticism and aesthetic values in general,² and more particularly between the classical metaphysical doctrine of substance³ and the aesthetic doctrine of imitation.

In this passage the Sceptical objective of tranquillity appears. At the same time we find the conventional understanding of art as imitation in the anecdote about Apelles. Such a theory of art corresponds to and is logically consistent with the classical theory of an underlying substance, something uniformly subsisting beneath all phenomena.⁴ Sextus himself was a physician, but it must be remembered that the

as it was by the Greeks, for those cases in which belief is simply withheld, or in which, as its etymology implies, the mental state connoted is a desire to consider of the matter before coming to a decision."

¹ The Teubner text has been used as far as it goes: *Sexti Empirici Opera* (ed. H. Mutschmann), vol. I, ΠΤΡΩΝΕΙΩΝ ΤΙΟΤΤΙΩΣΕΩΝ libros tres continens (Leipzig, 1912); vol. II, *Adversus Dogmaticos* libros quinque, *Adversus Mathematicos*, VII-XI continens (Leipzig, 1914). Translations: J. A. Fabricius, *Sexti Empirici Opera, Graece et Latine*. 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1840-41), (First ed., Leipzig, 1718); *Les Hypotheses ou Institutions de Sextus Empiricus en Trois Livres* (n.p., 1725); Eugen Pappenheim, *Des Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoneische Grundzüge* (Leipzig, 1877); *Erläuterungen zu des Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoneischen Grundzügen* (Leipzig, 1881) (Philosophische Bibliothek, vols. 74 and 86). Mary M. Patrick, *Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism* (Cambridge, 1899). (With a Translation of the First Book of the Pyrrhonic Sketches.)

² On the Sceptical attitude towards modern aesthetics, cf. Max Dessoir, "Skeptizismus in der Aesthetik," *Zeitschrift f. Aesthetik*, II (1907), 449-468.

³ Deriving from the classical theory of underlying substance, the popular notion of reality in the Occident still clings to tangible extension in space as the norm to which all other reals conform. Cf. Bertrand Russell, *Mysticism and Logic* (New York, 1929), p. 21: "The belief that what is ultimately real must be immutable is a very common one: it gave rise to the metaphysical notion of substance, and finds, even now, a wholly illegitimate satisfaction in such scientific doctrines as the conservation of energy and mass."

⁴ Cf. A. W. Benn, *The Greek Philosophers*, pp. 327-328: "Again, the spiritualism taught by Plato and Aristotle alike — by the disciple, indeed, with even more distinctness than by the master — was so entirely inconsistent with the common belief of antiquity as to remain a dead letter for nearly six centuries — that is, until the time of Plotinus. The difference between body and mind was recognized by every school, but only as the difference between solid and gaseous matter is recognized by us; while the antithesis between conscious and unconscious existence, with all its momentous consequences, was recognized by none."

Sceptical school was founded by a painter,¹ and a painter of all those who accepted the theory of imitation must have been most keenly aware that things are not as they seem, that an object represented on a flat surface is not the same identical thing for the eyes and for the hands. Sextus declares:

"Now the end² is that on account of which everything is done or considered, but which is itself not done or considered on account of something else; it is the last of those things for which we strive.³ So far we have always asserted that the Sceptic's end is impassiveness (ἀταραξία) with regard to those things which come under the head of opinion, and moderation (μετριοπάθεια)⁴ under circumstances

¹ Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 61: Πύρρων . . . ὡς φησι δ' Ἀπολλώδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς πρότερον ἦν ζωγράφος. *Ibid.*, IX, 62: Ἀντίγονος δέ φησιν ὁ Καρύστιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ Πύρρωνος τάδε περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἄδοξός τ' ἦν καὶ πένης καὶ ζωγράφος. σφῆσθαι τ αὐτοῦ ἐν Ἡλίδι ἐν τῷ γυμνασίῳ λαμπαδιστὰς μετρίως ἔχοντας. Antigonos of Carystus, who lived in Athens at the same time as Timon, was, together with that writer, the chief source employed by Diogenes Laërtius in his life of Pyrrho. He was a sculptor as well as a writer on philosophy. Cf. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Antigonos von Karystos* (Philologische Untersuchungen, vol. iv, Berlin, 1881). The chief original source for such anecdotes of artists was Duris, the historian and tyrant of Samos, who had been a pupil of Theophrastus. Cf. A. F. Roesiger, *De Duride Samio Diodori Siculi et Plutarchi auctore* (Diss. Göttingen, 1874); J. Dalstein, *Quibus Fontibus Plinius in Artificum Historia usus sit* (Metz, 1885); H. Voigt, *De Fontibus earum quae ad artes pertinent partium Nat. Hist. Plin. quaestiones* (Halle, 1887); F. Münzer, *Beiträge zur Quellenkritik der Naturgeschichte des Plinius* (Berlin, 1897); A. J. Reinach, "Notes critiques aux chapitres de Pline relatifs à l'histoire de l'art," *Revue de Philologie*, xxxviii (1914), 245-254, xxxix (1915), 50-78; K. Robert, *Archäologische Märchen aus alter und neuer Zeit* (Berlin, 1886); Aug. D. Kalkmann, *Die Quellen der Kunstgeschichte des Plinius* (Berlin, 1898). The dramatic emphasis of Duris led Plutarch (*Pericles*, 28, 3) to complain: Δούρις μὲν οὖν οὐδ' ὅπου μὴδὲν αὐτῷ πρόσεστιν ἴδιον πάθος εἰωθὼς κρατεῖν τὴν διήγησιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἐνταῦθα δεινῶσαι τὰς τῆς πατρίδος συμφορὰς ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῶν Ἀθηναίων. On ancient art criticism in general, cf. Édouard Bertrand, *Études sur la Peinture et la Critique d'Art dans l'Antiquité* (Paris, 1893).

² This is a free translation of Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 25-29. Cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.*, III, 235-238.

³ Cicero, *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, I, 12, 42: Quoniam autem id est vel summum vel ultimum vel extremum bonorum (quod Graeci τέλος nōinant), quod ipsum nullam ad aliam rem, ad id autem res referuntur omnes. Cf. *Metaphysics*, A, 2, 994 b 9; *Politics*, H, 13, 1332 a 26.

⁴ Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, V, 31: (Ἀριστοτέλης) ἔφη δὲ τὸν σοφὸν ἀπαθῆ μὲν μὴ εἶναι, μετριοπαθῆ δέ. The word does not occur, apparently, in Aristotle. It is not the

imposed by necessity. For when the Sceptic, to preserve tranquillity, begins to philosophize in order to judge appearances, and to understand which are true and which false, he meets contradictions of equal force and, not being able to decide between them, suspends judgment. Even as he does so there comes to him, by chance, impassiveness in matters of opinion. Whoever thinks that there is anything essentially beautiful or bad in itself is continually perturbed, and when those things thought beautiful are not his, he supposes himself a victim of the things which are essentially bad and pursues what he believes to be the good. Yet when he has secured them he only falls into more trouble, since through unreasonable and immoderate ambition and through fear of reversal he does everything possible not to lose those things that seem good to him. But he who does not determine what things are beautiful or bad in themselves neither avoids nor pursues anything very eagerly, and therefore he remains impassive. The story that is told of the painter Apelles applies to the Sceptic. They say that he was painting a horse, and when he wished to imitate the foam of the horse, it turned out so badly that he gave it up, and the sponge, which he used to clean the colors from his brush, he flung at the picture. When the sponge hit the horse, it made an imitation of the foam.¹ The Sceptics also hoped to attain impassiveness through judging the difference which exists among the things that appear to the senses and among the things that are perceived by the mind, but since they were unable to do this, they suspended judgment. While they did so, as if by chance,² impassiveness followed just as a shadow does a body.”³

same as the Stoic ἀπάθεια, as Diogenes says in his discussion of Pyrrho's opinions (IX, 108): τὰ δ' ὅσα περὶ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀνάγκην, οὐ δυνάμεθα φεύγειν, ὡς τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν καὶ ἀλγεῖν· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ λόγῳ περιελεῖν ταῦτα.

¹ The same or a similar story is told by Dio Chrysostom, *Orat.* 63, Περὶ τύχης; Plutarch, *De Fortuna*, 99 B; Valerius Maximus, VIII, 11, 7.

² (τυχικῶς). Cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, XXXV, 103–104, where similar stories are told of Protogenes, who imitated the foam in the mouth of a dog, and of Nealces, who, like Apelles, imitated that of a horse. In the case of Protogenes, Pliny uses the phrase: “fecitque in pictura fortuna naturam.” He later adds the moralizing remark: “ita Protogenes monstravit et fortunam.” The original source is probably the Peripatetic Duris. The function of happy chance is stressed by Aristotle in *Eth. Nicom.*, Z., 4, 1140 a 5, where a line from Agathon is also quoted with approval: τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε, καὶ τύχη τέχνην.

³ Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 107.

OTHER REFERENCES TO ART IN SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

In the passage just given, the significance of art for the Sceptical attitude is clear. But there are many in which art plays a crucial part. Among the other references to art or to the aesthetic situation in Sextus Empiricus, outside those found in the tropes, are the following: The mind does not know itself, as the architect knows the rules and elements of his art, therefore it cannot know that which thinks.¹ The art of the sculptor and the art of the painter are genuine arts, but magic, divination, and the use of pure Greek are not arts.² When it is urged that rhetoric is a useful art, because it persuades judges to judge properly, Sextus cites the cases of Helen and Phryne to show that beauty is more persuasive than the speeches of an advocate.³ In reply to the claim that orators laud praiseworthy things and condemn what is unworthy, he shows that in the standard illustrations there is always some unworthy or repulsive aspect.⁴ Painting is an art for those who see and music an art for those who hear, since they produce a sensible effect, but there is no art of prudent living in the Stoic sense, for it does not have an appropriate effect on the senses as do those arts.⁵ Incorporeal things such as the Platonic ideas cannot be communicated, cannot be taught or learned, for there is no uniformity with regard to them as there is with regard to the sensations.⁶ Sextus on several occasions⁷ illustrates his argument with the story that it was not the real Helen who went to Troy but an image of Helen.

¹ *Adv. Math.*, VII, 348.

² *Adv. Math.*, I, 182. (Fabricius, II, 72.) Cf. *Adv. Math.*, XI, 188.

³ *Adv. Math.*, II, 3-4. (Fabricius, II, 128-129.) Quintilian (*Inst. Orat.*, XI, 3, 67) admits the effectiveness of painting: *Pictura, tacens opus et habitus semper eiusdem, sic in intimos penetret adfectus, ut ipsam uim dicendi nonnumquam superare uideatur.* (C. Halm, II, 293.) The same writer reports (*Inst. Orat.*, VI, 1, 32) that, for the same reason, plaintiffs often exhibited "*depictam in tabula sipariorum imaginem rei, cuius atrocitate iudex erat commouendus.*" (C. Halm, I, 298). Seneca, *De Ira*, 2, 2, 4, has a similar remark: *Mouet mentes et atrox pictura, et iustissimorum suppliciorum tristis adspectus.* According to Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, XXXV, 23), Lucius Hostilius Mancinus won the consulship by exhibiting pictures of the siege of Carthage in the forum and telling his share in it to the spectators.

⁴ *Adv. Math.*, II, 10 ff. (Fabricius, II, 131 ff.)

⁵ *Adv. Math.*, XI, 197-199.

⁶ *Adv. Math.*, XI, 230.

⁷ *Adv. Math.*, VII, 180-253. Cf. Herodotus, *Hist.*, II, 112-119. Philostratus, *Vita Apollon.*, IV, 16 (136).

THE CONTROVERSY ABOUT MUSIC

The arguments of Sextus about music as a subject of liberal study and interest suggest the attitude which he would have taken towards the fine arts as an academic field if such a thing had been recognized in his age. The arguments are very similar to those which he raises with regard to poetry.¹ Music,² according to Sextus, is a term used in three ways. First, as the science which is concerned with modulations, sounds, and compositions of rhythms or numbers. Thus we say that Aristoxenus was a musician. Second, with skill on the pipes and musical instruments. Finally, through an abuse of language we use the same term for a proper action of any kind. Thus we say that a thing is music when it is well composed, even when speaking of a picture, as inspired or instituted by the Muses. Sextus will not accept music in any of these senses. He shows that for some, music is the most perfect of all things, while others believe that it is not a discipline necessary to happiness;³ on the contrary, it is harmful, since music is a weakening thing. Those who defend it say that if philosophy is the thing that chastens and tempers human life, restrains and controls our impulses and emotions, how much more should we admire music, which does not rule us by force but rather with our consent persuades us and accomplishes the same effect. Pythagoras by means of music on the flute converted intoxicated young men to modesty and sobriety. The Spartans, whose courage was praised by all, went to battle led by music. As music chastises the foolish, and induces moderation, exhorting the timid, it also calms the angry. Plato said that a wise man was like a musician, because his soul was harmonious, well composed, and beautiful. Thus Socrates, even when an old man, was not ashamed to take lessons in playing the cithara. Because our modern music is degenerate and enervated is no reason to condemn that of the ancients, seeing that the Athenians, who held moderation and temperance very desirable, believed music to be something virtuous and serious, and left it as a very necessary discipline to posterity.

¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, VIII, 5, 1339a-1340b.

² This is a paraphrase of Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, VI (Fabricius, II, 238 ff.).

³ Eduard Norden, *Die Antike Kunstprosa*, II (Leipzig, 1923), 670 ff., discusses the controversy over liberal studies in antiquity and the Middle Ages.

Although modern music may weaken the character and make it effeminate, this was not so of ancient, virile music. If we accept poetry as a useful thing in life, we should accept the witness of the poets who testify to the value of music. In conclusion, music not only contributes to gaiety, hymns, feasts, and sacrifices to the gods, and therefore stimulates to the emulation of what is good, but it also consoles hearts that are filled with sorrow.

In accordance with the Sceptic's method in argument, Sextus also gives the reasons of those who are opposed to music. In the first place, not everybody admits that music can sometimes stir the soul and at others calm and compose it. Just as the Epicureans assert that the sound of thunder does not signify some god has appeared, which is a superstitious conclusion, so the effects of music are due to our opinions alone, they are not thus by nature but are such only as a result of our judgments. A sound which will excite horses, for example, will not at all disturb men in a theatre. Furthermore, music is not useful in life, for even when music does moderate or calm the soul, when the music is over, the soul returns to what it was. Sleep and wine are like music in that they do not cure pain. The instance of Pythagoras is an unfortunate one, since he thereby admitted that musicians can accomplish more than philosophers. Those who carry burdens, or row, or perform some other heavy labor, use songs which distract their attention from the hardship of their toil, and the music of flutes is no different, it simply distracts our attention. Many of the barbarians also wage war to the sound of trumpets and drums, but theirs is hardly manly virtue. Even if the Platonists admit music, others, like the Epicureans, do not, asserting that it is associated with laziness, drinking, and wasting money.

After showing such reasons for doubting that music is a sound subject, he analyzes the concepts and terms employed in ancient theories of music, and by the Sceptic dialectic undermines their claims to scientific or philosophic validity.

ATTITUDE TOWARDS ART AND ARTISTS IN ANTIQUITY

Such an attitude towards the arts as vehicles of educational training is consistent with the prevalent attitude towards art and artists until the rise of Neoplatonism. Sextus, in discussing the question

whether the gods exist, also quotes Socrates' proof,¹ reported by Xenophon, of the existence of God, arguing from the evidence of design in the work of artists such as Zeuxis and Polyclitus to the existence of those artists,² and from the world as an orderly construction to its creator, but gives corresponding reasons for rejecting this proof.³ Again, in discussing the problem of causality, he refers to a similar proof from the existence of nature to the first cause.⁴

¹ This is the argument from design accepted by such philosophers as Anselm, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Berkeley, Fichte, Hegel, and Leibnitz.

² The names of these artists became stock illustrations of skilled excellence. Cf. Plato, *Hippias Major*, 290 A, *Meno*, 91 D, *Protagoras*, 311 C, *Gorgias*, 453 C; Xenophon, *Oecon.*, X, 1; Dion. Halicarn., *De Thucyd. histor. iud.*, 4; etc. A characteristic statement is that of Cicero, *Acad. prior.*, 11, 47, 146: Sic ego nunc tibi refero artem sine scientia non posse. an pateretur hoc Zeuxis aut Phidias aut Polyclitus, nihil se scire, cum in his esset tanta sollertia?

³ Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, IX, 92-97. Cf. Xenophon, *Mem.*, 1, 4, 2. Aelian, *Var. Hist.*, XIV, 37 (II [Lyons, 1731], 980-981), reasons in the same fashion from the manner in which artists represent the muses, that their cult is peaceful. Christian apologists, however, argued from the human origin of statues of the gods to the non-existence of pagan divinities. Cf. Athenagoras, *Πρεσβεια περὶ Χριστιανῶν*, 17. (E. Schwartz, *Texte und Untersuchungen*, IV, 2, p. 19, Leipzig, 1891.) συνελόντα φάναι, οὐδὲν αὐτῶν διαπέφενγεν τὸ μὴ ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου γεγονέναι. εἰ τοίνυν θεοί, τί οὐκ ἦσαν ἐξ ἀρχῆς; τί δὲ εἰσιν νεώτεροι τῶν πεποιηκότων; τί δὲ ἔδει αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι ἀνθρώπων καὶ τέχνης; γῆ ταῦτα καὶ λίθοι καὶ ὕλη καὶ περίεργος τέχνη. Lucian, *Zeὺς τραγῳδός*, 38, adopts the same line of argument on this theme as the Christian fathers. The lines of Prudentius, *Contra Symmachum* (II, 39 ff.; Migne, P. L., vol. IX, col. 182-184), summarize the whole attitude:

Aut vos pictorum docuit manus assimilatis
Jure poetarum numen componere monstris:
Aut lepida ex vestro sumpsit pictura sacello,
Quod variis notis, ceraque liquenti
Duceret in faciem, sociique poematis arte
Aucta, coloratis auderet ludere fucis.
Sic unum sectantur iter, et inania rerum
Somnia concipiunt et Homerus, et acer Apelles,
Et Numa, cognatumque malum, pigmenta, camoenae,
Idola, convaluit fallendi trina potestas.

The Stoics, however, had organized a defense of the pagan myths which, allegorically interpreted, provided vehicles for moral instruction. Cf. E. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, III, 1 (1880), 321 ff. The most important example is *Heracleti Quaestiones Homericae* (Leipzig, 1910).

⁴ *Adv. Math.*, IX, 137.

Nevertheless, ancient opinion in general did not include painting and sculpture in the realm of spiritual values,¹ and the analogy drawn by Socrates and rejected by others, was based on the conception of the painter or artist as nothing more than a skilled workman. This appears clearly in Aristotle as well as elsewhere. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* it is said: "Science is a term we use principally in two meanings: in the first place, in the arts we ascribe it to those who carry their arts to the highest accuracy; Phidias, for instance, we call a scientific or cunning sculptor; Polyclitus a scientific or cunning statuary; meaning, in this instance, nothing else by science than an excellence in art."²

Thus in Plato³ the artist is discussed as on a par with the smith and other artisans. The well-known discussion of artists by Socrates in Xenophon is therefore appropriately carried on with a harness-maker.⁴ The philosopher showed that none of the workers in these trades knew the deeper significance of what they were doing. The contention of Isocrates⁵ that Phidias, Zeuxis, and Parrhasius should not be ranked with doll-makers and vase-painters indicates that they were usually so considered. The first step toward placing the artist on the same level as that of educated men in general and according him professional rank was taken when artists such as Apelles, Lysippus, Protogenes, Polyclitus, and Pamphilus wrote on their art, and in the course of technical statements also introduced systematic rules, besides raising certain broader aspects of their occupation as critical questions.⁶

If Socrates dismissed artists as unimportant, Plato found deeper reasons for rejecting the artist and all his works.⁷ The activity of the

¹ Cf. Albert Dresdner, *Die Kunstkritik* (Munich, 1915), pp. 19 ff.; T. Birt, *Das Laienurtheil über bildende Kunst bei den Alten* (Marburg, 1902).

² *Eth. Nicom.*, Z, 6, 1141 a 1. The translation is from *The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle*, translated by D. P. Chase (Everyman's Library), p. 137. Other passages to the same effect are to be found in Aristotle, *Politics*, Θ, 2, 1337 b 8; Plato, *Republic*, VI, 495 D; Xenophon, *Oeconom.*, 4.

³ Plato, *Republic*, II, 373; Xenophon, *Oeconom.*, 7, 15.

⁴ *Memor.*, III, 10.

⁵ Isocrates, *De Permutatione*, 2.

⁶ Cf. H. L. Ulrichs, *Über Griechische Kunstschriftsteller* (Würzburg, 1887); L. v. Ulrichs, *Die Anfänge der griechischen Künstlergeschichte* (Würzburg, 1871-72).

⁷ *Republic*, II, 373; x, 596-598, 601-603; *Laws*, II, 656 D-657 A; *Phaedrus*, 248 D-E.

artist seemed to him merely an imitation of external form, belonging to the irrational part of the soul. What he presents is the imitation of the imitation of the reality. It is the freedom of the artist that Plato especially fears, but yet the state has need of him to make images of the gods, and in this connection he viewed with approval the static forms of Egyptian religious sculpture.¹ In this way the artist was only another sort of doll-maker and nothing could be further from the modern conception of the value and function of art.²

While Aristotle gives hints³ which were taken up by later ages and combined with Platonic ideals in Neoplatonism to afford the foundations of the modern attitude towards art, he does not offer a radical departure from the fundamental concepts of Plato in this respect.⁴ He goes further, however, than Plato, in advising that children be taught to paint: "Moreover, it is necessary to instruct children in what is useful . . . thus they should be instructed in painting, not only to prevent their being mistaken in purchasing pictures, or in buying or selling of vases, but rather as it makes them judges of the beauty of the human form."⁵ Such knowledge led them naturally to critical

¹ Official control of artists' activities, however, was said to be practiced in Greece. Cf. Aelian, *Var. Hist.*, IV, 4 (I [Leyden, 1731], 335): Νόμος Θηβαϊκὸς περὶ τεχνιτῶν καὶ γραφῶν.

² Cf. Eduard Müller, *Geschichte der Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten*, vol. I (Breslau, 1834), vol. II (Breslau, 1837).

³ Cf. *Poetics*, 9, 1451 b 5, that poetry is more serious and philosophical than history; *Poetics*, 6, 1459 b 27, that it is morally justifiable. But by Aristotle these ideas were related only to poetry. Cf. also *Republic*, VI, 501, and V, 472 where ideal imitation in painting is suggested but not developed.

⁴ What is shown of the relation of Plato and Aristotle with regard to the *Poetics* in the following works could also be established with regard to the plastic arts: Ch. Belger, *De Aristotele etiam in Arte Poetica componenda Platonis discipulo* (Diss., Berlin, 1872); Georg Finsler, *Platon und die Aristotelische Poetik* (Leipzig, 1900).

⁵ Cf. *A Treatise on Government*, Translated from the Greek of Aristotle, by William Ellis (Everyman's Library), p. 241. (*Politics*, Θ, 3, 1338 a-b.) Cf. also *Politics*, H, 2, 1337 b. It is particularly noted by Plutarch that Aemilius Paulus provided as instructors for his children not only sophists and rhetoricians but also painters and sculptors. Plutarch, *Aemilius Paulus*, VII. Plato (*Protagoras*, 325 D ff.) had mentioned only letters and music as subjects of instruction for children, but according to Diogenes Laërtius (III, 5) he had himself studied painting.

opinions, but these opinions were with regard to ethical value.¹ The Greek gentleman might acquire an amateur's acquaintance with art, but to develop professional skill in them exposed him to the faults proper to servants and slaves, who must engage in arts that deform the body, the mind, or the understanding, rendering it unfit for the practice of civic virtue, or else are practiced for gain, taking away freedom of mind and making it sordid.² Thus the Greek admitted the fine arts as useful in an intellectual life of leisure, and as subject-matter for ethical analysis, but the attitude towards the artist is one which robs art of what is today considered aesthetic value. The contrast between ancient and modern opinion is vividly put by Plutarch:³ "He who busies himself in mean occupations produces, in the very pains he takes about things of little or no use, an evidence against himself of his negligence and indisposition to what is really good. Nor did any generous and ingenuous young man, at the sight of the statue of Jupiter at Pisa, ever desire to be a Phidias, or, on seeing that of Juno at Argos, long to be Polycletus, or feel induced by his pleasure in their poems to wish to be an Anacreon or Philetas or Archilochus. For it does not necessarily follow, that, if a piece of work please for its gracefulness, therefore he that wrought it deserves our admiration."⁴ Lucian later combined the Sceptical point of view in philosophy with the same attitude towards art when he said,⁵ that if a man were a Phidias or a Polyclitus and produced great works in large number, his works would be praised, but nobody in his right senses would wish to be in his place for he would still be only an artisan, a manual laborer.⁶

¹ *Politics*, H, 5, 1340 a. Cf. *Poetics*, 2, 1448 a 5; 6, 1450 a 25 ff.; 25, 1460 b 8.

² *Politics*, Θ, 2, 1337 b. A similar attitude is expressed in Plato, *Protagoras*, 312 B. Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, xxxv, 76-77) states that it was Pamphilus who made painting the earliest subject taught to free-born boys, first at Sicyon and then elsewhere throughout Greece, and he also notes that "ideo neque in hac neque in toreutice ullius qui servierit opera celebrantur." In *Nat. Hist.*, xxxv, 135, Pliny tells of Metrodorus, sent by the Athenians to Lucius Paulus, to commemorate his triumph and to educate his children.

³ Plutarch, *Pericles*, 1, 2. Cf. Lehnerdt, *De locis Plutarchi ad artem spectantibus* (Königsberg, 1883).

⁴ From the translation appearing under Dryden's name, revised by A. H. Clough (*The Harvard Classics*), xii, 37.

⁵ Περὶ τοῦ ἐμπνεύου, 9.

⁶ Cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, 35, p. 20: parvis gloriabatur tabellis extinctus nuper in

Seneca also refused to admit painters or sculptors among the professors of the liberal arts,¹ and he maintained the inadequacy of the sculptor's materials to express divinity.²

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANCIENT SCEPTICISM³

There is, then, an obvious and impressive difference in the general attitude towards art and artists in antiquity in contrast with the prevailing modern estimate. But, granted the validity of the ancient attitude, the conclusions to be drawn from art objects, understood to be only imitative, technical products, were those logically derived by the Sceptics.

We should, however, observe that ancient Scepticism takes its place at a stage in a process that has often been repeated in the history of thought.⁴ After the great schools of Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Zeno had attained maturity, the principal concern of the adherents of each of these systems was to repeat and develop the original, central

longa senecta Titedius Labeo praetorius, etiam proconsulatu provinciae Narbonensis functus, sed ea re inrisa etiam contumeliae erat.

¹ *L. Annaei Senecae ad Lucilium Epistularum Moralium quae supersunt*, 88, 18.

² *Ibid.*, 31, 10-11. The title of the following is misleading, from the point of view of this essay: Rudolf Eucken, *Ueber Bilder und Gleichnisse in der Philosophie* (Festschrift, Leipzig, 1880).

³ Among the more important modern books on Scepticism are: A. Goedeckemeyer, *Die Geschichte des Griechischen Skeptizismus* (Leipzig, 1905); and Raoul Richter, *Der Skeptizismus in der Philosophie*, vol. I (Leipzig, 1904), vol. II (Leipzig, 1908). Mary Miles Patrick, *The Greek Sceptics* (New York, 1929), is a recent, but not quite satisfactory, work in English.

⁴ Cf. Edwyn Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics* (Oxford, 1913), p. 121: "And yet in the very effort of Greek philosophy there came ever and again the revulsion of despair, the sick feeling that the effort was no good, that there was no winning any real knowledge from the void. That disconsolate sceptical note is heard even in the young adventurous days of Greek philosophy — in Xenophanes." And here he cites the lines of that philosopher which are frequently quoted by Sextus (*Adv. Math.*, VII, 49 and 110; VIII, 326):

Καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὐτὶς ἀνὴρ γένηται [Sextus: ἴδεν] οὐδὲ τις ἔσται
εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,
αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

According to Diogenes Laërtius (IX, 71-73), the Sceptics found predecessors for their way of thought in Homer, the Seven Sages, Archilochus, Euripides, Xe-

doctrines. In the centres of intellectual life, — Alexandria and Rome, as well as Athens, — there was thus a strong momentum tending toward continuity, but at the same time there appeared two other trends. Of these, one was an eclectic confusion of the distinct, characteristic principles of the several schools, and the other a fundamental hesitation with regard to the validity of any system of thought, a doubt whether things in themselves could be known. Histories of philosophy usually distinguish three groups of Sceptics: Pyrrho and his immediate followers; the Middle and New Academy; and the later Sceptics who, after Aenesidemus, returned to Pyrrho.¹ As the Sceptical movement within the Academy is closely bound up with the course of that institution and a reinterpretation of Plato afforded a starting point for the view of Plotinus, the Scepticism of the Academy will not be discussed here.

THE LEADERS OF SCEPTICISM

Pyrrho of Elis,² born about 360 or earlier and living until 270 B.C.,³ is said by Diogenes to have been a pupil of Stilpo's son Bryson.⁴ He seems to have devoted himself to the teachings of Democritus,⁵ one of whose followers, Anaxarchus, he accompanied on the expedition

nophanes, Zeno of Elea, Democritus, Plato, Empedocles, Heraclitus, and Hippocrates. A passage in Plato cited in this connection was *Timaeus*, 40 D-E.

¹ Cf. Paul Elmer More, *Hellenistic Philosophies* (Princeton, 1923), p. 321, where it is said of Sextus: "Despite an occasional confusion of ideas, he has presented once for all and in final form the matter of what is certainly one of the most persistent and most important attitudes of the human mind towards the world in which we live. On the whole I am almost inclined to reckon the works of Sextus, after the Dialogues of Plato and the New Testament, the most significant document in our possession for the Greek Tradition as we are dealing with it in these volumes."

² Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 61-108. Ch. Waddington, *Pyrrhon et le Pyrrhonisme* (Paris, 1877); R. Hirzel, *Untersuchungen zu Ciceros philosophischen Schriften* (Leipzig, 1883), III, 1-250; P. Natorp, *Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblem im Alterthum* (Berlin, 1884), pp. 256 ff.; Victor Brochard, *Les Sceptiques Grecs* (Paris, 1887).

³ Some writers adopt the dates 365-275. Waddington, *op. cit.*, decides that Pyrrho flourished 315/310-300/290 B.C.

⁴ Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 61. But chronology seems to forbid the possibility of Pyrrho's having been a pupil of either Stilpo or Bryson.

⁵ Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 67. On the aesthetic theory of this philosopher, who wrote *περί ζωγραφίας*, see Julius Walter, *Die Geschichte der Aesthetik im Altertum* (Leipzig, 1893), pp. 111 ff.

of Alexander the Great to India.¹ Another very old tradition places Pyrrho among the direct successors of Democritus.² Still other influences appear to have been the sophists' cynicism and doctrine of relativity as well as the Cyrenaic theory of knowledge.³ Pyrrho developed his views only through oral teaching, so that many of the principles attributed to him were probably due to the activity of the school which he founded.⁴ Timon of Phlius⁵ was evidently considered by Sextus the most authoritative exponent of Pyrrho's views.⁶ Before he associated himself with Pyrrho, Timon had been a dancer in his youth,⁷ and had studied with Stilpo, the Megarian. His life extended from about 320 to 230 B.C., and he was known for his satirical poem, *Σίλλοι*, in which he parodied Homer and Hesiod, and mocked all the philosophers with the exception of Xenophanes and Pyrrho.

Scepticism revived in a later ancient group which flourished from the last century B.C. until the second century A.D., drawing upon Pyrrho and Timon, as well as upon the New Academy which had, however, returned to dogmatism after Antiochus of Ascalon. The leaders of this group were Aenesidemus, Agrippa, and Sextus Empiricus.

The retrospective attitude even among the Sceptics, in common with the other late philosophical schools, is indicated by the fact that Aenesidemus, Sextus, and Favorinus⁸ cite the name of the school's

¹ Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 61.

² H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 1912), 55 A 1, pp. 10 ff.

³ Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, VII, 191 ff.

⁴ Properly speaking, the Sceptics did not form a school, in the sense of being an organized group for the investigation of philosophical problems. The Sceptics themselves spoke of their doctrine as an *ἀγωγή* or way of life.

⁵ Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 109-116; Eusebius, *Præf. Evangel.*, XIV, 18, 28; C. Wachsmuth, *Sillographorum Græcorum Reliquiae* (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 8 ff.; H. Diels, *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta* (Berlin, 1901), pp. 173 ff.

⁶ Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, I, 53.

⁷ Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 109: *νέον δὲ καταλειφθέντα χορεύειν, ἔπειτα καταγρόντα ἀποδημῆσαι εἰς Μέγαρα πρὸς Σίλπωνα*. The weapons of humor and satire employed by Timon and Sextus were in turn employed against the Sceptics. Cf. *Anth. Pal.*, VII, 576:

Κάτθανες ὦ Πύρρων; ἐπέχω. πνύματα κατὰ μοῖραν
φῆς ἐπέχειν; ἐπέχω. σκέψιν ἔπανσε τάφος.

⁸ A. Gellius, *Noct. Attic.*, XI, 5, 5; Philostratus, *Vit. Soph.*, XI, 4.

founder in the title of their works. It was characteristic of the period that Timon's poem found a commentator, Apollonides of Nicaea, who dedicated his work to Tiberius Caesar.¹

Aenesidemus of Cnossos taught at Alexandria.² His work *Πυρρώνειοι λόγοι*³ was one from which Photius made extracts,⁴ and it was dedicated to L. Tubero, which suggests L. Aelius Tubero, the friend of Cicero; but since the latter referred to Scepticism as something that had disappeared, conflicting conclusions have been drawn from that dedication by scholars.⁵ His relation to the philosophy of Heraclitus is another topic on which the evidence and historians' opinions differ.⁶ The tropes, or standard Sceptical arguments for suspension of judgment, appear first in Aenesidemus,⁷ as well as the argument against causality.⁸

The birthplace and career of Sextus Empiricus⁹ — a Greek in spite of his name — are uncertain, and it is supposed that he flourished during the second century of the Christian era.¹⁰ His works, however,

¹ Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 109.

² E. Saisset, *Le Scepticisme Aénésidème-Pascal-Kant* (2nd ed., Paris, 1865). Cf. Eusebius, *Praep. Evangel.*, XIV, 18, 29. On the *Aenesidemus* of Reinhold (1792), see E. Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem*, III (Berlin, 1923), 58–69.

³ Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 116.

⁴ Photius, *Bibliotheca* (ed. Bekker, Berlin, 1824), pp. 169 ff.; Philo Judaeus also appears to have drawn on the *ὑποτίπνωσις εἰς τὰ Πυρρώνεια* of Aenesidemus. Cf. Hans von Arnim, *Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandria* (Berlin, 1888), pp. 53–100, (*Philologische Untersuchungen*, Heft 11); Philo, *De Ebrietate*, 167–205; vol. II (Berlin, 1897), pp. 202–210 of *Philonis Alexandrini Opera* (ed. P. Wendland).

⁵ Cf. Karl Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums* (Berlin, 1926), p. 582. (Uebeweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, Erster Teil, Zwölfte Auflage).

⁶ R. Richter, *op. cit.*, I, 30 ff., 321 ff., summarizes and discusses the various views.

⁷ Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, VII, 345. Cf. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, III (2), 23 ff.

⁸ Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 97–99; Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, IX, 195 ff.; *Pyrr. Hyp.*, III, 13 ff. Cf. Carl Hartenstein, *Über die Lehren der antiken Skepsis besonders des Sextus Empiricus in betreff der Causalität* (Diss., Halle, 1888), published also in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 93 (1888), pp. 217–279.

⁹ But cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 236 where Sextus denies that the Sceptics are identical with the Empirical school of physicians, for the latter were dogmatic in their assertion that things are unknowable, whereas the Methodical school preserved a properly Sceptical attitude also in medicine.

¹⁰ Cf. Patrick, *Greek Sceptics*, pp. 262 ff. Sextus refers familiarly to Alexandria, Athens, and Rome.

which survive, are our fullest source for a knowledge of ancient Sceptical doctrines. The most important is the *Πυρρώνειοι ὑποτυπώσεις* in three books. In addition there are two other works, usually designated *Adversus Mathematicos* (*Πρὸς μαθηματικούς*). One work consists of six books against the teachers and teachings included in the classical, liberal curriculum:¹ that is to say, grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy (limited to astrology in Sextus), and music. The other work is directed against the exponents of dogmatic philosophy, and consists of five books, analyzing and refuting current doctrines in logic, physics, and ethics. This is the traditional order, but it is clear that in chronological sequence, the work against the dogmatic philosophers precedes that against the professors of liberal education.

THE DOCTRINES OF ANCIENT SCEPTICISM²

It is possible, in some measure, to distinguish the contributions of these leaders to the various doctrines of Scepticism. Like the Socratics, Epicureans,³ and Stoics,⁴ the Sceptics were moved by a desire for impassiveness (*ἀταραξία*) as their objective, and the general aim was thus ethical rather than speculative. Pyrrho, who was a contemporary of Aristotle and a friend of Alexander the Great, believed that metaphysics, speculation about the nature of things in themselves, cannot bring us this desired end. He found any agreement about the solutions to the essential problems of metaphysics completely lacking in the rival schools of philosophy. Thus peace of mind, the only human happiness, is not secured by metaphysical speculation, but necessarily entails distress and anxiety when we seek certainty in and through philosophy.⁵ Because that study creates endless disputes, it is useless.

¹ Cf. Plato, *Republic*, VII.

² Cf. E. Cassirer, *op. cit.*, I (Berlin, 1906), 162-186, for Scepticism and the beginnings of modern philosophy.

³ According to Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 82, Epicurus wrote Herodotus: ἡ δὲ ἀταραξία τὸ τούτων πάντων ἀποελύσθαι. Timon, according to Sextus (*Adv. Math.*, XI, 141) declared: Εὐδαίμων μὲν (οὖν) ἐστὶν ὁ ἀταράχως διεξάγων καὶ . . . ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καὶ γαληνότητι καθεστώς.

⁴ *Marci Antonini Imperatoris in semet ipsum libri XII*, Θ, 31; *Epicteti Dissertationes*, I, 4, 11.

⁵ Contrary to the Sceptics of antiquity who felt that suspension of judgment led to peace of mind, most moderns feel that Scepticism is itself a state of mental un-

Because we can always prove both the positive and the negative side of every question, it is impossible to reach certainty. Contrary to the opinion of the Stoics, the essence of things as they are in themselves cannot be grasped (*ἀκατάληπτος*).¹ Pyrrho therefore refrains from making positive statements on either side;² he suspends his judgment.³ He differs from the dogmatic philosophers of every kind, in that he refuses absolutely to deny the possibility of knowledge, as the sophists and the leaders of the New Academy deny it, and he also refuses to affirm anything categorically. Pyrrho acquired from the sophists⁴

rest. Cf. Edward Caird, *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers* (Glasgow, 1904), II, 175, who says of the Sceptic: "He has to play the game of life like others, though he is convinced that it is an illusory game, and that the prizes in it are worth nothing; and therefore he is not in earnest in playing it. But a life that is occupied with nothing but vanity must itself be vain. We cannot say that such a consciousness is at rest in itself. We must rather say that it is given over to endless unrest, in so far as it is continually denying the reality and value of the objects, with which nevertheless it has continually to occupy itself."

¹ Diogenes Laërtius, I, 16.

² *Ibid.*, IX, 74, 104.

³ Some thinkers hold that analogy is the basis of logic; cf. Scott Buchanan, *Poetry and Mathematics* (New York, 1929). But E. G. Spaulding, *The New Rationalism* (New York, 1918), p. 154, discusses analogy and echoes the Sceptical attitude: "In general we may conclude, that, if reasoning by analogy is valid, then, paradoxically, this validity rests on some further, non-analogical basis. . . . Thus the universe may be an organism, or it may be a machine; but it may be neither. On the basis of analogy one should neither accept nor reject these possibilities, but should hold his judgment in suspense regarding them until evidence and proof from other sources are at hand to justify a highly probable conclusion one way or the other."

⁴ On Protagoras: the Sceptical title of his principal works was *Καταβάλλοντες λόγοι*. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, VII, 60. His fundamental doctrine is given in Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 51; Plato, *Theaetetus*, 152 A; and the passage of Sextus Empiricus just cited: *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν*. Contrary to the view of F. C. S. Schiller, *Studies in Humanism* (London, 1907) and others, this dictum was the statement of a doctrine that was individualistic, subjective, and sensualistic. This is the view taken by Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen* (Leipzig, 1877), I, 982 ff.; Hans Meyer, *Geschichte der Alten Philosophie* (Munich, 1925), pp. 87 ff.; Natorp, *Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems*, pp. 1 ff., cf. the discussion in the *Theaetetus* beginning with the passage noted above; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, *Γ*, 4, 1007 b 19; 5, 1009 a 6-1011 a 1; *I*, 1, 1053 a 35 ff.; the passage of Diogenes Laërtius just cited; Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 216 ff.; Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Quattuor Pos-*

the relativity of Protagoras as well as the Sceptical conclusions of the Megarian school. Because all sensations and opinions are relative, Pyrrho held that both together cannot give us truth, but merely show how they appear in accidental relations.¹ Convention or custom is the source of all opinions, including ethics, and not natural necessity.² Therefore every statement can be opposed by its contradictory. Neither is more true (οὐδὲν μᾶλλον) than the other (ἰσοσθένεια τῶν λόγων);³ and the grounds for every statement and its contradictory

teriores Commentaria, ed. H. Diels (Berlin, 1895), p. 1098 (Arist. 249 a 25). On Gorgias: *Aristotelis quae feruntur . . . de Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia* (ed. O. Apelt, Leipzig, 1888), p. 187. (Bekker, 979 a 11 ff.); Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, vii, 65–87. Sextus states the doctrine thus: πρῶτον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν, δεύτερον ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπῳ, τρίτον ὅτι εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, ἀλλὰ τοί γε ἀνέξοιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῷ πέλας. The two doctrines agree generally in the negation of truth as an agreement of thought with external things, although the broad inference from the principle of Protagoras is that every impression is true, of Gorgias that every one is false. It is of great interest, in view of the general argument of the present article, to note that, according to Plutarch, Gorgias combined aesthetic penetration with his intellectual nihilism: Γοργίας δὲ τὴν τραγωδίαν εἶπεν ἀπάτην, ἦν ὁ τ' ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος. (*Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat*, 15 D).

¹ Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, ix, 114, according to which Timon “was constantly in the habit of quoting to those who would admit the evidence of the senses when confirmed by the mind, the line: “συνῆλθεν Ἀτταγᾶς τε καὶ Νουμήνιος.” (The usual explanation is that both Attagas the Thessalian and Numenius the Corinthian were conspicuous swindlers.)

² The doctrine that in judgment the essential element is an act of will, that the assent given by the mind to its perceptions (συγκατάθεσις), both as regards theoretical judgment and the evaluation of natural feelings and impulses, is a free voluntary action, is common to both Stoics and Sceptics. The difference between the two is that the Sceptics extended the principle of indifference to include ethical and aesthetic values, which the Stoics did not do. Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, ix, 61: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔφασκεν οὔτε καλὸν οὔτ' αἰσχρὸν οὔτε δίκαιον οὔτ' ἄδικον· καὶ ὁμοίως ἐπὶ πάντων μηδὲν εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, νόμῳ δὲ καὶ ἔθει πάντα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους πράττειν· οὐ γὰρ μᾶλλον τόδε ἢ τόδε εἶναι ἕκαστον. The contrast between φύσις and νόμος is present also in many early thinkers: Archelaus (H. Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, i, p. 410, 47 A 1; and p. 411, 47 A 2); Antiphon (Diels, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 295, 80 B 15); Hippias (Plato, *Protag.*, 337 D); Herodotus, *Hist.*, iii, 38; Xenophon, *Memor.*, iv, 4, 5 ff.; Theodorus (Diogenes Laërtius, ii, 99); Plato, *Gorgias*, 482 E–483 A, where it is placed in the mouth of Callicles. Cf. J. C. Kreibitz, *Geschichte und Kritik des Ethischen Skeptizismus* (Vienna, 1896).

³ Diogenes Laërtius, ix, 75–76. A. Gellius, *Noct. Attic.*, xi, 5, 4. This method of

opposite are equally weighty. Since we know nothing of the existence and nature of things in themselves, they should be indifferent to us (*ἀδιάφορα*). Through such an attitude towards the world, abandoning any pretense of certainty in our judgment, especially any judgment of final values, we attain security in the face of the movements of taste. The agreement of Epicurus and Pyrrho that impassiveness is the ethical end to be sought may be traced to their common obligation to Anaxarchus and Nausiphanes, followers of Democritus, but the direction given to this teaching by Epicurus and Pyrrho is by some historians considered a lapse from Democritus and a return to the sophists.¹ The phrase *οὐδέν μᾶλλον* was meant by the Sceptics not positively but negatively.² To be thoroughly consistent in their teaching, after they had applied this principle to the dogmatic views, the Sceptics applied it to itself.³

Timon's principles have been briefly summarized as follows:⁴

argument is said to have been introduced by Protagoras. Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 51, 53; Clement, *Stromata*, VI, 65; and Seneca, *Epist.*, 88, 43.

¹ W. Windelband, *Geschichte der antiken Philosophie* (3rd ed., Munich, 1912), p. 292.

² Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 75.

³ *Ibid.*, IX, 76: καὶ αὐτῷ δὲ τοῦτω τῷ λόγῳ λόγος ἀντίκειται, ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς μετὰ τὸ ἀνελεῖν τοὺς ἄλλους ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ περιτραπεῖς ἀπόλλυται, κατ' ἴσον τοῖς καθαρτικοῖς, ἃ τὴν ὕλην προεκκρίναντα καὶ αὐτὰ ὑπεκκρίνεται καὶ ἐξαπόλλυται. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 206. This admission was seized upon by opponents of the Sceptics in both antiquity and modern times. Cf. Norman MacColl, *Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus* (London, 1869), p. 100: "The sceptics do not appear to have seen that their supposed disproof of reasonings, if valid, disproved their own reasonings; if, indeed, we can allow those who did not allow of proof to talk of disproof." But Alfred Sidgwick, in "Mr. Bradley and the Sceptics" (*Mind*, III (1894), 336-347), an article on Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, argues against this conclusion. He says (p. 347): "There is no way of escaping the genuine sceptical attack made by any one who is determined not to be led away by personalities or side-issues. Of existing attempts to escape, one of the most ingenious is perhaps that which we have here discussed, — the assumption that a self-contradictory sentence is false, and that a tautology can be true." Cf. also, Alfred Hodder, *The Adversaries of the Sceptic* (New York, 1901).

⁴ Alfred Weber, *History of Philosophy* (trans. Frank Thilly, New York, 1909), p. 150. But the phrase "unreservedly obey the law of nature" is a Stoic rather than a Sceptic expression. The Sceptic equivalent would perhaps be: "conform to the prevailing custom."

"(1) The dogmatic philosophers cannot prove their starting-point, which therefore is merely hypothetical; (2) it is impossible to have an objective knowledge of things: we know how they affect us, we shall never know what they are apart from our intelligence and our senses; (3) hence, in order to be happy, we must abandon barren speculations, and unreservedly obey the law of nature."¹ Three words: ἀκαταληψία, ἐποχή, and ἀταραξία crystallize the Sceptics' advice on these problems.²

He reduced the views of Pyrrho to three leading questions, to which the three principles summarized above may be considered answers: (1) How are things in reality? (2) How should we act with regard to them? (3) What do we gain when we act properly with regard to them?³

Of Agrippa nothing is known except for his reduction of Scepticism to five tropes,⁴ of which the first covers the first nine of Aenesidemus and the second corresponds to the tenth. The basis of this version of the Sceptical attitude goes back to Carneades who showed that proof involves an endless regress from premise to premise (ὁ εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκβάλλων τρόπος), an illegitimately assumed premise (ὁ ὑποθετικός τρόπος), or an argument in a circle (ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος).

In spite of his arguments against the final cause⁵ and causality in general,⁶ and his arguments against theology,⁷ Sextus taught⁸ that

¹ Cf. K. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* (Leipzig, 1855), vol. 1 (*Die Entwicklung der Logik im Altertum*), pp. 497 ff.; F. Enriques, *The Historic Development of Logic* (New York, 1929), pp. 37 ff.

² Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, xi, 20 for Timon's versified statement.

³ Aristocles, in Eusebius, *Praep. Evangel.*, xiv, 18, 2: 'Ο δὲ μαθητὴς αὐτοῦ Τίμων φησὶ δεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα εὐδαιμονήσῃν εἰς τρία ταῦτα βλέπειν· πρῶτον μὲν, ὅποια πέφυκε τὰ πράγματα· δεύτερον δὲ, τίνα χρὴ τρόπον ἡμᾶς πρὸς αὐτὰ διακέεισθαι· τελευταῖον δὲ τί περιέσται τοῖς οὕτως ἔχουσιν. Kant indicated the fundamental principles of his system as the answers to three parallel questions: Was kann ich wissen? Was soll ich thun? Was darf ich hoffen? *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 803. ("Der Kanon der reinen Vernunft, zweiter Abschnitt.")

⁴ Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, i, 164 ff. Diogenes Laërtius, ix, 88-89.

⁵ *Adv. Math.*, ix, 207 ff. *Pyrr. Hyp.*, iii, 17 ff.

⁶ Cf. Saisset, *Le Scepticisme*, pp. 153 ff., for an analytical outline of the argument against causality. This outline is translated by MacColl, *Greek Sceptics*, pp. 73 ff. The destructive analysis of the concept of causality, in which he anticipates Hume and Kant, goes back to Aenesidemus.

⁷ *Adv. Math.*, ix, 49 ff.

⁸ *Pyrr. Hyp.*, i, 21 ff.

Sceptical doctrines do not lead to complete passivity, but to conformity with the prevailing practice.¹

Phenomena alone are not rejected by the Sceptics,² but these are acknowledged to be sensations, constituting the appearances presented to us.³ Sextus does not draw the conclusion so often afterwards derived from this situation, that nothing exists outside of mind.

THE TEN TROPES THAT LEAD TO SUSPENSION OF JUDGMENT⁴

The Sceptical arguments which in antiquity were found most convincing, were assembled and reduced to order by several different thinkers, and to one of these sets of formulated statements Sextus devotes almost an entire book. These arguments, called tropes, serve to demonstrate the uncertainty of knowledge derived from sensation.⁵ In the arrangement of the ten tropes by Sextus,⁶ the arguments are those based upon:

I. The difference in the organization of living creatures (ὁ παρὰ τῶν ζώων ἐξαλλαγήν).

¹ Diogenes Laërtius (IX, 64), tells us that the citizens of Elis made Pyrrho a high priest because they respected his way of life. Sextus declared his devotion to conventional religion (*Pyrr. Hyp.*, III, 2), and Cicero, in his *De Natura Deorum*, put the reasons of Carneades into the mouth of Cotta, the Pontifex.

² *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 19 ff.

³ *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 22 ff.

⁴ In the presentation of these tropes, the text of Sextus Empiricus is freely translated, with the condensation or omission of passages that merely serve to illustrate or expand the argument. The essential ideas of Sextus are reproduced literally, and in every case references to the fine arts or considerations which effect the judgment of aesthetic values are retained.

⁵ Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 36. Aristocles, in Eusebius, *Præp. Evangel.*, XIV, 18, 11 ff.

⁶ As in the case of Aristotle's categories, there has been a good deal of controversy over the order and logical coherence of the tropes of Scepticism. The first four stand in an obvious relation, but the connection of the other six is not so clear. Furthermore, the order of the ten is given differently by various authorities: Eusebius, Aenesidemus, Favorinus, Diogenes, and surprisingly enough Diogenes speaks of the order in Sextus as different from that which we find in his text. It is probable that there was no fixed order, therefore, in these tropes. There are many general relations and some striking correspondences between the tropes and the Aristotelian categories. Cf. A. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, 1846; Pappenheim, *Erläuterungen*, pp. 21-45; Benn, *Greek Philosophers*, p. 467, n. 4.

II. The difference in the organization of human beings (ὁ παρὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων διαφορὰν).

III. The difference among the senses of the same human being (ὁ παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατασκευάς).

IV. Conditions under which things are sensed (ὁ παρὰ τὰς περιστάσεις).

V. Positions, distances, and places (ὁ παρὰ τὰς θέσεις καὶ τὰ διαστήματα καὶ τοὺς τόπους).

VI. Mixtures in sensations (ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἐπιμιξίας).

VII. Quantities and constitutions of substances (ὁ παρὰ τὰς ποσότητας καὶ σκευασίας τῶν ὑποκειμένων).

VIII. Relation in general (ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι).

IX. Frequency and rarity of occurrence (ὁ παρὰ τὰς συνεχεῖς ἢ σπανίους ἐγκυρήσεις).

X. Institutions, customs, fabulous beliefs, and dogmatic opinions (ὁ παρὰ τὰς ἀγωγὰς καὶ τὰ ἔθη καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς μυθικὰς πίστεις καὶ τὰς δογματικὰς ὑπολήψεις).

First Trope. The Difference in the Organization of Living Creatures

The differences in living animals are illustrated not only by various kinds of animals in Greek sculpture,¹ but also by the varying styles of representation of the same animals at different times. Lions,² horses,³ owls,⁴ and scorpions,⁵ for example, have differently formed heads and eyes, so that one may surmise a corresponding difference in their impressions. Not only that, but if art is held to be accurate imitation, horses in the eighth century B.C.,⁶ must have had different sensations from those in the fifth century B.C., because they are constructed in ways that differ so conspicuously.⁷ Ancient and modern opinions re-

¹ The references to objects of ancient art given before the translation of each trope are intended to be illustrations rather than demonstrations of the points made. Cf. Gisela M. A. Richter, *Animals in Greek Sculpture* (New York, 1930).

² Richter, *op. cit.*, figs. 1-29.

³ *Ibid.*, figs. 49-80.

⁴ *Ibid.*, figs. 207-212.

⁵ *Ibid.*, fig. 235.

⁶ *Ibid.*, fig. 49. Statuette of a horse, in bronze, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. Geometric period, probably eighth century. Acc. No. 21.88.24.

⁷ *Ibid.*, fig. 62. Statuette of a horse, in bronze, Metropolitan Museum of Art,

garding the impressions received by animals from human works of art differ, but, with the exception of a few extremists, historians of art have not devoted much time to the art-products of animals.¹ Sextus gives the first of the ten tropes as follows:

"The first trope² is that based on the difference in the organization of living creatures, according to which the same impressions (*φαντασίσαι*)³ of the same things are not presented to them. This we conclude from the difference in the generation of living creatures and in the constitution of their bodies.⁴ . . . It is, then, probable that the anomalies and differences in their generation bring about great antipathies, from which their uncongeniality, unsuitability, and pugnacity derive. But even the difference in the most important parts of their bodies, and especially of those naturally suited to judging and feeling, may create the greatest discord in their impressions. Those who are suffering from jaundice say that those things which appear white to us are yellow, and those with bruised eyes say that they are blood-red. Since, then, some living creatures have yellow eyes, others blood-shot, some white, and others eyes of other colors, it is probable that they have a different apprehension of colors. When we gaze for a long time at the

New York. The inlaid eyeballs are now missing. Dated about 480-470 B.C. Acc. No. 23.69.

¹ Hans Tietze, *Die Methode der Kunstgeschichte* (Leipzig, 1913), p. 11.

² Translation of Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 40-78. Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 79-80. Philo, *De Ebrietate*, 171 (Wendland, II, 203).

³ This word, a favorite of the Stoics, means a presentation, an impression received through sensation. As an image of appearance it is related to *φαινόμενον*, that which is apparent. The Stoics spoke of it as the impression which the thing that appears stamps on the soul, as if it were wax. Cf. Cicero, *de Fato*, XIX. The same figure is used by Plato and Aristotle, but Diogenes Laërtius (VII, 45), writing of Zeno, makes the point especially clear: *τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, τοῦ ὀνόματος οἰκείως μετενηνεγμένου ἀπὸ τῶν τύπων (τῶν) ἐν τῷ κηρῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ δακτυλίου γινομένων*. On the difference between the terms, *φαντασία*, *φανταστόν*, *φανταστικόν*, and *φάντασμα*, cf. Plutarch, citing Chrysippus, *De Placitis Philosophorum*, IV, 12 (900 E). Sextus also opposes the *φαινόμενα* to the *νοητά*. Cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 9: *φαινόμενα δὲ λαμβάνομεν νῦν τὰ αἰσθητά, διόπερ ἀντιδιαστέλλομεν αὐτοῖς τὰ νοητά*.

⁴ Aristotle (*Περὶ ζῶων μορίων*, Δ, 10, 686 b 22) asserts that in comparison with adult men all animals and even children seem dwarfs because of the disproportion of the lower and upper parts of their bodies, and (686 b 19) on this account: *ἀφρονέστερα πάντα τὰ ζῶα τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν*.

sun, and then look down at a book, the letters seem to be like gold and wavering. . . . When we press our eyes at the sides, the forms, figures, and dimensions of things seen appear to be long and narrow. It is probable, therefore, that living creatures with slanting and elongated pupils, such as goats, cats and the like, have different impressions of existing things, and do not apprehend them to be the same things that they are for animals with round pupils. Mirrors, also, according to the difference in their structure, show existing things sometimes very small, as in the case of concave mirrors, sometimes long and narrow, as in the case of convex mirrors; some of them show the head of the person reflected in the mirror at the bottom, with the feet up at the top.¹ Since, then, of the vessels of vision, some prominent eyes project on account of their convexity, while others are more concave, and others remain flat, it is probable that they transmit different impressions, and that dogs, fish, lions, men, and locusts do not see the same things as equal in dimension or similar in shape, but as their vision, apprehending things apparent, makes an impression on each one of them.² The same reasoning holds good of the other senses. How could one say with regard to touch, that these animals have the same feeling, — creatures with hard shells and those with visible flesh, those that have spines, feathers and scales? With regard to hearing, how can these creatures perceive alike, — those that have very narrow aural ducts, and those with very wide ones, the hairy-eared and the bare? How, since even we hear differently when our ears are stopped up, and when we use them without obstruction? . . . Since living

¹ Lucian, for all his Scepticism, lapsed into the uncritical principle of imitation when he demanded that historians should not write of contemporary events like Herodotus or Thucydides, but repeat the facts as they are reflected in a clear mirror. Cf. *Πῶς δεῖ ἱστορίαν συγγράφειν*, 61-62.

² If, however, the animals see as we do but lack only human intelligence, we might expect them to be more easily deceived by art objects. Ancient opinion, with the belief that art imitates appearances accurately, therefore pointed many anecdotes by instances where animals were deceived by objects of art. Cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxv, 23; *habuit et scaena ludis Claudii Pulchri magnam admirationem picturae, cum ad tegularum similitudinem corvi decepti imagine advolarent*. Cf. also, Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxv, 121, the story of Lepidus for whom a scare-crow was made by painting a large snake on parchment to frighten away the birds so that he could sleep.

creatures have different organs of taste, and have a superabundance of different juices, they may have different impressions of how things taste. As the same food, when digested becomes vein, artery, bone, sinew and every other part of the body,¹ and displays a different power depending on the part of the body that receives it; and as water, one and the same, when distributed in trees, becomes bark, branch, fruit, — fig, pomegranate, and every other kind; — and as the breath of the musician, although one and the same thing, when blown into a flute becomes sometimes a high note and sometimes a low one; and the same stroke of the hand on the lyre sometimes produces a deep tone, and again a high one:² in the same way, it is probable that things that exist externally are perceived differently depending on the difference in constitution of the living beings that have impressions of them. Such a conclusion is more clearly learned from the things that living creatures pursue and those that they run away from. . . . To men sea water is a distasteful and poisonous drink, but to fish very pleasant and drinkable. . . . Since the same things appear to be dissimilar according to the variations in living creatures, we may say how things external look to us, but we shall suspend judgement about how they are in nature. Nor can we ourselves judge between our impressions and those of other living beings, since we are ourselves a part of the disagreement and therefore, far from being able ourselves to judge, we lack any arbiter. Furthermore, we are powerless to choose our impressions rather than those of the dumb animals, either with demonstration or without it.³ Apart from the fact that probably there is no demonstration, as we shall show later, the so-called demonstration will itself be either apparent to us or not apparent. If it is not apparent, we shall not put it forth with confidence. If it is apparent to us, then since our question is that of the appearances perceived by living creatures, and

¹ Cf. Lucretius, I, 859 ff.

² Cf. Boethius, *De Inst. Musica*, v, 5.

³ Pliny, however, seems to think that imagination, the power to create imitations in art, and variety of impressions distinguish man from the dumb animals. *Nat. Hist.*, vii, 52: Cogitatio etiam utriuslibet animum subito transvolans, effingere similitudinem aut miscere existimatur, ideoque plures in homine quam in ceteris omnibus animalibus differentiae, quoniam velocitas cogitationum animique celeritas et ingenii varietas multiformes notas imprimit, cum ceteris animantibus immobiles sint animi et similes omnibus singulis in suo cuique genere.

the proof is apparent to us who are also living creatures, the proof is itself open to question insofar as it is a thing apparent. It is absurd to wish to prove something in question through something that is itself in question, since the same point is then both to be granted and doubted, which is impossible, — granted insofar as it seeks to prove, doubted insofar as its own proof goes. We shall not, therefore, have a proof by which we may prefer our own impressions to those of the so-called dumb animals.¹ If, then, impressions are different according to the difference of living creatures, and it is impossible to judge between them, it is necessary to suspend judgment ² regarding things that exist externally.”

Second Trope. The Difference in the Organization of Human Beings

The differences in human beings mentioned by Sextus are also illustrated in ancient sculpture and applied art. Human beings with eyes as shown in archaic sculpture,³ we may surmise, would have had different impressions from those of later times.⁴ The differences in the appearances which the Scythians ⁵ accept and those which they reject, compared with similar judgments by the Indians,⁶ are equally striking. Tiberius, who could see in the dark, is represented in two celebrated cameos;⁷ which we, however, can see only in the light. Such

¹ The following, however, do not discuss the Sceptical inferences from such evidence: S. O. Dickerman, "Some Stock Illustrations of Animal Intelligence in Greek Psychology," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, XLII (1911), 123-130. (As a Halle Diss., *De Argumentis quibusdam apud Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotalem Obviis et Structura Hominis et Animalium Petitis*, 1909).

² Cicero translates this term as *adsensionis retentio* (*Acad. prior*, II, 59), *sustinere adsensionem* (*Acad. prior*, II, 98); and *assensus sustinere* (*De Fin.*, III, 9, 31).

³ Cf. A. W. Lawrence, *Classical Sculpture* (New York, 1929), plate 11. This is a stela from Chrysapha in Laconia, now in Berlin (No. 131). Of the two seated figures one is in full face and the other in profile, but in both cases the eyes are represented in the same way.

⁴ Lawrence, *op. cit.*, plate 51. This is a metope from the Parthenon, now in the British Museum (No. 319), depicting a fight between a Lapith and a Centaur.

⁵ Gregor Boroffka, "Kunstgewerbe der Skythen," *Geschichte des Kunstgewerbes*, I, 69-100 (edited by H. T. Bossert, Berlin, 1928).

⁶ Ernest and Rose Lenore Waldschmidt, "Das Kunstgewerbe Süd- und Hochasiens," *Geschichte des Kunstgewerbes*, III, 181-344 (Berlin, 1930).

⁷ The *Gemma Augustea*, in Vienna, and the *Camée de la Sainte Chapelle*, in Paris. Reproduced in Rodenwaldt, *Kunst der Antike* (Berlin, 1927), pp. 542-543.

differences, both individual and racial, among human beings, lead to a radical doubt with regard to art, if it is based on the theory of imitation. Sextus asserts:

"As the second trope¹ leading to suspension of judgment we consider that based upon the difference in the organization of human beings. Admitting as a concession in argument that men are more worthy of belief than the dumb animals, we shall still find that so far as the difference among us is concerned, we are led to suspension of judgment. Now it is said that there are two things out of which man is constituted, soul and body, and we differ from one another with respect to both, with respect to the body, for example, in our forms and peculiar temperaments. A Scythian differs in the form of his body from the body of an Indian; as we are told, the difference in the humors which prevail in their bodies makes that unlikeness; and according to the variations in the humors that dominate, impressions also differ, as we established in the first trope. Consequently there is great difference in the external things that they select and that they reject. The Indians delight in certain things and the Greeks in others, and the fact that they differ in what they like indicates that they have different impressions of external reality. Because of our differences in temperament, some of us digest beef more easily than we do the fish that live among rocks,² and weak Lesbian wine turns some stomachs. . . . Tiberius Caesar used to see in the dark.³ Aristotle mentions a certain Thasian who seemed to see the form of a man going before him everywhere. . . .⁴ But tragedy is full of these things, and Euripides writes: ⁵

If, in their ideas
Of excellence and wisdom, all concurred,
No strife had e'er perplexed the human race.

¹ This section is a translation of Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 79-89. Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 80-81; Philo, *De Ebrietate*, 175 (Wendland, II, 204).

² This is one of the three classes into which Aristotle divides marine animals; cf. *Hist. Anim.*, I, I, 31, and 8, 13, 4.

³ This is asserted also by Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, XI, 143; Suetonius, *Tiberius*, 68.

⁴ Aristotle, *Meteor.*, 373 b 4.

⁵ Euripides, *Phoen.*, 499:

εἰ πᾶσι ταῦτόν καλὸν ἔφν σοφόν θ' ἄμα,
οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἀμφίλεκτος ἀνθρώποις ἔρις.

. . . Since selection and rejection depend on pleasure and disgust, and pleasure and disgust are based on sensation and impression, when the same things are selected by some and rejected by others, we may consequently conclude that they are not similarly moved by the same things, for otherwise they would pursue or avoid the same things. If, then, the same things have different effects, depending on the difference in men, this would also be a reason for suspending judgment. What each external thing seems to be in relation to each difference, we may perhaps say, but what it is in its real nature we are not in a position to pronounce. We must have confidence in all men or in some. But if we would believe all men, we undertake the impossible, and accept contradictories. If we are to believe only some men, let them tell us with which we ought to agree, for the Platonists will say Plato, the Epicurean Epicurus, and the rest likewise, so that their being hopelessly at odds leads us again to suspension of judgment.¹ Those who say that we ought to agree with the majority reason like children,² for nobody can visit all men and ascertain what pleases the majority,³ since it is possible that among certain races that are unknown to us, what is rare among us may be common with them, and what commonly occurs among us may be rare with them. . . . It is necessary therefore

The translation is from *The Plays of Euripides in English* (Everyman's Library), II, 237.

¹ In cases like the competition for the statue of an Amazon, mentioned by Pliny, there is, indeed, a judgment on how the works of the best artists of the period seemed to expert opinion, but how the Amazon looked in reality, or which, from our point of view, was the best, we are unable to say. Cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxiv, 53: *venere autem et in certamen laudatissimi, quamquam diversis aetatibus geniti, quoniam fecerant Amazonas, quae cum in templo Dianae Ephesiae dicarentur, placuit eligi probatissimam ipsorum artificum, qui praesentes erant, iudicio, cum apparuit eam esse quam omnes secundam a sua quisque iudicasset. haec est Polycliti, proxima ab ea Phidiae, tertia Cresilae, quarta Cydonis, quinta Phradmonis.*

² But cf. Cicero, *De Officiis*, I, xli, 147: *Ut enim pictores et ii qui signa fabricantur et vero etiam poetae suum quisque opus a vulgo considerari vult, ut, si quid reprehensum sit a pluribus, id corrigatur, iique et secum et ex aliis quid in eo peccatum sit exquirunt.*

³ The modern theory of induction could not be entertained together with the extreme concept of underlying substance, patterned on tangible extension in space, which the Sceptics and their predecessors all held. On Induction, see B. Erdmann, *Logik* (3rd ed., Berlin, 1923), pp. 686-739.

that also because of the difference in the organization of human beings we should suspend judgment."

The obvious discrepancies in the representative arts of different peoples and of the same people at different times are closely connected with this second trope. The explanations advanced in ancient times to account for the fact that not all imitations of the same natural thing were identical, usually depend on the idea of a gradual progress toward perfection. Perfection is by the writers judged to be that period in Greek antiquity now called classic, and the judgments established on a literary basis have been uncritically accepted in modern times from the days of Winckelmann until revised by Wickhoff¹ and Riegl.² Thus Cicero, long after the age of Apelles, still held that painting reached absolute perfection in the time of the Greek artist, after gradual progress up to that point.³ Neoclassic theorists thought that imitation of the ancients was the best way for artists in modern times to reach perfection, but Quintilian had already shown that imitation is not a way of reaching perfection.⁴ The persistence of the neoclassic tradition is illustrated, for example, in a note to an edition of Pliny which is particularly concerned with that author's materials for art history.⁵ Commenting on Pliny, *Natural History*, xxxv, 16, the modern scholars assert: "It is evident that the discrepancies between ideal and iconic statues were explained by Pliny, or his author,

¹ Franz Wickhoff, *Die Wiener Genesis* (Vienna, 1895); *Roman Art*, translated by Mrs. S. A. Strong (London, 1910).

² Alois Riegl, *Stilfragen* (Berlin, 1893); *Die spät-römische Kunstindustrie* (Vienna, 1901).

³ Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, v, 1448-1457. Cicero, *Brutus*, xviii (70): Quis enim eorum qui haec minora animaduertunt non intellegit Canachi signa rigidiora esse quam ut imitentur ueritatem, Calamidis dura illa quidem, sed tamen molliora quam Canachi; nondum Myronis satis ad ueritatem adducta, iam tamen quae non dubites pulchra dicere; pulchriora etiam Polycliti et iam plane perfecta, ut mihi quidem uideri solent? Similis in pictura ratio est; in qua Zeuxim et Polygnotum et Timantheum et eorum qui non sunt usi plus quam quattuor coloribus formas et linamenta laudamus; at in Aetione, Nicomacho, Protogene, Apelle iam perfecta sunt omnia.

⁴ *Inst. Orat.*, x, 2, 8: nihil enim crescit sola imitatione quodsi prioribus adicere fas non est, quo modo sperare possumus illum oratorem perfectum?

⁵ K. Jex-Blake and E. Sellers, *The Elder Pliny's Chapters on the History of Art* (London, 1896), p. 14, note on line 7.

as the result of an improbable rule, simply because the ancients had no habit of applying historical criticism to art, and consequently of discriminating between the works of a time when only the types were aimed at, from those of periods when *art had advanced to individual portraiture.*" (Italics mine.) But the principle of progress to a unique moment of perfection from which all sculpture since has been only a long series of lapses,¹ is no less untenable than the belief that art advances when it approaches naturalism. Both dogmas, as the basis of sound art history are on a par with the reason, cited in the same note, from Dio Chrysostom,² who explained the discrepancy between early and late statues through a theory of physical degeneration.

Third Trope. The Difference among the Senses of the Same Human Being

The differences between painting and sculpture, which appeal to different senses of the same individual, may create a fundamental doubt with regard to imitation as the basis of art and with regard to substance as the ground of reality. Fruit represented in sculpture³ differs radically from such objects shown in ancient painting,⁴ corresponding to the differences in the senses to which appeal is made, as pointed out by Sextus. Figure painting,⁵ as well as landscapes,⁶ produced in antiquity, did, however, convey to the eye impressions of modelling in relief and of recession in space, although painting appeals to vision primarily. Sextus expounds the third trope, involving such differences, as follows:

¹ This assumption detracts from the value of such otherwise excellent works as H. G. Spearing, *The Childhood of Art* (New York, n.d.).

² *Or.*, XXI, 1.

³ As an attribute in the hand of Venus Genetrix, for example, in the Roman copy of a Greek work, now in the Louvre (No. 525); or in decorative sculpture, such as the garlands from the Ara Pacis, now in the Museo delle Terme. Reproduced in G. Rodenwaldt, *Die Kunst der Antike (Hellas und Rom)*, pp. 296 and 519.

⁴ Cf. M. H. Swindler, *Ancient Painting* (New Haven, 1929), fig. 491. (From the Naples National Museum, reproduced from Pfuhl, *Malerei und Zeichnung der Griechen* (Munich, 1923), vol. III, fig. 703.)

⁵ Cf. the wall paintings from Pompeii, reproduced in Rodenwaldt, *op. cit.*, pp. 396-397.

⁶ Cf. Swindler, *op. cit.*, figs. 541-547.

"When certain conceited philosophers say that we must prefer themselves to all other men as judges of things, we know that their claim is foolish, for they are themselves a part of the difference.¹ When, giving themselves the preference, they judge what is apparent in this fashion, even before they begin judgment they beg the question, turning over the decision to themselves. But even so, let us limit the discussion to one man, the sage² that they dream about, and be led to suspension of judgment by the trope which is third in order. This we call the trope based on difference among sensations. That sensations differ with regard to one another is obvious. To sight, pictures seem to have parts that recede and parts that project,³ but not to the sense of touch. To some, honey seems sweet to the tongue, but distasteful to the eyes. It is therefore impossible to say whether it is sweet or distasteful absolutely. . . . Each thing that is apparent to us seems to be presented as a manifold of sensations, as, for example, an apple seems smooth, fragrant, sweet, and red.⁴ It is uncertain, therefore, whether it has these qualities only, or only one quality, but on account of the difference in the constitution of the organs of sense appears different, or has still more qualities than those that are apparent, though they are not all perceptible to us. . . . That the apple may have more qualities than those that are apparent to us we infer in the following fashion. Let us think of a man who at birth has the senses of touch, smell, and taste, but does not hear or see. He will suppose that there is nothing at all that is visible or audible, but that there are

¹ This section is a translation of Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 90-99. Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 81.

² The Stoic sage. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, VII, 409.

³ This illustration, perhaps deriving from Pyrrho himself, is repeated by the Neoplatonizing Bishop Nemesius, *De Natura Hominis*, VIII (Oxford, 1671), 157 ff. According to Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, XXXV, 15) all authorities agree that painting began with the outlining of a man's shadow. Such an explanation occurs in many references to the plastic arts. Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.*, VII, 9. It became common in the Middle Ages through Isidore (*Etymol.*, XIX, 16, 2). But Aelian (*Var. Hist.*, X, 10) says these attempts were so crude that it was necessary to add in writing the names of the animals depicted!

⁴ ξαυθός, here meaning red, is a word which in itself fortifies the Sceptic argument. In Homer (*Il.*, I, 197; 23, 141; *Od.*, 13, 399 and 431) it refers to golden hair, but afterwards it is used with regard to other objects, and later (*Anth. Pal.*, XII, 97) it means red.

only those three kinds of qualities which he can perceive. It is, then, possible that we, having five senses, perceive only those qualities in the apple of which we are capable. It is possible that it really has still other qualities, perceptible to other organs of sensation, in which we do not share, and therefore do not perceive the sensations that correspond to them.¹ . . . Since the senses do not grasp external reality, then, thought cannot grasp it either since its guides fail it; so on account of this argument, too, suspension of judgment with regard to external reality seems to follow."

A controversy in the history of modern criticism is closely related to this trope. The problem raised in Lessing's *Laokoon*² develops from an attempt to define the incorporeal art of poetry with relation to the corporeal reality of painting. The distinctions customary between the arts, based on the several senses to which they appeal and on the appropriate materials employed, are in line with that attempt. A phrase of Horace, neglecting the context, became almost an axiom, in the definition and delimitation of the arts.³ A statement of Simonides, quoted by Plutarch,⁴ was also employed as an authority, especially in sixteenth-century Italy. Sophocles, according to Athenaeus,⁵ provided further material. The poem *De arte graphica*, by C. A. du Fresnoy, published with a French translation by Roger de Piles,⁶ translated into English by Dryden,⁷ and the work of Ch. Bat-

¹ Cf. J. I. Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition* (Oxford, 1906). Strabo (*Geographica*, II, 5, 11) uses the apple as an illustration of sense perception. Cf. also Macrobius (*Saturnalia*, VII, 14) and Boethius (*Philosophiae Consol.*, v, prosa 4; ed. R. Peiper, Leipzig, 1871, p. 133).

² There is a convenient edition by W. G. Howard (New York, 1910). Cf. "Ut pictura poesis," by the same author, *Publ. Mod. Lang. Assoc.*, XXIV (1909), 40-123.

³ *De Arte Poetica*, 361 ff.:

Ut pictura poesis erit quae, si propius stes,
Te capiat magis, et quaedam, si longius abstes.

⁴ *De Gloria Atheniensium*, 3 (346 F): Πλὴν ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν μὲν ζωγραφίαν ποίησιν σιωπῶσαν προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ ποίησιν ζωγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν.

⁵ Athenaeus, XIII, 603 e.

⁶ Written 1641-1665, published, Paris, 1667. Latin and French, with notes, Paris, 1673, 1684, 1688, 1751, 1760, etc.

⁷ With a preface by Dryden, London, 1695, 1716, 1750, 1769, etc.

teux,¹ among others, represent the extreme conclusions reached by the Neoclassicists.

Fourth Trope. Conditions under which Things are Sensed

Another group of considerations discussed by the Sceptics is based on the fact that the reports of the same sense in the same individual vary according to his condition. Abnormal states are represented in ancient art, as, for example, Maenads dancing,² Dionysiac celebrations,³ and an old woman intoxicated.⁴ Normal but distinct conditions are also represented; in genre and portrait all ages of human life are to be found. It is a commonplace, however, in the history of art criticism, that new or exotic movements in art have been condemned as the products of men who were either mad or malicious, and their failure to imitate reality as conceived by their judges, was held to prove their condition. Sextus, for his part, uses this situation as an argument for Scepticism:

"In order to end in suspension of judgment when we limit the discussion to each single sense, or even do without the senses, let us take up the fourth trope also.⁵ This is the one called 'according to conditions,' speaking of our states as conditions. We say that it is the one considered under conditions such as being natural or unnatural, asleep or awake, at an age in life, moving about or resting, hating or loving, hungry or well-fed, drunk or sober, predisposed, confident or afraid, sorrowing or rejoicing. An example, with regard to contradictions in things that are natural or unnatural, is when the delirious⁶ or the inspired seem to hear divine beings, but we do not.⁷ . . . The same cloak seems tawny to those with blood-shot eyes, but not to me.

¹ *Les Beaux-Arts réduits à un même principe*, Paris, 1747.

² Cf. Swindler, *op. cit.*, figs. 313, 316.

³ *Ibid.*, fig. 332.

⁴ Rodenwaldt, *Kunst der Antike*, p. 471.

⁵ This section is a translation of Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 100-117. Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 82; Philo, *De Ebrietate*, 178 ff. (Wendland, II, 204).

⁶ Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 82: οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ μαινόμενοι παρὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι· τί γὰρ μάλλον ἐκεῖνοι ἢ ἡμεῖς; καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς τὸν ἥλιον ὡς ἐστῶτα βλέπομεν.

⁷ The relation of attention to sense impressions, and the disturbances of normal perception, such as those experienced by the Corybantes, are discussed by Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, XI, 27.

The same honey ¹ seems sweet to me, but bitter to those suffering from jaundice. . . . Depending on whether one is asleep or awake different impressions arise,² since we do not have the same impressions in dreams that we do when awake, so that their being or not being is not something by itself but in relation to something, that is to say, in relation to being asleep or awake.³ Probably we see while asleep things which do not exist when we are awake, but they are not once and for all non-existent, for they exist in sleep, just as waking visions exist even if not in sleep. . . . Since there is such contradiction in respect to our conditions, and men are in different states at different times, perhaps it is easy to say how each existing thing appears to each, but not how it really is, because the anomaly is not to be decided, since whoever decides it is either in some one of the states previously mentioned or in no state at all. But to say that he is in no state at all, neither well nor ill, neither moving nor resting, at no age in life, and independent of the other conditions, is thoroughly absurd. If, while in some state, he judges impressions, he participates in the difference, and furthermore he is not an impartial judge of things that exist externally, because he is contaminated with the states in which he is.⁴ . . . Whoever judges one impression superior to another, and one state superior to another, does so either unjustifiably and without demonstration or justifiably

¹ This, one of the Sceptics' favorite illustrations of their formula οὐδὲν μᾶλλον, was derived from Democritus. Cf. Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 213. As a quotation from Timon's work, *Περὶ αἰσθήσεων*, Diogenes Laërtius (IX, 105) puts it in this form: τὸ μέλι ὅτι ἐστὶ γλυκὺ οὐ τίθημι, τὸ δ' ὅτι φαίνεται ὁμολογῶ.

² For comment on this argument, see Plato, *Theaetetus*, 158, and Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Δ, 5-6.

³ For similar arguments against knowledge, cf. *Theaetetus*, 147 B, 165 B; *Ion* as a whole; *Sophist*, 233 A; all of which are cited by Sextus in *Adv. Math.*, I.

⁴ This same difficulty arises when the question is asked; who are the most competent judges of excellence in art? Cicero indicates that though there may be a great difference between expert and unskilled creation, there is no such difference in judging excellence in the theatre. (*De Optimo Genere Oratorum*, III.) Others held that skill is required to judge sculpture as well as to make it. Cf. *Epicteti Dissertationes*, II, 24, 7 (ed. Schenkl, p. 199). The younger Pliny asserted that only the artists are adequate judges; *Epist.* I, 10: Ut enim de pictore, sculptore, fictore, nisi artifex iudicare, ita nisi sapiens non potest perspicere sapientem. With regard to painting, however, Cicero declared (*De Opt. Gen. Orat.*, IV, 11): tamquam ad picturam probandam, adhibentur etiam inscii faciendi cum aliqua sollertia iudicandi.

and with demonstration. But he cannot do it without justification, because no one will believe him; nor can he do so with it. When he judges impressions, in every case he judges by means of a criterion.¹ He will say that his criterion is either true or false. If false, he will not be believed. If, however, he says the criterion is true, he will be saying so either with or without demonstration. If without demonstration, he will not be believed. If with demonstration, it will be absolutely necessary for the demonstration to be true, if he is to be believed. . . . Thus both the criterion and the demonstration fall into the argument in a circle, wherein both are found to be unworthy of belief. . . . If, then, neither without demonstration and a criterion, nor with these, is it possible for anyone to judge one impression superior to another, impressions varying according to different conditions will be impossible to decide between, so that suspension of judgment with regard to the nature of external reality results also on the basis of this trope.”

This fourth trope is to be considered particularly in connection with a passage in Sextus which expounds a theory of mental representation:² “In general, everything known is known through palpable evidence or through transition from the palpable, and the latter in various ways: through similarity, through composition, or through analogy, and the latter through either increase or decrease. Through palpable evidence is known what is white or black, sweet or sour. Even though these are sensations, nevertheless they are known. By way of transition from palpable evidence, we know through similarity, as for example, when Socrates is not present, we know him from a representation of Socrates.³ Through composition, for example, of man and

¹ In the case of Alexander the Great, the criterion was himself, and to insure that only the best representations should be produced he limited the production of portraits of himself to three artists: Apelles, Pyrgoteles, and Lysippus. Cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, VII, 125; *Hor. Ep.*, II, 1, 239; Apuleius, *Florida*, 7.

² This section is a translation of *Adv. Math.*, IX, 393–395. The same reasoning with the same illustrations is to be found in *Adv. Math.*, VIII, 58–60, and *Adv. Math.*, XI, 250–251.

³ Leon Battista Alberti, however, acknowledged that likeness in this sense might not be essential in portraits. Cf. *De Statua*, p. 175: Socratis an Platonis an cogniti alicuius effigiem, ut referant, id minime curae est, satis quidem se fecisse statuentes, si assecuti sint, ut quod effecerint, opus homini vel ignotissimo assimiletur. *Leone Battista Albertis kleinere Kunsttheoretische Schriften*, edited by H. Janitschek (Vienna, 1877).

horse, we know that which is neither man nor horse, but composed of both; that is to say, a centaur.¹ By way of analogy through increase or decrease, for example, seeing the average-sized man we increase the size and imagine the Cyclops . . . and we decrease it and derive the idea of the pygmy.”

But in none of these ways can we know length without breadth,² a conclusion which Sextus uses to place in doubt the foundations of geometry, physics, logic, and morals.

This theory of mental representation is consistent with the theory of art entertained in antiquity. The abundance of anecdotes, popular with writers, that refer to artists and their works³ nearly all illustrate the main positive concepts of antiquity with regard to art: that it is

¹ To account for the invention of creatures such as those mentioned by Sextus, when nature offered no such beings for apprehension by the senses, was a constant problem in antiquity. Cf. Seneca, *Epist.*, 58, 15; *Martial*, x, iv.

² This was a stock illustration of imaginary objects like $\sqrt{-1}$ in modern discussions. The phenomena of light and shade are brought to bear in *Philoponi (olim Ammonii) in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium* (ed. A. Busse, Berlin, 1898), p. 85: “Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἀνάπλασμα τῆς ἡμετέρας τυγχάνει διανοίας τὸ εἶναι τι μῆκος ἀπλατές, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων, δεικνύουσι σαφῶς καὶ οἱ διορισμοὶ τῶν πεφωτισμένων τόπων ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσκιασμένων· τοῦ γὰρ ἡλίου εἰς τοῖχον, εἰ τύχοι, προσβάλλοντος καὶ μέρος τούτου φέρε φωτίζοντος, ἀνάγκη τὸ διορίζον μεταξὺ τοῦ πεφωτισμένου καὶ τοῦ ἐσκιασμένου τόπου μῆκος εἶναι ἀπλατές μόνον· εἰ γὰρ ἔχει πλάτος, ἢ πεφωτισμένον ἔστί τοῦτο πάντως ἢ ἐσκιασμένον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τούτων μεταξὺ τι. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν εἴη πεφωτισμένον, τῷ πεφωτισμένῳ συναττήσεται, εἰ δὲ ἐσκιασμένον, τῷ ἐσκιασμένῳ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐναργῶς ὁρᾶται μεταξὺ γραμμῆ, ἥτις κατὰ μῆκος ἐπιτεταμένη μόνον διορίζει τὸ ἐσκιασμένον ἀπὸ τοῦ πεφωτισμένου· εἰ γὰρ διώριστα ταῦτα ἀλλήλων, ἀνάγκη εἶναι τι παρ’ αὐτά, τὸ διορίζον αὐτά, ὅπερ οὔτε πεφωτισμένον ὑπάρχον οὔτ’ ἐσκιασμένον οὐδὲ πλάτος ἔξει.

³ The anecdote of Zeuxis and the grapes: Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxv, 64–66; Seneca, *Controv.*, v, 34. Myron’s heifer is often referred to, especially in the *Palatine Anthology*; cf. Overbeck, *Antike Schriftquellen*, Nos. 550–591. Cf. Paul Vitry, “Étude sur les Épigrammes de l’Anthologie Palatine qui contiennent la description d’une œuvre d’Art,” *Revue Archéologique*, xxiv (1894), 315–367. The anecdote that Zeuxis produced his Helen by combining the most beautiful parts of the five most beautiful maidens of Croton implies the principles of imitation and composition found in Sextus. Cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxv, 64; Cicero, *De Invent.*, II, 1, 1; Dionys. Halicarn., *De Præcis Script. Cens.*, 1 (vol. v, p. 417, ed. Reiske). Aristotle admits the same thought in *Politics*, I, II, 1281 b. By this method of composition the artist should be faithful to the facts and yet could improve on his model. Cf. *Poetics*, xxv, 1461 b 12–14. The principle included sculpture also. Cf. Maxim. Tyr., *Dissert.*, VII, 4.

intended to be an accurate imitation of a reality perceived through the senses, and that the final basis of any estimate of art is technical or ethical.¹ Such stories all fall within the definition of art given by Lucian, Quintilian, and Sextus Empiricus,² which states that it consists of organized precepts and practices and is useful in life. Yet it was sometimes conceded to be more difficult to imitate from an imitation than from nature.³

Fifth Trope. Positions, Distances, and Places

Confidence in our judgment as based upon sensation is also undermined by the fact that our sensations vary depending on our position with respect to the stimulus. A photograph of a Greek temple, such as that at Paestum, illustrates the phenomena of perspective⁴ cited by Sextus. Ships are frequently found in the art of the ancient Mediterranean peoples;⁵ architectural elements are found in many paintings; doves are not uncommon;⁶ all of which things are mentioned

¹ This view is concisely expressed in a Stoic maxim. Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, VII, 130: εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὥραν ἀνθος ἀρετῆς. Thus statues of men afterwards condemned by moral opinion were destroyed, as Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, XXXIV, 30) speaking of a statue says: eam vero, quam apud aedem Telluris statuisset sibi Sp. Cassius, qui regnum adfectaverat, etiam conflata a censoribus. nimirum in ea quoque re ambitionem providebant illi viri.

² Lucian, *Parasit.*, 4: Τέχνη ἐστίν, ὡς ἐγὼ διαμνημονεύω σοφοῦ τινος ἀκούσας, σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων πρὸς τι τέλος εὐχρηστον τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ. Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.*, II, 17, 41: artem constare ex praeceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad finem uitae utilem. Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, II, 10 (Fabricius, II, pp. 131-132): πᾶσα τοίνυν τέχνη σύστημά ἐστιν ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων καὶ ἐπὶ τέλος εὐχρηστον τῷ βίῳ λαμβανόντων τὴν ἀναφορὰν. *Pyrr. Hyp.*, III, 188: τέχνην δὲ εἶναι φασὶ [οἱ Στωικοὶ] σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγυμνασμένων, τὰς δὲ καταλήψεις γίγνεσθαι περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Cf. also Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, IV, 13 (31): Et ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quadam suavitate, eaque dicitur pulchritudo.

³ Pliny the Younger, *Epist.*, IV, 28: Peto autem ut pictorem quam diligentissimum adsumas. Nam cum est arduum similitudinem effingere ex vero, tum longe difficillima est imitationis imitatio.

⁴ Cf. Rodenwaldt, *Kunst der Antike*, pp. 242-243. Such phenomena are imitated in late wall-decorations; cf. Swindler, *op. cit.*, figs. 528, 530, 574, 592-593.

⁵ Cf. Swindler, *op. cit.*, figs. 31, 32, 38, 44, 49, 51, 210, 232, 271, 348, 367, 395, 396, 508-510, 529, 541, 542, 544-546, 548, 549, 580.

⁶ In sculpture, the grave-relief of a girl in the Metropolitan Museum. In mosaic, cf. Swindler, *op. cit.*, fig. 489.

by Sextus. But the paintings of ships already mentioned disregard the phenomenon of the apparently broken oar. If knowledge is held to be a statement of the manner in which objects extend in space, reported by the sense of touch, the phenomena of vision are of doubtful validity to begin with, and their imitation in painting is open to further suspicion. Sextus states:

"The fifth trope¹ is that concerned with positions, distances, and places, for in accordance with each one of these the same things seem different.² For example, the same colonnade seen from both ends seems smaller at one end than at the other, but seen from the middle both ends appear equal.³ The same ship seen from afar seems to be small and standing still, from near at hand to be large and moving. The same tower seen from a distance seems to be round, but close at hand square. These are examples of differences in accordance with distances; examples of differences in accordance with places are the following. The light of a lamp appears dim in the sun, but bright in the darkness,⁴ and the same oar under sea water seems broken but straight outside it. . . . And a sound seems one thing on a shepherd's

¹ This section is a translation of Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 118-123. Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 85-86. (Here given as the seventh trope.) Philo, *De Ebrietate*, 181 (Wendland, II, 205).

² R. Hönigswald, *Die Skepsis in Philosophie und Wissenschaft* (Göttingen, 1914), p. 157: "An keinem zweiten Punkt vielleicht kommt das Grundmotiv der sensuellen Skepsis, der Gedanke von der Relativität, oder was für dasselbe bedeutet, der Scheinbarkeit aller Erfahrungserkenntnis zu so unverkennbarer Ausprägung, wie in dem fünften Tropus."

³ The example of the colonnade and of the oar is also given by Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.*, I, 3, 9. Cf. also Tertullian, *De Anima*, xvii, who cites 1 John 1 against the Sceptics. Lucretius, *De Rerum Natura*, IV, 426-431. But the column is used as an illustration for exactly the opposite conclusion as that of Sextus by St. Paul, 1 *Timothy*, iii, 15: ἵνα εἰδῆς πῶς δεῖ ἐν οἴκῳ θεοῦ ἀναστρέφεσθαι, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἐκκλησία θεοῦ ζῶντος, στῆλος καὶ ἑδραίωμα τῆς ἀληθείας. Architecture and its products are frequently used by the older writers as the basis of arguments, particularly for their theories of knowledge. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z, 8, 1035 a ff.; St. Paul, 1 *Corinth.*, III, 10; St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I, I, qu. 15; *Quodlibeta*, IV, I, 1, 3.

⁴ "Longinus," *On the Sublime*, xvii, 2-3, discusses the same situation and draws an interesting comparison with painting: σχεδὸν γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ μυδρὰ φέγγη ἐναφανίζεται τῷ ἡλίῳ περιανγούμενα, οὕτω τὰ τῆς ῥητορικῆς σοφίσματα ἐξαμαυροῦ περιχυθὲν πάντοθεν τὸ μέγεθος. οὐ πόρρω δ' ἴσως τούτου καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ζωγραφίας τι συμβαίνει· ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κειμένων ἐπιπέδου παραλλήλων ἐν χρώμασι τῆς σκιᾶς τε καὶ τοῦ φωτός,

pipe but another on a flute, and still another simply in the air. In accordance with positions things also seem different: for example, the same picture when tipped back appears smooth, but when it inclines forward a little it seems to have parts that recede and parts that project.¹ The necks of doves² appear different in respect to color depending on the different directions in which they are turned. Since, then, all things apparent are viewed in some place, from some distance, and in some position, each of which makes a great difference in the impressions, as we have said, we are through this trope also compelled to suspend judgment. Whoever desires to judge some of the impressions superior to others attempts the impossible.³ . . . It is impossible to bring forward proofs which are *regressus in infinitum*. . . . If it is possible to judge the appearances offered neither without demonstration nor with it, suspension of judgment follows. . . .”

In the *Sophist*,⁴ Plato also argues from the observation that a change in distance produces an alteration in our apprehension of the true and uses illustrations drawn from the fine arts. “And so we recognize that he who professes to be able by virtue of a single art to make all things will be able by virtue of the painter’s art to make imitations which have the same names as the real things, and by showing the pictures at a distance will be able to deceive the duller ones among young children into the belief that he is perfectly able to accomplish in fact what he wishes to do.”⁵ . . . “Now most of the hearers (of the art which has to do with words) . . . when they have lived longer and

ὁμως προῦπαντᾷ τε τὸ φῶς ταῖς ὄψεσι καὶ οὐ μόνον ἔξοχον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐγγυτέρω πορὰ πολὺ φαίνεται.

¹ Cf. Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.*, II, 21: et pictor, cum vi artis suae efficit, ut quaedam eminere in opere, quaedam recessisse credamus, ipse ea plana esse non nescit.

² The same illustration, apparently, was used by Protagoras. Cf. *Scholia in Arist.*, 60 b 18 (ed. C. A. Brandis, Berlin, 1836).

³ Cf. More, *Hellenistic Philosophies*, p. 339: “. . . it is a fact that no scientist of antiquity, who sought to go behind appearances, could escape the dilemmas into which his sceptical antagonist threw him; and the makers of hypotheses today in regard to mass and energy would fare no better, had not the critical sense been pretty well frightened out of the field by the superstition that whatever is said by a man of science must be science.”

⁴ *Sophist*, 234 B ff. The translation is that by H. N. Fowler in the Loeb Classical Library.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 234 B.

grown older, will perforce come closer to realities and will be forced by sad experience openly to lay hold on realities; they will have to change the opinions which they had at first accepted, so that what was great will appear small and what was easy, difficult, and all the apparent truths in argument will be turned topsy-turvy by the truths that have come upon them in real life.”¹ . . . “I think I see this time also two classes of imitation.”² . . . “I see the likeness-making art as one part of imitation. This is met with, as a rule, whenever anyone produces the imitation by following the proportions of the original in length, breadth, and depth, and giving, besides, the appropriate colours to each part.”³ But not all imitators try to do this. “For if they reproduced the true proportions of beautiful forms, the upper parts, you know, would seem smaller and the lower parts larger than they ought, because we see the former from a distance, the latter from near at hand.” . . . “So the artists abandon the truth and give their figures not the actual proportions but those which seem to be beautiful. . . .”⁴ “And to the art which produces appearance, but not likeness, the most correct name we could give would be ‘fantastic art.’” . . . “These, then, are the two forms of the image-making art that I meant, the likeness-making and the fantastic.”⁵ Plato, therefore, prefers what is accurate primarily to touch rather than to vision alone.

The story told by Tzetzes of the rivalry between Phidias and Alcamenes⁶ is an illustration of Plato’s objection to the changes made in the tangible object to render it visibly truer. According to the Byzantine poet, in making the statue of Athena, Phidias, aware of the diminution of objects when elevated above the ground, introduced changes in the proportions of the figure which gave a more pleasing result to the observer and thus won the victory over Alcamenes who

¹ *Ibid.*, 234 D.

² *Ibid.*, 235 D.

³ *Ibid.*, 235 E.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 236 A. An example of vain exaggeration is cited by Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxiv, 19: notatum ab auctoribus et L. Accium poetam in Camenarum aede maxima forma statuum sibi posuisse, cum brevis admodum fuisset.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 236 C: Τοῦτω τοίνυν τῷ δύο ἔλεγον εἶδη τῆς εἰδωλοποιικῆς, εἰκαστικὴν καὶ φανταστικὴν.

⁶ Tzetzes, *Chil.*, viii, 354 ff. Overbeck, *Antike Schriftquellen* (Leipzig, 1868), No. 772.

did not alter the true proportions. The refinements introduced into the Parthenon by Ictinus, who not only designed the temple but wrote about it also, illustrate still further the alteration of objective relations to improve the optical effect.¹

The moral prejudice against art, from Plato down to recent times, derives partly from the fact noted by Sextus that paintings appeal only to one sense and although satisfying that sense fail to meet the demands of the rest. If ordinary experience leads men to doubt the validity of their sensations with regard to objective reality, the situation becomes even worse when artists produce works which make the discrepancy between the senses all the more obvious. The ancients, therefore, rarely attacked works of art solely on the basis of the themes represented, before the time of the early Christian fathers,² seeing that the more fundamental issue of truth and falsehood was for them more significant.

Seneca, however, maintains that some deceptive things are delightful and harmless.³ Most of the anecdotes of successful deception through works of art are, indeed, told to stress the excellence of the imitation. But there are also a good number where we may see survivals of the more primitive magic efficacy of sculpture, particularly those in which the sculptured figure is a substitute for a man or a god.⁴ Thus Jupiter deceived Juno,⁵ Amasis substituted three wax images for men who were to be sacrificed to Juno,⁶ and, as Servius notes, such substitutions were customary in sacrifices.⁷

¹ Cf. W. H. Goodyear, *Greek Refinements* (New Haven, 1912); D. S. Robertson, *Handbook of Greek and Roman Architecture* (Cambridge, England), pp. 115 ff.

² Augustinus, *De Civ. Dei*, II, 7: Omnes enim cultores talium deorum, mox ut eos libido perpulerit, ferventi, ut ait Persius, tincta veneno magis intuentur quid Iuppiter fecerit, quam quid docuerit Plato vel censuerit Cato. Hinc apud Terentium flagitiosus adolescens spectat tabulam quandam pictam in pariete,

ubi inerat pictura haec, Iovem

Quo pacto Danae misisse aiunt quondam in gremium
imbrem aureum,

atque ab tanta auctoritate adhibet patrociniū turpitudini suae, cum in ea se iactat imitari deum.

³ Seneca, *Epist.*, 45, 8.

⁴ An instance of this is found in the Bible; cf. 1 *Samuel*, XIX, 19 ff.

⁵ Pausanias, IX, 3, 1-2.

⁶ Porphyry, *De Abstinētia*, II, 55.

⁷ On *Aeneid* II, 116 (ed. G. Thilo and H. Hagen, I, 238): Sciendum in sacris

Sixth Trope. Mixtures in Sensations

Still another argument which leads to the Sceptical conclusion is based on the circumstance that sensations themselves are not known in a pure state, but are always combined. Sculpture, for example, is a mixture of what is seen and what is touched. The illusionistic method in ancient painting, sacrificing tactile to visual impressions, presented the difficulties stressed in this trope; it sometimes even attempted moonlight scenes, where values alone remain, as in the fresco of the introduction of the Wooden Horse at Troy, by night.¹ The opposition to the illusionistic school by admirers of the conservative linear school was based on the condemnation of their work as a hasty makeshift.² Sextus, therefore, argues:

"The sixth trope³ is that based on mixtures, in accordance with which we conclude that it is perhaps possible to say that a thing is a certain mixture of the external and of that with which it is viewed, but not what the external reality is absolutely, since nothing of external substance is presented to us by itself but always with something else. . . . Our own complexion looks one way in warm air, another in cold, and we cannot say how our complexion is in reality, but only how it is with each one of these.⁴ The same sound seems one thing in thin air, another in dense air; and aromas are much stronger in the bathing room and in sunlight than in very cold air; and the body surrounded by water is light, but heavy when surrounded by air. Leaving aside

simulata pro veris accipi: unde cum de animalibus quae difficile inveniuntur est sacrificandum, de pane vel cera fiunt et pro veris accipiuntur.

¹ Cf. Swindler, *op. cit.*, p. 373 and fig. 578.

² *Ibid.*, p. 336.

³ This section is a translation of Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 124-128. Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 84-85; Philo, *De Ebrietate*, 189 ff. (Wendland, II, 206).

⁴ In his presentation of this trope, Diogenes Laërtius (IX, 84) discusses also how colors change in accordance with their illumination: ἡ γοὺν πορφύρα διάφορον ὑποφαίνει χρώμα ἐν ἥλιῳ καὶ σελήνῃ καὶ λύχνῳ. Cf. Cicero, *Acad. prior*, II, 105: *Mare illud, quod nunc Favonio nascente purpureum videtur, idem huic nostro videbitur, nec tamen adsentietur, quia nobismet ipsis modo caeruleum videbatur, mane ravum, quodque nunc, qua a sole conlucet, albescit et vibrat, dissimileque est proximo et continenti: ut, etiam si possis rationem reddere, cur id eveniat, tamen non possis id verum esse, quod videbatur oculis, defendere.* St. Augustine has a similar passage: *De Civ. Dei*, XXII, 24.

external mixtures, our very eyes have membranes and moisture in them. Since visible things are not seen without these, they are not apprehended precisely. We apprehend the mixture, and therefore those suffering from jaundice see everything yellow, and those with blood-shot eyes blood-red. . . . Neither does thought apprehend external reality, since the senses which guide it fail.¹ Perhaps thought also adds a certain mixture of its own to those things reported by the senses, since in every place where the dogmatic philosophers say the authoritative part of the soul resides,² we observe certain humors, in the brain, the heart, or whatever part of the living creature one would place it. In accordance with this trope, also, we see that since we can say nothing about the nature of external reality, we are compelled to suspend judgment."

Vitruvius also acknowledges that allowances must be made for such variations in conditions.³ But distortions in effect due to surrounding objects had given Carneades, a Sceptical leader of the Academy, an opportunity to belittle his opponent Chrysippus.⁴ For accurate vision Nemesius demands proper conditions.⁵ Therefore, Vitruvius notes, places where pictures are viewed or produced should have a north light.⁶

¹ It is significant that those conflicts in sense impressions from which epistemological consequences are drawn are mainly those between vision and other senses. On ancient theories of vision, cf. H. Lackenbacher, "Beiträge zur Antiken Optik," *Wiener Studien*, xxxv (1913), 34-61; A. E. Haas, "Antike Lichttheorien," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, xx (1907), 345-386.

² Diogenes Laërtius (vii, 159), explains this term of the Stoic physiological psychology: ἡγεμονικὸν δ' εἶναι τὸ κυριώτατον τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν ᾧ αἱ φαντασίαι καὶ αἱ ὁρμαὶ γίνονται καὶ ὅθεν ὁ λόγος ἀναπέμπεται· ὅπερ εἶναι ἐν καρδίᾳ.

³ *De Architectura*, iii, 5, 8-9.

⁴ Diogenes Laërtius, vii, 182: Ἦν δὲ καὶ τὸ σωματίον εὐτελές, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ ἀνδριάντος τοῦ ἐν Κεραμειῷ, ὃς σχεδὸν τι ὑποκέκρυπται τῷ πλησίον ἱππεῖ· ὅθεν αὐτὸν ὁ Καρνεάδης Κρῖνσιππον ἔλεγεν. Carneades, however, also illustrated his arguments through reference to objects of art, as Cicero tells us (*De Div.*, i, 13): Fingebat Carneades in Chiorum lapicidinis saxo diffisso caput exstitisse Panisci. A similar story in Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, xxxvi, 14. This illustration afterwards became a favorite one in Neoplatonism.

⁵ *De Natura Hominis*, vii, 153 (Oxford, 1671).

⁶ *De Architectura*, vi, 4, 2: aestiva ad septentrionem . . . non minus pinacothecae et plumariorum textrina pictorumque officinae, uti colores eorum in opere propter constantiam luminis inmutata permaneant qualitate.

Seventh Trope. Quantities and Constitutions of Substances

This trope is one which, based on the obvious inconsistency in the qualities of objects, refutes the contention that the art in objects of art is the intrinsic character of the materials, the skill with which they are manipulated, or the influence of purpose on materials and technique.¹ Opinion today may differ with regard to the coloring and finish of ancient sculpture, both in marble and in bronze, but due to weathering, burial in the earth, submersion in the sea, and other causes, we can be rather sure that its original appearance was not like its present condition, so that if art objects are more than relics, their function is not one permanently related to material and surface. Sextus in this trope declares:

"As the seventh trope² we designate that based on the quantities and constitutions of substances, calling constitutions what are commonly known as compositions. It is obvious because of this trope also that we are compelled to suspend judgment on the nature of things. For example, the scrapings of a goat's horn seem white when observed simply and without composition, but black when composed in the natural substance of the horn. The filings of silver by themselves seem black, but white in a whole piece. The marble of Taenarus, when the pieces are polished, looks white, but in the rough it looks red.³ Grains of sand when scattered seem rough, but gathered together in a heap they impress the sense of touch as soft.⁴ . . . Wine drunk in moderation strengthens us, but taken in excess ruins the body. . . . This trope based on quantities and constitutions obliterates the natural substance of external things. Therefore this trope also would seem to lead to

¹ The theory refuted by this trope is that usually attributed to Gottfried Semper, *Der Stil* (Munich, 1878-79). Cf. Hans Prinzhorn, *Gottfried Semper's Aesthetische Grundanschauungen* (Diss., Munich, 1909). Also published in *Zeitschrift f. Aesthetik*, IV (1909), 210-267.

² This section is a translation of Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 129-134. Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 86. (Here given as the eighth trope.) Philo, *De Ebrietate*, 189 ff. (Wendland, II, 206).

³ Yet Pliny (*Nat. Hist.*, XXXIV, 58) says of Myron, a sculptor in bronze: *primus hic multiplicasse veritatem videtur*.

⁴ This illustration may be compared with the dialectical arguments of Eubulides of Miletus. (Diogenes Laërtius, II, 108.)

suspension of judgment, since we are not able to pronounce absolutely on the nature of external substance.”

Eighth Trope. Relation in General

The trope on relation in general is illustrated by all the preceding references to works of art. But it is of particular importance for art objects as products of a temporal sequence, and for art history as an orderly and significant chronological series. If the variable of time is introduced, the differences in judgment of critics at various times with regard to the same object of art become significant in themselves. But if the variable of time is omitted, and an absolute based on extension in space is postulated, then the Sceptical tropes serve to demolish the certainty of any knowledge of what exists and make a chaos of the realm of values. Nevertheless, a point of view that may be permitted to Winckelmann still persists in many books on classical art currently produced, in contrast with the principles employed in other divisions of art history.¹ Sextus, centuries ago, argued:

“The eighth trope² is that of relation, in accordance with which we conclude that since everything is in relation, we shall suspend our judgment about what anything is absolutely and objectively. It is necessary, by the way, to note that in this trope, as well as in some other places, we employ *is* instead of *appears to be*, though we really mean ‘everything appears to be in relation.’ This is said in two ways: first, in relation to that which judges, for things that exist externally and are judged appear to be in relation to that which judges; second, in relation to things seen with it, as the right in relation to the left. That everything is in relation we have considered above, as, for example, in regard to that which judges, that each thing appears in

¹ Cf. Julius Schlosser, *Die Kunstliteratur* (Vienna, 1924); Wilhelm Waetzoldt, *Deutsche Kunsthistoriker* (Leipzig, 1921, 1924); Walter Passarge, *Die Philosophie der Kunstgeschichte in der Gegenwart* (Berlin, 1930); contributions to *Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* (Stuttgart, 1906–date).

² This section is a translation of Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 135–140. Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 87–88. (Here it is given as the tenth trope.) Philo, *De Ebrietate*, 186 ff. (Wendland, II, 206.) A. Gellius, *Noct. Att.*, XI, 5, 7. This is the trope which has in recent times again stimulated philosophers, physicists, and mathematicians. Many critics consider it the most important of the tropes.

relation to a certain living creature, man, sensation, and situation; and in regard to what is seen with it, in relation to a certain mixture, place, composition, quantity, and position. But the following argument also shows independently that everything is in relation. Is there any difference between things that are in relation and those that differ? If there is no difference, then those that differ are also in relation. But if there is a difference, since everything that differs is in relation, for it is said to be in relation to that from which it differs, then the different is in relation. . . . What signifies and what is signified are in relation. . . . With regard to the existing things, some are similar and others dissimilar, some equal and others unequal. . . . Since, in brief, as we see it, everything is in relation, it is finally obvious that we are unable to say what each thing is by its own nature and absolutely, but only what it appears to be relatively, whence it follows that we must suspend judgment on the nature of things in themselves."

Ninth Trope. Frequency and Rarity of Occurrence

The comparative rarity and infrequency of Greek bronzes, compared with more modern works of art, would probably be cited by a present-day Sextus as an illustration of the ninth trope, leading to the conviction that art is concerned with something that is essentially unreal. Work of art, as a class, are themselves extremely few in number compared with other objects, and if degree of reality depends on frequency of occurrence, it may be felt, for example, by Schopenhauer¹ or Élie Faure,² that art is chiefly concerned with illusions. Sextus reasons:

"The trope³ based on frequency or rarity of occurrence,⁴ which we speak of as ninth in order, we shall elaborate as follows. The sun is

¹ *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Book III (Leipzig, 1819); translated by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp (London, 1884-86).

² Élie Faure, *L'Ésprit des Formes* (Paris, 1927).

³ This section is a translation of Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 141-144. Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 87. Diogenes here notes that the Sceptics were not agreed on the order of the tropes: "This ninth mode is put eighth by Favorinus and tenth by Sextus and Aenesidemus; moreover, the tenth is put eighth by Sextus and ninth by Favorinus."

⁴ Cf. *Ad Herenn.*, III, 22, 36.

far more astonishing than a comet, but since we see the sun frequently, and a comet rarely, we are so astonished at the comet, that it is considered a portent, but we are not at all astonished at the sun. But if we imagine the sun seldom appearing and seldom setting, lighting up everything all at once and suddenly making it dark, we should be greatly astonished at the thing. An earthquake does not disturb in the same way those who experience it for the first time and those who are accustomed to it. What great astonishment his first sight of the sea brings to a man! The beauty of the human body when first suddenly viewed moves us more than when we have become accustomed to see it.¹ Things that are rare seem valuable, but not at all those that are common and plentiful. If we imagine that water were rare, how much more precious it would seem than all the things that are precious. If we imagine gold simply lying about on the ground almost as plentiful as stones, who would think it so precious or to be protected? Since, then, the same things seem, in relation to the frequency or rarity of their occurrence, sometimes astonishing and valuable, and at others not so, we conclude that we can say perhaps what each of these things appears to be in the case of a certain frequency or rarity of occurrence, but we are not able to say how each external thing is absolutely. Therefore because of this trope also we suspend judgment."

The clearest parallel to this passage of Sextus is to be found in the Rhetoric *ad Herennium*.² But on the theory that art imitates nature, those ancient writers who discussed art were faced with the fact that in nature things of perfect beauty are seldom, if ever, to be found. The rarity of the excellent was asserted by Cicero,³ and that of beautiful things stressed by Himerius, as reported by Photius.⁴ Estimates of

¹ Aristotle, however, according to Diogenes Laërtius (IV, 20), gave an empirical answer to the aesthetic problem which, although positive, leaves us as badly off as the Scepticism of Sextus: πρὸς τὸν πνθόμενον διὰ τί τοῖς καλοῖς πολλὸν χρόνον ὁμιλοῦμεν, "τυφλοῦ," ἔφη, "τὸ ἐρώτημα."

² III, 22. Docet igitur nos ipsa natura, quid oporteat fieri. Nam si quas res in vita videmus parvas, usitatas, quotidianas, eas meminisse non solemus; propterea quod nulla nisi nova aut admirabili re commovetur animus. . . . Imitetur ars igitur naturam et, quod ea desiderat, inveniatur; quod ostendit, sequatur.

³ Cicero, *de Amicitia*, XXI, 79: omnia praeclara rara, nec quicquam difficilius quam reperire quod sit omni ex parte in suo genere perfectum.

⁴ *Bibliotheca*, cod. 243 (ed. Bekker), p. 375, line 32 ff.

artistic value also sometimes are related to the time and effort involved in creating them.¹ Works of art were occasionally, even by artists, valued on account of the cost of the materials, a point of view condemned by Apelles.² Pliny, however, does not seem quite convinced that a work of Lysippus which had been gilded was better when the gold was removed.³ But Seneca holds that if the object sought is beautiful, it is worth the pains it costs.⁴

On the other hand, the ancients, it seems, were never so much impressed by the theoretical difficulties of the principle of imitation as they were by the fact that men could artificially imitate external reality at all. This general attitude of wonder⁵ was strengthened by the admiration of monumental⁶ or otherwise striking works of art which were necessarily rare in number.

Although it did not become a commonplace until centuries later, the comparison of the Creator to an artist, because of the uniqueness and wonder of his work, appears even in Empedocles.⁷

Tenth Trope. Institutions, Customs, Fabulous Beliefs, and Dogmatic Opinions

The possibility of history as a record of the past, including the history of art, depends on the facts discussed in the tenth trope. Observed

¹ Plato, *Laws*, VI, 769 A-C.

² Clemens Alexandrinus, *Paedag.*, II, 12, 125: 'Ἀπελλῆς ὁ ζωγράφος θεασάμενός τινα τῶν μαθητῶν Ἑλένην ὀνόματι πολύχρυσον γράψαντα, ᾧ μειράκιον, εἶπεν, μὴ δυνάμενος γράψαι καλὴν πλουσίαν πεποίηκας. τοιαῦται τοίνυν Ἑλέναι αἱ νῦν εἰσὶ γυναῖκες, οὐ καλὰ γνησίως, πεπλασμέναι δὲ πλουσίως.

³ Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, XXXIV, 63: fecit et Alexandrum Magnum multis operibus a pueritia eius orsus. quam statuam inaurari iussit Nero princeps delectatus admodum illa, dein, cum pretio perisset gratia artis, detractum est aurum, pretiosiorque talis existimabatur etiam cicatricibus operis atque concisuris in quibus aurum haeserat remanentibus.

⁴ Seneca, *Epist.*, 31, 6-7.

⁵ Dionys. Halicarn., *De Composit. Verb.* X: καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνη πλάσματα καὶ γραφάς, καὶ γλυφάς, καὶ ὅσα δημιουργήματα χειρῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὁρῶσα, ὅταν εὐρίσκη τό θ' ἡδὺ ἐνὸν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ καλόν, ἀρκεῖται, καὶ σὺδὲν ἔτι ποθεῖ. Himerius, *Ex propeptica in Ampelium*; ed. F. Dübner (Paris, 1869), p. 34, lines 28 ff.

⁶ An anecdote of the Colossus of Rhodes is told by Sextus, *Adv. Math.*, VII, 107. Cf. Overbeck, *Antike Schriftquellen*, Nos. 1539-1554. This and other colossi are discussed by Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, XXXIV, 39-46.

⁷ H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin, 1912), I, 234, Nr. 23.

differences in various cultures at the same time and in the same culture at different times make it possible to construct an orderly and coherent sequence of such differences. The observation of specific differences enables the student to assign any given art object to a place in the chronological and geographical continuity. But for antiquity, history could hardly be more than a record of physical movements to which moral considerations were added. As Sextus argued:

"The tenth trope¹ is that which is most connected with morals,² the one concerned with institutions, customs, laws, fabulous beliefs, and dogmatic opinions.³ An institution is a course of life or something, observed by one or by many, as, for example, by Diogenes or the Lacedaemonians. A law is a written agreement made by the citizens, and whoever transgresses against it is punished. A custom or habit, — for there is no difference between them, — is something approved in common by many men, and the transgressor is not punished at all. . . . A fabulous belief is the approval of things that did not happen and are fictitious, as, to choose one example from many, are the stories told of Cronos, which find many believers.⁴ A dogmatic opinion is the approval of something that seems to be established through deliberation or some demonstration, as for example, that the elements of substance are indivisible or equally divisible or very small or something else. We place each one of these sometimes in opposition to itself, and again against each of the others. For example, we place custom in opposition to custom in this way. Some Ethiopians tattoo new-born babies, but we Greeks do not. The Persians consider it becoming to wear garments dyed with bright colors, falling to the feet, but we Greeks consider it unbecoming.⁵ We set law against law

¹ This section is a translation of Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 145-163. Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 83-84. (Here given as the fifth trope); Philo, *De Ebrietate*, 193 ff. (Wendland, II, 207). This trope was the ground of the sophists' nihilism and cynicism.

² For a Sceptical attitude with regard to knowledge of virtue, cf. *Meno*, 80 D.

³ The material presented in this trope is used again by Sextus in his attack on the Stoic theory of ethics. Cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.*, III, 168 ff.

⁴ Ammianus Marcellinus (XXIX, I, 15), however, remarks: fallere non minus uidetur, qui gesta praeterita sciens, quam ille qui numquam facta fingit.

⁵ Pliny also observed that the Greeks differed from the Romans in their judg-

in this way. . . . It was a law of the Tauri in Scythia to sacrifice strangers to Artemis, but among us Greeks it is forbidden to kill a man in a sacred place. . . . We set dogmatic opinion against dogmatic opinion, when we say that some pronounce that there is one element in substance, others an unlimited number; some that the soul is mortal, others immortal; some that our affairs are ordered through the providence of the gods, others without any providence. We set custom against the other things, as, for example, law. . . . The Egyptians marry their sisters, which is forbidden by law among us. . . . A custom is set against a fabulous belief, when the myths say that Cronos ate up his own children, whereas it is our custom to take care of children. It is our custom to worship the gods as good and unaffected by evils, but they are shown wounded and jealous of one another by the poets. A custom is set against a dogmatic opinion, when it is our custom to seek good things of the gods, but Epicurus says that the divine does not pay any attention to us, and when Aristippus held it a matter of indifference to wear women's clothing, but we consider it shameful. We set institution against law, when, although there is a law that it is not allowed to beat free and well-born men, those who compete in the pancratium strike one another as a consequence of their way of life, and although murder is forbidden, gladiators kill one another for the same reason. . . . We set a fabulous belief against a dogmatic opinion when . . . the philosophers do away with centaurs, bringing us the centaurs as an example of unreality. . . . Because of this trope also it is necessary to suspend judgment regarding the nature of the substances that exist externally."

In his later and more extended discussion of ethics, Sextus clearly identifies aesthetic preferences with ethical, pointing to the fact that men's judgments do not agree, that they are governed by prejudice, and that philosophers as well as uneducated men are alike in this respect. He declares:¹

"All men, as Aenesidemus said, think that which appeals to them good, whatever it be, and entertain discordant opinions as to its nature. For example, if they chance to agree that there is such a thing

ment of the proper costume for sculptured figures (*Nat. Hist.*, xxxiv, 18): *Graeca res nihil velare, at contra Romana ac militaris thoraces addere.*

¹ Translation of *Adv. Math.*, xi, 42-44.

as bodily beauty, they quarrel about the well-formed and beautiful woman. Ethiopians prefer one snub-nosed and dark, the Persians one hook-nosed and white, but others say that one of medium features and color is more beautiful than all. Common men and philosophers too, in the same way, according to a common prejudice, think that there is something good and bad, the good being what profits them and the bad the contrary, so that they fight with one another about its nature. . . . Some eagerly seek fame, others wealth, some health, and others pleasure. The same holds true of philosophers."

At the end of his keen discussion of Stoic ethics, Sextus also shows that he considers beauty a quality of sensation:¹ "Of those things said to be good and bad, some are so according to opinion, others according to necessity. . . . According to opinion . . . (things are thought good or bad) with regard to body, such as beauty, strength, health, . . ."

OTHER SETS OF TROPES

While the ten tropes are based largely on differences in sensation, other sets of tropes concentrate on the inconsistencies of logical demonstration in itself. The later Sceptics, after Agrippa, among whom was Sextus, exerted themselves in the development and elaboration of arguments against the dogmatic philosophers, although Agrippa and his successors did not intend to provide substitutes for the tropes of Aenesidemus² but to offer a more thoroughly dialectic argument toward the same end. Sextus tells us of a group of tropes,³ according to which doubt is based on the following considerations: Nothing can be proved by itself, as appears from the discrepancy in our views on every perceptible and thinkable thing, on which there is no certain conclusion. Next, nothing can be proved through something else, for in itself nothing has certainty, and if it is to gain certainty through something else, we are led either to a *regressus in infinitum* or an argument in a circle. The five tropes, however, are more explicit in statement, as Sextus reports them:

"The later Sceptics teach the following five tropes as arguments for

¹ Translation of *Adv. Math.*, XI, 142.

² Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 177.

³ Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 178 ff.

suspending judgment.¹ First, that based on contradiction; second, that which strikes out into the unlimited; third, that based on relation; fourth, hypothesis; fifth, the argument in a circle. The argument based on contradiction (ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς διαφωνίας τρόπος) is that according to which we find regarding the thing set forth an indeterminable discord in life as well as among the philosophers, on which ground, since we are unable to choose or reject anything, we end by suspending judgment. The argument which strikes out into the unlimited (ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπτώσεως τρόπος) is that according to which we say that the confirmation of the thing before us requires another confirmation, and this confirmation another in turn, and so on without limit, so that, since we have no beginning with which we can make a start for constructive reasoning, suspension of judgment naturally follows. The argument based on relation (ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς τι τρόπος) is that, as we have said, in which what subsists appears to be of one kind or another in relation to the one judging, and in relation to the things seen together with it, but how it is constructed in itself by nature, we refrain from deciding. The argument from hypothesis (ὁ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τρόπος) is present when the dogmatic philosophers, driven forth into the unlimited, proceed from something which they do not prove but simply and indemonstrably are willing to hold good.² The argument

¹ The above is a free translation of Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 164-169. Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 88-90: "The mode arising from disagreement proves, with regard to any inquiry whether in philosophy or everyday life, that it is full of the utmost contentiousness and confusion. The mode which involves extension *ad infinitum* refuses to admit that what is sought to be proved is firmly established, because one thing furnishes the ground for belief in another, and so on *ad infinitum*. The mode deriving from relativity declares that a thing can never be apprehended in any by itself, but only in connection with something else. Hence all things are unknowable. The mode resulting from hypothesis arises when people suppose that you must take the most elementary things as of themselves entitled to credence, instead of postulating them: which is useless, because some one else will adopt the contrary hypothesis. The mode arising from reciprocal inference is found whenever that which should be confirmatory of the thing requiring to be proved itself has to borrow credit from the latter, as, for example, if anyone seeking to establish the existence of pores on the ground that emanations take place should take this (the existence of pores) as proof that there are emanations." Diogenes Laërtius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, II (London, 1925), 501. The translation in this volume of the Loeb Classical Library is by R. D. Hicks.

² This has no connection with the method of scientific experiment as practiced

in a circle (ὁ διάλληλος τρόπος) arises whenever that which rightly should confirm the point in question itself requires acceptance of the point in question, and since we can accept neither as proof of the other, we suspend judgment regarding both.”¹

The following passage is a modern representative sample of conventional replies to the dialectic of Scepticism. It will be seen that this very argument involves the fourth and fifth tropes of Agrippa, reasoning from an unproved hypothesis and reasoning in a circle:²

“To the attack upon the possibility of demonstration, inasmuch as every proof requires itself a fresh proof, it may quite fairly be retorted that the contradiction really lies in the demand for proof of the self-evident, on which all proof must ultimately depend. It is of course always possible that in any particular case we may be deceived; we may be assuming as self-evidently true what is in reality not so. But such incidental lapses are found to correct themselves by the consequences in which they involve us, and they have no power to shake our trust in the general validity of reason. It may, however, be granted that the possibility of lapse throws us open to the objections, ingenuous or disingenuous, of the sceptic; and we must remain exposed to them so long as we deal with our first principles as so many isolated axioms or intuitions. But the process of self-correction referred to

in modern times. Such a method was impossible in view of the fact that they had no telescopes, microscopes, thermometers, or even watches. Cf. Edwyn Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics* (Oxford, 1913), pp. 127 ff. On the ancient use of hypothesis, see Martin Altenburg, *Die Methode der Hypothese* (Diss. Marburg, 1905).

¹ The five tropes of Agrippa are particularly directed against Aristotle's theory of immediate self-evidence (*Anal. post.*, 72 b 18; 75 a 38; *Anal. prior*, 46 a 17, etc.). The Sceptical argument against the syllogism is developed by Sextus (*Pyrr. Hyp.*, II, 193 ff.), and is revived by J. S. Mill (*A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive*, London, 1843). Scholars disagree as to the order and the significance of the several tropes of Aenesidemus, especially the ninth and the tenth, and the value and weight for philosophy of them all. Richter sees in the tropes of Agrippa the essence of rational Scepticism, and considers that those of Aenesidemus include only sensual Scepticism. Goedeckemeyer finds in Agrippa's tropes an effort to bring together in a unified statement all the factors leading to suspension of judgment, whereas Aenesidemus had systematically treated in that fashion but one trope, that based on the conflict of opinions.

² *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1911), XXIV, 308-309. This article was written by A. S. Pringle-Pattison.

points to another proof — the only ultimately satisfactory proof of which our first principles admit. Their evidence lies in their mutual interdependence and in the coherence of the system which they jointly constitute.”

Nevertheless, the same author ¹ asserts: “Of a scepticism which professes to doubt the validity of every reasoning process and every operation of our faculties it is, of course, as impossible as it would be absurd to offer any refutation.” This is in line with Bevan’s position: “Men did not answer the Sceptical arguments; they simply went past them, turned their backs upon them.” ²

SUBSTANCE ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE AND THE SCEPTICS

It may not, however, be necessary to adopt so cynical a position with regard to the possibility of meeting the Sceptical position. It appears possible to show, for example, that classical Scepticism employs valid arguments provided that the classical idea of substance is previously assumed. But if the classical concept of substance is abandoned, the arguments no longer apply. Aristotle’s use of the concept of substance and his illustration of it through reference to art are to be seen clearly in the *Metaphysics*.³ He replaced Plato’s dualism of the world of ideas and the world of appearances with the reciprocal relation between general concepts and individual perceptions. In both the realms of nature and of art this relation is that between form and matter.⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, immediately following the passage just quoted.

² Edwyn Bevan, *Stoics and Sceptics* (Oxford, 1913), p. 140.

³ Cf. R. Abendroth, *Das Problem der Materie* (Leipzig, 1889); Cl. Baeumker, *Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophie* (Münster, 1890); E. Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* (Berlin, 1910); *Substance and Function and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity*, translated by W. C. and M. C. Swabey (Chicago, 1923), p. 7 ff. Cf. p. 9: “The two chief forms of logic, which are especially opposed to each other in the modern scientific development, are distinguished — as will become clear — by the different value which is placed upon *thing-concepts* and *relation-concepts*.” Bruno Bauch, *Das Substanzproblem in der griechischen Philosophie bis zur Blütezeit* (Heidelberg, 1910), pp. 217 ff.; W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (London, 1930), pp. 167 ff.

⁴ Aristotle, *Physics*, A, 7, 190 b 20. Γίγνεται πᾶν ἐκ τε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τῆς μορφῆς; *Metaphysics*, Z, 2, 1028 b 36: τὸ δ’ ὑποκείμενον ἐστὶ καθ’ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα λέγεται, ἐκεῖνο δ’ αὐτὸ μηκέτι κατ’ ἄλλου; *ibid.*, 1033 a 5: ἐξ οὗ δὲ ὡς ὅλης γίγνεται ἓνια λέγεται

With regard to the work of art, the difference from nature is merely that form, before being imposed on matter, exists in the human soul.¹ In addition to these two fundamental categories, ὕλη and μορφή (εἶδος, ἰδέα),² Aristotle recognized others as also applicable both to art and to nature,³ and these categories, of which only those of form and substance are fundamental and *a priori*, are discussed fully in relation to a work of art by Seneca.⁴

A similar idea of substance is assumed by the Sceptics. That we cannot be sure of the nature of things in themselves is the conclusion of the ancient Sceptics, but that there are such things they did not undertake to prove. They rarely even stated the implication which

οὐκ ἐκέينو ἀλλ' ἐκείνινον, οἷον ὁ ἀνδριάς οὐ λίθος ἀλλὰ λίθινος . . . αἴτιον δ' ὅτι γίγνεται ἐκ τῆς στερήσεως καὶ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, ὃ λέγομεν τὴν ὕλην; *ibid.*, 1036 a 8: ἡ δ' ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθ' αὐτήν. Cf. Erwin Panofsky, *Idea* (Leipzig, 1914), pp. 9 ff., a work of fundamental importance for an understanding of the genesis of modern evaluations of art. Bruno Bauch, *Die Idee* (Leipzig, 1926), however, devotes but a few concluding pages to art.

¹ *Metaphysics*, Z, 7, 1032 a: 'Απὸ τέχνης δὲ γίγνεται ὅσων τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.

² Cf. Charles Werner, *Aristote et l'Idéalisme Platonicien* (Geneva, 1900), pp. 11 ff.; Erich Neubauer, *Der Aristotelische Formbegriff* (Diss., Heidelberg, 1909); Hans Meyer, *Natur und Kunst bei Aristoteles* (Paderborn, 1919).

³ αἰτία, τέλος (τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα), τὸ κινεῖν (τὸ ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως).

⁴ *Epistolae*, 65, 2 (ed. Hense, pp. 190): Omnis ars naturae imitatio est. itaque quod de universo dicebam, ad haec transfer, quae ab homine facienda sunt: statua et materiam habuit, quae pateretur artificem, et artificem, qui materiae daret faciem. ergo in statua materia aes fuit, causa opifex. eadem condicio rerum omnium est: ex quo constant, quod fit, et ex eo, quod facit. Stoicis placet unam causam esse, id, quod facit. Aristoteles putat causam tribus modis dici: "Prima" inquit "causa est ipsa materia, sine qua nihil potest effici; secunda opifex. tertia est forma, quae unicuique operi inponitur tamquam statuae"; nam hanc Aristoteles idos vocat. "quarta quoque" inquit "his accedit, propositum totius operis." quid sit hoc, aperiam. aes prima statuae causa est. numquam enim facta esset, nisi fuisset id, ex quo funderetur ducereturve. secunda causa artifex est. non potuisset enim aes illud in habitum statuae figurari, nisi accessissent peritae manus. tertia causa est forma. neque enim statua ista doryphoros aut diadumenos vocaretur, nisi haec illi esset inpressa facies. quarta causa est faciendi propositum. nam nisi hoc fuisset, facta non esset. quid est propositum? quod invitavit artificem, quod ille secutus fecit; vel pecunia est haec, si venditurus fabricavit, vel gloria, si laboravit in nomen, vel religio, si donum templo paravit. ergo et haec causa est, propter quam fit: aut non putas inter causas facti operis esse numerandum, quo remoto factum non esset?

exists in the frequent use of words and phrases such as: τὰ ὑποκείμενα, τὰ φύσει ὄντα, τὰ ὄντως ὄντα.¹

Things thus admitted to exist as parts of substance they also believed to possess the properties and qualities which dogmatists attribute to external reality, although they suspended judgment with regard to the coincidence of our perceptions with the things whose existence they accepted.² Consequently, they also implied that knowledge derived from sensation should consist of copies or images of the original things-in-themselves.³ The external existence of properties and qualities, as well as the passivity of the subject in the apprehension of appearances, they did not, indeed, attempt to prove, but assumed as given.

Given this understanding of substance, it was held that as extension in space is a common situation uniformly accessible to the senses, truth, as an accurate mental picture of external reality, should be immediate, uniform, and identical in every individual and under every circumstance. The observed contradictions lead to the conclusion that judgment with regard to the nature of substantial reality, assumed to conform to the pattern of sensed space, must be suspended. Such a conclusion is based on an expectation of uniformity and identity, and precludes sameness, similarity, likeness, or analogy. Nevertheless, it may be questioned, whether, apart from the formal doubt which the Sceptics stated with regard to the validity of their own position, there is not also an effective contradiction present in this expectation. Those minds to which the Sceptical arguments are presented are expected to be similar in their apprehension of the contradictions of experience in relation to underlying substance, and the

¹ A statement by Sextus which comes close to an express assertion that there are things in themselves apart from our doubtful knowledge of them is to be found in *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 19: ὅταν δὲ ζητῶμεν, εἰ τοιοῦτον ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον ὁποῖον φαίνεται, τὸ μὲν ὅτι φαίνεται δίδομεν, ζητοῦμεν δ' οὐ περὶ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκείνου ὃ λέγεται περὶ τοῦ φαινομένου.

² This appears in several of the tropes and in the arguments against causality of Aenesidemus. Cf. *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 182: τέταρτον καθ' ὃν τὰ φαινόμενα λαβόντες ὡς γίνεται, καὶ τὰ μὴ φαινόμενα νομίζουσιν ὡς γίνεται κατειληφέναι, τάχα μὲν ὁμοίως τοῖς φαινομένοις τῶν ἀφανῶν ἐπιτελουμένων, τάχα δ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλ' ἰδιαζόντως.

³ *Pyrr. Hyp.*, I, 19: τὰ γὰρ κατὰ φαντασίαν παθητικὴν ἀβουλήτως ἡμᾶς ἄγοντα εἰς συγκατάθεσιν οὐκ ἀνατρέπομεν.

analogies to art objects are felt to be demonstrations of the arguments because of their sensible properties. Thus it may be concluded that the Sceptics by appealing to argument admit the function or relation of similarity, and themselves demonstrate that substance as conforming to unique, continuous, and tangible body extended in space, is an inadequate concept.

CONCLUSION

We thus observe that: (1) The principle of a universal underlying substance is held by Sextus as well as by Aristotle and other classical thinkers. (2) Their underlying substance is that in which properties, qualities, and values inhere. (3) The nature of substance is largely determined by reference to physical extension in space, our knowledge of which is gained through the sensation of touch. (4) A truth as known is an accurate image of the external object in the mind; while a work of art is an accurate imitation of an external object in another object external to the mind, differing from the original object mainly in two respects; (a) it is a product of human skill and not one spontaneously yielded by nature, and (b) it lacks some of the attributes of the original object.

On this basis, the arguments of classical Scepticism are of fundamental significance, providing the initial problems of modern critical philosophies. They establish a radical doubt regarding knowledge, if it is an accurate image of substance, and regarding art, if it is an accurate imitation of objects. The theory of substance is effectively and almost habitually justified through arguments from objects of art, by Sextus, as well as by Aristotle, and other ancient thinkers. The discrepancies between the imitation and the thing imitated are obvious in the work of art, and inevitably lead to the Sceptical conclusion that our sense impressions are equally unreliable images of external reality. Plato, with a theory of imitation or participation as an explanation of the relation between the ideas and all individual things, therefore chose to reject or rigidly control those arts which demonstrated the weakness of the principle of imitation, in the sphere where it is capable of verification by the senses.

If either the theory of substance or the theory of imitation in art, by which it is justified, is incorrect, both are untenable. But if some

other explanation of art is arrived at, then the arguments of Scepticism may be overcome through an analysis which is not limited to the data afforded by touch. The field of aesthetics and the class of fine arts¹ are relatively modern distinctions, and they are possible, historically and logically, as a result of Neoplatonism. In another essay I hope to continue the present discussion and show that as Scepticism demonstrated the defectiveness of the doctrine of substance and of imitation, Neoplatonism superseded the doctrine of imitation and made possible the fundamental postulates on which the concepts of both aesthetics and fine arts are founded.

¹ The term *aesthetics* is due to A. G. Baumgarten: *Aesthetica* (2 vols., Frankfurt a. d. O., 1750-58). The term *fine arts* was made popular by J. B. Du Bos, *Reflexions critiques sur la Poésie et la Peinture* (Paris, 1719, 1740, etc.) and Ch. Batteux, *Traité des Beaux-Arts, réduits à un même principe* (Paris, 1746), translated by J. A. Schlegel into German (Leipzig, 1751).

THE OSI OF TACITUS—GERMANIC OR ILLYRIAN?

By JOSHUA WHATMOUGH

THE central European tribe called the *Osi* are known only from the *Germania* of Tacitus, who mentions them twice, cap. 28. 3:

sed utrum Arauisci in Pannoniam ab Osis Germanorum natione an Osi ab Arauiscis in Germaniam commigrauerint, cum eodem adhuc sermone institutis moribus utantur, incertum est, quia pari olim inopia ac libertate eadem utriusque ripae bona malaque erant,

and cap. 43. 1:

retro Marsigni, Cotini, Osi, Buri terga Marcomannorum Quadorumque claudunt. e quibus Marsigni et Buri sermone cultuque Suebos referunt; Cotinos Gallica, Osos Pannonica lingua coarguit non esse Germanos, et quod tributa patiuntur.

From these passages it is clear that the *Osi* dwelt in *Germania*, and not in *Pannonia*. Modern authorities (e.g. Tomaszek in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. *Arauisci*) have conjectured that their home was in the valley of the Eipel, which enters the Danube from the north at Szob, some 70 km. above Buda-Pest, perhaps rightly. At least, *pace* Holder (*Altcelt. Sprachschatz*, ii. 884), they are not to be confused with the *Osones* of *Itin. Ant.* 263. 7 who lived in *Pannonia* on the other side of the Danube, in or adjoining the country of the *Arauisci*. The other references furnished by Holder (*ibid.*) are equally valueless; for at *Ptol.* 2. 11. 10 (263. 4) the reading *Ὀσιβοὺργοι* (Müller) and at *Iul. Capitol. M. Ant.* 22. 1 the reading *Osi* (after K. Müllenhoff, Haupt's *Zeitschrift für deutsches Alterthum*, 9, 1853, p. 132; cf. *Hermes* 2, 1867, p. 318) are both conjectural. We are left therefore with the passages of Tacitus above quoted.

That these passages are inconsistent is obvious. Editors are uneasy and apply the knife. Hear Furneaux, who follows Passow and Halm in excising the words *Germanorum natione* (28. 3): 'in c. 43. 1 it is distinctly stated that their *Pannonian* language showed them not to be Germans. It is implied here that they had otherwise closer affinity to the *Arauisci* than to the *Pannonians* generally, but it could hardly

have been doubtful to the historian which nation was the offshoot of the other, and it seems impossible to bring the two passages into harmony. The difficulty is increased by *Germanorum natione*, which is most probably no more than the gloss of some perplexed critic; though many have retained it, taken in a loose sense ("reckoned as Germans"), as part of the supposition here treated as uncertain, and again (43. 1): 'Tacitus here speaks of their language as Pannonian, which shows them to be an Illyrian race, specially related to the Arauisci.'

The Osi, then, lived in Germania, but their tribal customs and their language were those of the Pannonians. It follows that they were a Pannonian enclave in Germania, either having migrated there or being an ancient Pannonian remnant north of the Danube. In either case the name of the Osones south and west of them seems to belong to a kindred tribe. But at 28. 3 does not Tacitus use *natio* with a territorial connotation 'ad regionem' which the lexica fail to recognize? A study of the terms *populus*, *gens*, *natio* in Imperial or at least in post-Augustan Latin is a desideratum. Tacitus, if I mistake not, uses *natio* here, if not elsewhere, almost with the significance of English *nation* — not a race; not always, if generally, a language; not generally now, if in former times, a religion; but always a territory and frequently a state. Thus in *Agric.* 12. 1 *nationes* is synonymous with *gentes*, *ibid.* 12. 2; in *C. I. L.* vi. 2203 *natione Raetus* means 'from the territory included in the *prouincia* (*C. I. L.* x. 5398) of Raetia,' for the term *Raeti* is a comprehensive one for tribes of racially different origins. So the Osi were tributary, like the Cotini (who spoke Keltic), to a Germanic political organisation or state, even though — what in the first century of our era was impossible — that state did not embrace all the existing tribes of Germanic race or speech. We speak in the same way of the American nation, because there is an American state; but there is no American language, and no American race if by 'American' we refer to the United States as we do in the expressions 'American nation' and 'American state.'

Political frontiers do not as a rule coincide with linguistic frontiers or ethnic frontiers; the former are, moreover, much more precisely defined. Not only may a political unit include more than one dialect and race; but dialect merges into dialect and race into race gradually

— with all degrees of sharpness, sometimes imperceptibly, sometimes very clearly. Isoglosses (i.e. boundaries of linguistic phenomena) are usually to be traced in bundles near to political or racial boundaries, but by no means invariably; and they coincide exactly neither with one another nor with political boundaries. Editors of ancient authors should know these facts. The Osi, of Pannonian language and customs, belonged to a German state, they were (in Furneaux's phrase) 'reckoned as Germans,' and the offending words are really inoffensive and should stand.

The circumstance, however, that the Pannonian Osi were 'reckoned as Germans' is full of interest to the student of language as well as to the historian or to the editor of Tacitus. The historical events which led up to this particular circumstance are probably not to be revealed to us; linguistically the circumstance is both interesting and easily explained. Within this decade there has been brought together a body of evidence which connects the Germanic dialects, otherwise markedly distinguished by the great Germanic sound shifts, with dialects to the south, and especially with Illyrian. This evidence I commend to the reader of Tacitus who balks at *Germanorum natione* and rejects my suggested interpretation of those words. It is not impossible that the Osi were *natura* or *genere* Germans despite the Pannonian flavour of their speech; no linguist would reject two such facts as inconsistent in the case of a tribe living practically on the Germanic frontier. In the val d'Aosta there are over 70,000 Italians who are described as 'franco-phone' or French speaking.

Now Hirt has called attention to certain similarities between Germanic and Italic (see *Gesch. d. deutsch. Sprache*, ed. 2, 1925, p. 269, cf. id., *Idg. Gram.* i, 1927, p. 56). The little that we know of Illyrian suggests comparisons of it also with Germanic. So far as the Osi are concerned we may note at once that the study of local names¹ has confirmed the ancient notice which makes certain Illyrian tribes, the *Pirustae*, *Daesitiae*, *Maezeii*, Pannonian (Strabo 7. 314), see Krahe, *Die alten Balkanillyr. geograph. Namen*, 1925, p. 110, with the references to Kretschmer (*Einkl.*, p. 252) and Hirt (*Indogerm.* i. 156, ii. 610; cf. Forbiger, *Hdb.*, ed. 2, iii. 468, n. 33). The contiguity of Italic, Illyrian,

¹ Cf. also Löwenthal in *Zeitschr. f. Ortsnamen-forschung*, iv, 1928, pp. 62 sq.

and Germanic tribes in ancient times is well known, e.g. Strabo 7. 313: λέγωμεν δὴ τὰ Ἰλλυρικά πρῶτα, συνάπτοντα τῷ τε Ἰστρῷ καὶ ταῖς Ἀλπεσιν, αἱ κεῖνται μεταξύ τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ τῆς Γερμανίας, ἀρξάμεναι ἀπὸ τῆς λίμνης τῆς κατὰ τοὺς Οὐνδολικούς καὶ Ῥαιτοὺς καὶ Τοινίους. The presence of the Illyrian formants *-st-* and *-ōn-* in Pannonian names (*Segesta*, *Ionista*, *Lepauista*; Ἡμῶνα) and the recurrence of tribal and local names in both territories (*Amantini*, *Breuci* [-*nī*], *Altinum* and others, see Hirt, *Krahe ll. cc.*) are striking.

Even more striking are the close relations between Illyrian and Germanic which have already been noted, the evidence for which this paper is meant to supplement. The following are among the previous discussions of the same topic which I have noticed: R. Much in Hoops' *Reallexikon d. germ. Altertums* iv, 1918-9, p. 508 sq., who observed similarities between Germanic and Venetic (i.e. Illyrian) names and formants, an observation which gained great weight when Sommer called attention to the correspondence between Venetic *exō* 'I,' *mecho* 'me' and Gothic *ik*, *mik*, and particularly of Venetic *sselboisselboi* 'for himself' to O. H. G. *selb selbo* (*I. F.*, 42, 1924, pp. 129 sqq.), especially since the Germanic forms are otherwise unparalleled. A Venetic inscription from Pieve di Cadore (*Prae-Italic Dialects*, i, no. 162) contains a dedication to a goddess *lo·u·zera* 'Libera' who must be identical with the Pannonian Libera, one of the divine pair (Liber and Libera) 'ausserordentlich häufig auf Weihinschriften von Dacien, Dalmatien, und Pannonien, wo offenbar zwei engverbundene einheimische Gottheiten sich dieser Namen bemächtigt haben' (Wissowa, *Rel. u. Kultus d. Römer*, ed. 2, 1912, p. 303; cf. Conway, *Studi Etruschi*, iv, 1930, p. 289). Since Sommer's there have appeared two articles by Vasmer (*Zeitschr. f. slav. Philol.* v, 1929, pp. 360 sqq., and vi, 1929, pp. 145 sqq.) in which certain North-European names, not obviously Germanic or Slavonic, are explained as Illyrian; and two articles by Krahe, *I. F.* 47, 1929, pp. 321 sqq., in which other names of the same kind are similarly dealt with, and three important comparisons of more certain character — that is to say, not proper names — are added (Messap. *βύριον* 'building' cf. O. E., O. H. G. *būr* 'dwelling,' *βρένδος* 'stag,' cf. Swed. dial. *brind* 'deer,' *σίπτα* 'be silent,' cf. O. H. G. *gi-swiftōn* 'conticescere'); and *I. F.* 48, 1930, p. 236, a criticism of Vasmer's second article. Jokl's paper on 'Balkangermanisches' in *Festschr. d. 57 Ver-*

sammlung deutscher Philologen u. Schulmänner in Salzburg gewidmet (1929) adds other evidence of like purport.¹

We shall not be surprised, then, to find that what is claimed as the oldest Germanic document is written in a Sub-Alpine (or 'North-Etruscan') alphabet on a helmet from Negau in Steiermark, that is from Illyrian territory (see Kretschmer in *Actes du premier congrès de linguistes*, 1928, p. 110), or that the runic script is now referred to a Sub-Alpine origin (see the comparative tables published contemporaneously by M. Hammarström in *Studier i nordisk filologi* 20, 1929, no. 1 'Om runskriftens härkomst,' p. 51 and by S. Feist in *Acta Philolog. Scand.* 4, 1929, p. 21), a view, anticipated by Buck in 1919 (see *Modern Philology* 17, p. 47), which gives a new significance to the well-known statement of Tacitus *Germ.* 3. 3: *monumentaue et tumulos quosdam Graecis litteris inscriptos in confinio Germaniae Raetiaeque adhuc exstare*, the Sub-Alpine alphabets being themselves of Chalcid-Etruscan origin.

However, most of the comparisons between Germanic and Illyrian made hitherto have been of proper names² from the respective territories, and that such comparisons are often dubious and inconclusive is notorious. But to Sommer's and Krahe's observations some others may be added.

(1) The change of I. Eu. *ō* to *ǣ*, a feature of Germanic, appears not only in the Illyrian Messapic, as others have observed, but also in a number of northern forms some of which are certainly Raetic (i.e. Illyrian). Thus in Messapic the gen. sg. of consonant stems is in *-as* (e.g. *platoras*, *kalatoras*), of *o*-stems it is *-a-ihī*, with *ǣ* for the stem vowel *ō* as in the nom. sg. *dazimas* (Δάσιμος, *Dasimus*); so also *blatθihī* gen. sg. masc., 'Blossii,' cf. in Apulia, *Blattius*, Liv. 26. 38. The Oscan *ualaimo*- 'optimus' (cf. *piris uolaemis* Verg., *Geo.* 2. 88) and *tanginūd* 'sententiā' (cf. Latin *tongēre* 'nosse' Fest.) have been thought to stand in ablaut-relationship to the forms with *ō*, as Latin *uolo*, Goth. *þagkjan*, but the precise relationship has never been made clear,³ and it seems probable to me that the Oscan *ualaimo*- is really a Messapic

¹ Since writing the above I have noted another important article, by Jacobsohn, *Zeitschr. f. deutsches Altertum*, lxi, 1929, pp. 217 sqq.

² Cf. the mountain *Retico* 'in Germania' (Mela 3.3.30).

³ Cf. Buck, *Addenda and Corrigenda* (*Gram. of Osc. and Umbrian*), p. 360.

or Illyrian form borrowed into Oscan, the more so because *uolaema* in Vergil is probably at least north Italic if not actually Celtic (Serv. auct., ad loc., probably from Isid. *Etym.* 17. 7. 67); and possible that *tangin-* is similarly borrowed,¹ since the Messapian Ennius knew the word, though he Latinised it (*tongent*), as perhaps Vergil did a northern *ualaimo-*. At least we have *ǣ* for *ǝ* in the following forms, no less than in the *hariχasti* (**korjo-*, cf. *κοίρανος*) of the Negau helmet; the corrupt †*plaumorati* (Plin., *N. H.* 18. 172) is discussed below, but in Raetic *va-l-tikinu* (Magrè, *Prae-Ital. Dial.* no. 237) beside Ital. *Volteius*, *Voltius*, *Volta*, *Voltilius* and others (*Ital. Dial.*, pp. 591, 670), in Raetic *elanu* (no. 221) beside Elonus (*C. I. L.* 11, 850 Mutina), and perhaps in Raetic *ritamneh* (no. 221) beside Etr. *ritumenas* (Schulze, *Eigen-namen*, p. 278, n. 2), we seem to have reasonably certain examples of the change, cf. Illyr. *Assoparis* (Krahe, *Lex. Altilyr. Personennamen*, p. 11) beside the Thracian *-πορις* (Κετρίπορις and others). Accordingly in *lancea*, *λαγκία* beside Gr. *λόγχη*, in Lepontic *uasekia* (*Prae-Ital. Dial.*, 306), cf. *uasamos* (no. 305), Venetic *vas-seno* (136), cf. Messapic *vaççnihi* (407), *Vassius* (Benevento, *C. I. L.* 9. 2015) beside the Celtic *Vosegus* (just as in the Germanic *Walha* for the Celtic *Volcae*), in *Pădus* beside *Bödincus*, as the Po was called in its upper course (Nissen, *Landesk.*, i. 183) — cf. not only *Padua* Catull. 95. 7, but also *Patauium* with *t : d*, *p : b* as well as *ǣ : ǝ* —, and finally in **Αλπια* beside **Ολβια* (Athen. 6. 23, p. 233d-e), where again the change of *ǝ* to *ǣ* is accompanied by that of *b* to *p*, it is not unreasonable to see 'North Italic' forms showing the transition from Italic proper to Germanic proper.

The form **Αλπια* is of interest further because of the other variants recorded, **Αλπεις*, and gen. pl., *Σαλπίων* (see Holder, i. 107). If the last form, known from Lycophron (fl. 270 B.C.), is valid, the etymology which connects *Alpes* with Lat. *albus*, Gr. *ἄλφος*, Umbr. *alfo-*, 'mit Wiedergabe des kelt. *b* durch *p*' (Walde) — cf. 'Sabine' *alpum*, cannot stand, and indeed there is an old tradition (e.g. Serv., *Geo.* 3. 474) which explains *Alpes* not as 'white,' i.e. 'snowy' mountains, but as 'lofty' (*alti montes*), which seems to accord better with **Αλπεις* as a

¹ Trombetti's derivation (Etr. *θυνχ-*), *Lingua Etrusca*, § 221 is highly improbable.

river-name (ἐκ τῆς κατ' ὑπερθε χώρας Ὀμβρικῶν, Hdt. 4. 49) 'deep.' Here again Walde's etymology (cf. Gr. λόφος, *alobh-) would fall before Σαλπίων. It is not necessary to find (what would in any event be mainly speculative) an etymology for this local name-stem (σ)αλπι-. The point of interest is the variation between the form with and that without initial *s*-, since others are recorded of the same kind in 'North Italic' glosses, viz. *asia* (Plin., *N. H.*, 18. 141) where Welsh *haidd*, Breton *heiz* point to an older form with *s*-; *saliunca* beside ἀλιούγγια, ἀλιουάσκα (Diosc. 1. 7. 1); *segusius* (canis) Lex Salica (*tit.* 6) beside ἐγούσια (κύνων); and perhaps *silis* (v. l. *ilis*) Plin., *N. H.* 24. 177 (cf. 20. 36) beside (*h*)*alus* 26. 42, whatever the relation of *i* to *a* may be (perhaps *ī* from *ē*:*ə*?). Loss of *s*- (through *h*-) does not however point to comparison with Germanic, where *s*- was preserved. Nor can we see a loss of *-s* (as in West and North but not East Germanic) in the Venetic (*-ant*, *-ont*) and Messapic (*-et*) nom. sg., as Deecke supposed (*Gött. Gehl. Anz.* i, 1886, p. 64), which might have invited comparison with the Negau *hariχasti* (for *-is*).¹ Indeed Venetic shows a n. sg. *iiuwa·n·t·s* (*Prae-Ital. Dial.*, no. 3).

(2) The Gothic, O. Sax. *Rūma* 'Roma' and Goth. *Rūmōneis* 'Romani' show a representation of the Latin close *ō* by *ū*, and in Eastern Germanic at least, as in Italic, the long *ō* was extremely close. The same seems to be true of Venetic, where a woman of Roman descent, or claiming to be of Roman descent, calls herself *ruma·n·na* 'Romana' (*Prae-Ital. Dial.*, no. 21), and probably also of Messapic. As to Venetic there can be no doubt, since the Venetic script² possessed the symbol *o* (e.g. *·o·posoφo·s* 'operibus'), and this same epithet is actually written (abbreviated) *roman* (no. 22), just as in the Gothic text of Wulfila there is occasional variation in the writing of *o* and *u* (Streitberg, *Got. Elementarb.*, ed. 6, 1920, p. 50). In Messapic, however, the native alphabet completely lacks the *u*-symbol, the *u*-sound being written *o* or *ao*, as in coin legends of *Uria*, Οὐρία written *orra* (with *rr* from *ri*, see below) and *Uzentum*, Οὐξεντον, with *aoze*, *oza*, *ozan*. Hence in Messap. *platoras*, for example, we are able not only to assign the value *u* to the *o*-symbol, a value confirmed by the writing (in Greek alpha-

¹ Is not the reversion of *-z* to *-s* in Gothic comparable to the restoration of *-s* in Classical Latin?

² Etruscan *rumax* is not really convincing since Etr. had no *o*-sound.

bet) *πλατυρ* (*Prae-Ital. Dial.* nos. 360 bis, 362, 369a), but also to deduce a change of *ō* to *ū* (suffix *-tōr-*), as in Osc.-Umb. *-tūr-*. Less convincing is *polaihi*, in Greek alphabet *πουλαι*, beside *Polus* and *Pola* of Latin inscriptions, since the Latin forms appear rather to show the rustic Latin *ō* (open) for *au*, the spelling *Paulus* (*-a*) also occurring (Mommesen, *U. D.*, p. 81).

(3) In Germanic I. Eu. *ou* appears as *au*, and again some North Italic forms suggest the same change. Thus, side by side with the local name *fundus Roudelius* (Tab. Vel.), which Kretschmer derived from **roudos* 'red,' O. Ir. *rūad* (Lat. *ruber*, Gr. *ἐρυθρός* etc.), see *K. Z.* 38, 1903, p. 117, we find also *Campi Raudii*, near Vercellae (Vell., 2. 12. 5), cf. Goth. *ráuþs*. Such at least appears to me a more plausible account of the form *Raudii* than a comparison with *raudus* 'saxum' (Fest., p. 320 L.), despite such local names as *campi Lapidarii* (Schol. Vallicell., Isid., 14. 8. 23), *campi Lapidei* (Plin., *N. H.* 3. 34), *πεδίων λιθῶδες* (Strabo, p. 182 C.), *Lapidaria* (Raetia, Tab. Peut.), cf. *Stonyfield* (Lancs., England), since in *raudus* the diphthong *au* for dial. *ō* (*ū*, *rūdus*) is a hyper-polite urban pronunciation (cf. Muller, *I. F.* 39, 1921, p. 181). Similarly in *drausus* beside *drūsus* 'patiens, rigidus, contumax' (*Thes. Gloss. Emend.*), which has been claimed as Illyrian (Krahe, *Personennamen*, p. 44), cf. Messap. *droççihī* (: *Drusus?*), we may have *au* from *ou* in the North Italic *drausus* (Suet. *Tib.* 3) beside *ū* from *ou* in the Latin *Drusus*. At least Holder's etymology, cf. W. *dryll* (**drus-lo-*): Lat. *frustum*, Gr. *θραύω*, fails to take account of the glosses; nor do I understand how Holder proposes to relate *drausus*, which he considers the older form, to *drūsus*. The Brythonic Keltic change of *au* to *u* is much later in date, while in Latin it is dependent upon older accentual conditions which would not apply to **draūsos*; and in the dialects, whereas Oscan preserved *au*, Umbrian changed it not into *ū*, but into *ō*.

Parallel to the development of *ou*, is that of *oi*, which is *ai* in Germanic and Illyrian, Goth. *aīns* 'one,' Messap. *vaikanetaos* beside Gr. *οἶκος*, Lat. *uīcus*, though it has to be admitted that many Messapic forms show *oi*, being perhaps borrowed, e.g. *oibaliahiāi[hi]*, cf. *Οἰβάλιος* and (Verg. *Geo.* 4, 125) *Oebalia* (Tarentum); or *oi* may come from an original *ōi*.

In Messap. *θaotor* and the like, however, I regard *ao* simply as a

writing of *ū* (*ou*, from older *eu*, *Teuta*) and not as graphic for *au* from *ou*, a change for which there is no certain evidence in Messapic, since beside *ao* the writing *o* always occurs; so that if *ou* did become *au* in Messapic, then *au* afterwards passed into *ū* (written *ao*, *o*).

(4) Two forms of especial interest for a comparison of Illyrian with Germanic are the Messapic preposition *in* 'in' and the Raetic verbal form *ist·i·* 'is (?)', for I. Eu. **en(i)* and **esti* respectively. Latin *in* arose under special conditions (Stolz-Leumann, p. 58) which there is no reason to suppose applied in Messapic any more than in Oscan and Umbrian which have *en*. Latin, it is true, shows a sort of umlaut (id., p. 96) which recalls Germanic, but umlaut can never be counted characteristic of Latin¹ as of Germanic. Gothic shows *i* for every I. Eu. *e* (except before *r*, *h*) and perhaps the most pertinent comparison would be with Gothic rather than with Germanic as a whole, though in the two forms already cited the conditions of *i*-umlaut are present. Raetic *ist·i·* (*Prae-Ital. Dial.*, no. 189 bis), the interpretation of which is not, I think, doubtful, is especially interesting since its accentuation (*·i·* for *i*) confirms the identification with Lat. *est* and agrees with the enclitic accentuation of Greek *ἔστί*. But in Messapic ² *ἵκκος* 'horse' (Tarentine, Et. Magn. 474. 12, Plat. *Prot.* 316d, *legg.* 839e) *ι* requires explanation as much as in Greek *ἵππος*. Kretschmer (*Einl.* p. 247) has sought a source for *ἵππος* (as a loan-word) in Thracian, which seems to show a variation between *e* and *i* (id., ib., p. 226, n. 2), and it is believed with reason that the horse played an important part in the life of prehistoric dwellers in the Danubian and adjoining regions (see Schrader-Nehring, *Reallex.*, s.v. Pferd). Plain lands to the north of Greece were more suited to the horse as the 'friend of man' than Greece has ever been, and Tomaschek was right in stressing the importance of the horse in ancient Thrace (*Die alten Thraker*, ii. 2, pp. 5 sqq.).

But Pindar's Olympic victors in horse-racing come from Magna Graecia, as has often been remarked, for one reason among others that western Greece afforded a more favourable training ground for

¹ Cf. perhaps Osc. *inim* (Buck, *Add. and Corr.*, p. 361); and Pauli, *Die Veneter*, p. 323 compared Messap. *kil-* with Ven. *kel-*.

² Cf. mod. *Brindisi* (Βρεντῆσιον) and Messap. *Menzana* (**mandiana*, cf. *Manduria*). Note also *Brintesia* (Brenta).

race horses. The form ἵππος, being Homeric, is not to be derived directly from western Greece, but it may have reached Greek in both Hellas and the West independently from the same northern source with a change of *ě* to *ǵ*. The gloss of Hesychius ἱπνὴ· ἐφιππίς, Σικελοί is interesting here, because the name *Siculi*, Σικελοί may well show the very same change, *ě* to *ǵ* (cf. *Sequani* i.e. 'comrades, *socii*'?) and the name *Italia* (Osc. *vitelliu*, cf. Gr. *ἔτος*, Lat. *vetus*) surely does, a name restricted at first to the 'toe' of Italy, whence tradition brought the *Siculi* to Sicily, and where archaeological discovery has just revealed Sikel remains (see Orsi's memoir in *Mon. Ant.* xxxi). In all these forms, therefore, the change by which *ě* became *ǵ* is located among the Sicels and Messapians; in Greece proper *Sicyon* for the older *Secyon* (coins, inscc.) is probably quite local and independent. But Sikel toponymy suggests strong links between the Sicels and the Illyrians (see v. Scala, *Umrisse d. ältest. Gesch. Europas*, Innsbruck Rektorats-schrift, 1908; id., in *Innsbrucker Festgruss*, 1909, pp. 29 sqq.). The horse was not without honour among the Messapians, who worshipped *Menzana* (Fest. p. 190 L., s.v. *October equus*), cf. Alb. *mes* 'mule-foal' (**manzia*, **mandia*), Tyrolese *menz* 'sterile cow,' N. Ital. *mannus* 'pony' (Cons., *ars. gram.*, Gram. Lat. 5. 364. 8, K., cf. C. I. L. 5. 4488, *Mannulus* at Brescia), and whose eponymous hero was Messapus, *equum domitor*, mentioned by Vergil in the same breath with *Mezentius* (*Aen.* 9. 521 sq.).

Now *κκ* in ἵκκος from *k̂u* is parallel to *cc* from *k̂u* in Venetic *Ecco*, cf. Ven. *ecupetaris* 'charioteer' (*Prae-Ital. Dial.*, no. 157). Testimony is borne to the prominence of the horse among these northern Illyrians also by the numerous dedications of figures of horses to the Venetic goddess Rehtia; by Strabo's words (5, p. 212 C.), in which the tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse, who helped the Veneti to repel the attacks of Liburnian pirates, is represented as paying tribute to their horsemanship by keeping a stud in their country; and perhaps by Alcman's 'Venetic steed' (*Parth.* 50), for it is not clear that Alcman was alluding to Paphlagonia.

The consonant gemination in ἵκκος, *Ecco* has no direct parallel in Germanic, so far as I can find, since I. Eu. *k̂u* fell together there with *q̂u* (Goth. *aiþva-*), and Germanic *-nn-* from *-n̂u-* is too remote; in West Germanic, however, we find consonant lengthening before *u*,

and hence O. H. G. *nackot* where Gothic had *naqaps*, and in the puzzling *alacco alaucus* of Varro (*L. L.* 8. 65 — Cisalpine?) it would seem that *u* has been assimilated to a following *k* rather than that *au* has become *a* as it did in Messapic (*Basta* for an older *Baṽστα*).

(5) Consonant gemination (before *ǵ*) is indeed a marked feature of Messapic, which has been held the source whence Latin (thanks to Ennius) formed the habit of writing 'double' consonants. Thus we have *orra* (*Uria*, *Οὐρία*), *pollihi* (*πουλαι*), *pollonnihi* (but *baledonas*), *nekassihi* (another *-ǵo*-stem), *teotoridda* (for *-idia*), and (*tt* being written *tθ* in Messapic) *blatthes* (*Blossius*) with *rr*, *ll*, *ss*, *dd*, *tθ* respectively for *r*, *l*, *s*, *d*, *t* followed by *ǵ* (see most recently Krahe in *Glotta*, 17, 1928, p. 81). Here the same phenomenon in West Germanic at once comes to mind, e.g. O. E. *sibb* 'kinship,' Gott. *sibja*; O. E. *biddan* 'ask, bid,' Gothic *bidjan*, and many others.

(6) Venetic and Messapic show also the change of I. Eu. final *-m* to *-n*, a change shared not only by Germanic, but also by Greek, Keltic, Armenian, and Balto-Slavonic. Thus we have the following forms, all except the last, which is nom., acc. sg. (I. Eu. *-m*, preserved in Italic and Indo-Iranian¹), Messapic *aran* f. 'land, territory,' *tan* m., def. art. (Gr. *τόν*), cf. *aproditan*, *noman*, *argorian*, *πενσκλην* (?), and similarly in Venetic *aza·n* f., 'nail, pin' (Pauli, *Die Veneter*, p. 251 compares Lith. *adatà* 'nail') *·a·hsu·n* m. 'hinged door' (a *u*-stem), cf. Gr. *ἄξονες*, Lat. *axis* (Conway), *ostiiakon* n. 'ossuarium,' cf. Gr. *ὀστέον*, *ὀστέϊνος* (Conway).

(7) A feature of Germanic is loss of final short syllables. Italic shows a similar phenomenon, but subject to considerable restrictions. Thus Latin has *mens* for **mentis*, and *sacer* for **sakrs*, *sakros*, like Gothic *akrs* (Lat. *ager*) for **agros*, but not, for example, **lups* but *lupus*, where Gothic has *wulfs*. In Messapic the precise conditions under which syncope of a final short syllable (in part with *samprasā-*ra*ṇa*) took place, have never been formulated, but it is interesting to compare the n. sg. of *ǵo*-stems in Gothic and Messapic. In Gothic we have e.g. *harjis* 'army' for an older **haris* (*j* being restored by analogy) in which *-is* stands for pro-ethnic Germanic *-ǵaz*, I. Eu. *-ǵo-s*; so in Messapic *-io-s* became *-ǵas* and this *-es*, e.g. *blatthes*, *dazes*.

¹ The traditional view; Meillet and others have questioned which sound was the older, but the question is immaterial here.

The remnants of diphthongal root-nouns are too meagre in Germanic to afford material for comparison with the Messap. gen. sg. in -s for -os after -*u*- in *āu*- and *ēu*-stems (not *ōu*-stems, see Torp, *I. F.*, 5, 1895, p. 203), e.g. *staboaos*, *staboos* (nom. *staboas*) *ioeos* (nom. *ioes*), in which *ō* in the final syllable was syncopated; but wherever -os appeared as the termination for the gen. sg. in Germanic it regularly became -s with loss of *ā* from *ō* in the final syllable, e.g. Goth. *hanins*, *tuggōns*, *brōþrs* ('weak' declension).

(8) But the reader may ask whether anything comparable to the first great Germanic sound-shift is found in Illyrian. It may be observed in passing that characteristic as that sound-shift is of Germanic, other languages do show something like it, especially Armenian, and in much smaller degree, Keltic (Hirt, *Idg. Gram.*, i, p. 223), while in its cavalier treatment of the so-called voiced aspirates of I. Eu., Italic is also comparable (*id.*, *ib.*, p. 56). Now it may be admitted at once that there is nothing in Illyrian proper to show like, for example, the *h* (from I. Eu. *k̂*) of Germanic, e.g. *harixasti* at Negau. But the intermediate step between *k̂* and *h* was *χ* (through *kh* and *kχ*), and here both Messapic and Raetic, if not also Venetic, do show a fluctuation in the writing that suggests a change from breathed stops to breathed fricatives. Thus we have in Messapic *k* and *χ*: *taimakos* but also *δαιμαχος*, *καιλινου* but also *χαillonas*, *δεχias* side by side with *Decius*, *γυνακhai* even in the borrowed *γυνή*, *γυναικός*, *χαοχα* beside *keoχorrihi* (cf. [?] *χeorris*; *eo* for *eu*, which became *ou*, *ū*, *ao* for this *ou*, *ū*), *trigonoχoa* beside (?) *dokihiko*[a, cf. *hopakoas* (?). Messapic has a symbol *ϣ*, which I transcribe *z*, in addition to *X χ* (see *Proc. Camb. Philol. Soc.* [Eng.], cxxx, 1925, p. 2; *C. Q.*, xix, 1925, pp. 67 sq., where a somewhat different view is advanced to account for the variation in writing discussed here), and *z* appears to have the value of *h*. But *ϣ* is undoubtedly a Western Greek *χ* which survived in the Tarentine-Ionic alphabet employed by the Messapians side by side with the Eastern *X*, and its use as an alternative to *H h* suggests a change from *χ* to *h*, the symbol *ϣ* being favoured no doubt as the extension of Ionic usage (over the old Tarentine) with *H* for *η* tended to suppress the value *h* of the symbol *H*. Thus we have *]aozzezihi* beside *kraθeheihi*, *-izi* beside *-ihi*, *dazezihi* beside *dazehias*. I hesitate to regard *z* as having the value of a voiced fricative since, its actual oc-

currence being rare, the evidence is too meagre to support such a conclusion; we shall, however, find a variation $t : \theta : d$ (for δ ?).

Again in Raetic we find both *tinaxe*, *strinaxe*, *laxe*, *putixinu*, *maixe* and *pinake*, *kerrinake*, *pnake*, *va-l-tikinu*, *laseke*. Venetic is more difficult to control, since χ (however it was pronounced) corresponds to a Latin g and Greek γ , and the writing *kh* seems not to occur. But once at least χ seems to be written for h from k . For \dot{k} did become h in Venetic before t and before s (as in Oscan and Umbrian). Thus we have (cf. Pauli, *Die Veneter*, pp. 256, 298 sq.) $\cdot a \cdot hsu \cdot n \cdot$ acc. sg., $\cdot a \cdot hsu \cdot \dot{s}$ acc. pl., which have been aptly compared by Conway with Gr. $\acute{\alpha}\xi\omicron\nu\epsilon\varsigma$, Lat. *axis*, in which h must come from an older k , I. Eu. \dot{k} (Stet. *ákša-s*); in *vhaχ·s·to* 'fecit,' therefore, there can be little doubt that here χ stands for *kh* or h rather than for g , though it might perhaps be z . The same may be true of $\phi\omicron\chi s\cdot$ beside $\phi\omicron h i i o \cdot s \cdot$ and perhaps of $vo \cdot \chi \cdot s i i$, $vhux \cdot s \cdot i i a$ and other examples of χs . Again we have *rehtia* 'Rectia,' cf. *aht·s·* with which Pauli (*l. c.*) compared North Italic personal names such as *Atius* (for *act*-?), and even the Messapic *atiθaos*. In this detail Germanic, with *ht* and *hs* from *kt* and *ks* offers a complete parallel: Goth. *ahtáu*, O. E. *eahta*: Lat. *octo*, Gr. $\acute{o}\kappa\tau\acute{\omega}$, Goth. *rahts*, O. H. G. *reht*: Lat. *rectus*, and likewise O. H. G. *ahsa*: Lat. *axis*, Goth. *sahts*, O. H. G. *sehs*: Lat. *sex*. Similarly Keltic shows $-\chi t$ - and $-\chi s$ - for I. Eu. *kt*, *ks* (O. Ir. *ocht* 'eight,' W. *chwech* 'six').

Passing now to the dentals, in Messapic we find $t : \theta$ and θ' (in the epichoric alphabet Π , apparently a modification of T), e.g. *tabara*, *θabara*, θ' *abarovas*; *totor*, *θotor*, *θaotoras*, θ' *aotoras*, *taotas*; *teotinih[i]*, *θeotor*; *taroas* (?), θ' *aroas*; *atitai*, *atiθaos*; *kritaboa*, *kriθonas*; *daranθoa*, *Τάραντος*; *θυγαφε*: Gr. $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\chi\omega$ (?); *Avitus*, *aviθos*; $-\theta i$ 'and' cf. $\acute{\epsilon}\tau i$; *ettis* and *etθihi* ($t\theta$ being regular for $t + t$); $-ti$ beside $-\theta i$ as a verbal termination, 3 sg. act. primary, where for the secondary tenses we have 3 sg. mid. $-da$ (d for δ , cf. *inθi* beside *anda*?), I. Eu. $-ti$, $-to$ respectively. Again Venetic has $t : \theta$, e.g. *ecupetaris* and $\epsilon \cdot ku\theta e\theta a r i \cdot s$, *lemetor* and *lemeθorna*, *zona·s·to* and *zona·s·θo*, *Clutorius* and *kluθiia-ri·s*, and Raetic has $t : \beta$, e.g. *tinaxe* and *pinaxe*, *ritiei* and *ripie* (cf. C. Q., xvii, 1923, pp. 63 sqq.).

There does not seem to be the same alternation in the case of labials, ϕ in Venetic (however it was pronounced) corresponding to Lat. b , Gr. β and the writing *ph* occurring in neither Messapic (which wants

φ entirely in its alphabet) nor Venetic. Messapic even transcribed the Greek φ by *p*, e.g. *aprodita* (but observe the spelling *Aprhodita* at Tarentum, *N. d. Sc.* 1894, p. 64), probably because Gr. φ was still a true aspirate, not a fricative.

Variation in spelling between voiced stops and breathed stops is so frequent in Messapic and Illyrian as to strike the most casual observer; thus *Μέταβον* is cited as the older name (Strabo 6. 1. 15) of *Metapontum* (cf. *Messapii*?) and we find (Krahe, *Geogr. Nam.*, pp. 66 sq.) *Veneti*, *Ἐνετοί* and *Enedi* (Plin. *N. H.*, 3. 22), *Desitiatae*: *Desidias*, *Butua*: *Budua*, *Ταυλάντιοι*: *Δαυλάντιον* and others; or, in Messapic proper: *βρένδος* and *βρέντιον*, *daranthoa* and *Τάραντος*, *δαιμαχος* and *taimakos*; *ardannoa* and *Ἄρτας*, coins of Graxa with *κρη*. In 'North Italic'¹ I have noted *Tinca* (Placentinus): *Tinga*, *precula*: *pergula* (Quint. 1. 5. 12 — was Livy's 'Patavinity' of this order?), *ceua* v. l. *geua*, *uasekia*: *Vosegus* (Kelt.), *carpentum* for **carbento-* (Holder, *s.v.*), *Ἄλπεις*: *Ὀλβία* (v. *supr.*, pp. 144 sq.), *Padus*: *Bodincus*, *cotonea* (Venetic, Plin., *N. H.* 26. 42, cf. *κυδώνια*?), *Βριτόμαρτος* (Plut. *Marcell.* 6 sq.), also called *Viridomarus*. In nearly every case, however, there is no evidence, or no good evidence, to show which form, the one with the voiced stop or the one with the breathed stop, is the older; *Μέταβον*, cited above, is a notable exception to this uncertainty. Accordingly it would be rash to suggest that voiced stops became unvoiced in Illyrian as they did in Germanic (*teiva* at Negau, with *t* from *d*, cf. *deus* **deiws*). Nevertheless the examples of variation in writing do suggest the possibility of such a change being in process.

But Messapic agrees with Germanic (*hariχasti* at Negau, with *χ* written for *g* from I. Eu. *gh*, cf. Venetic *χ* at least in its phonetic value) in representing I. Eu. sounds, which are commonly described as having been voiced aspirates, by voiced stops. The following examples may suffice: *bilia* 'daughter' (I. Eu. *dh*, cf. Lat. *filius*, Goth. *daddjan*); *berada* (I. Eu. *bh*, Lat. *fero*, Goth. *baíran*); *hipades* (I. Eu. *dh*, Lat. *facio*, Goth. *ga-dēps*); *βαυρία*, *βυρίον* (I. Eu. *bh*, Lat. *fui*, Goth. *bauan*); *balakrahiaihi* cf. Thess. *Φάλακρος* (Coll.-Becht. 345, 48), Macedonian *Βάλακρος* (Arr. *Anab.* 3. 5. 6 cet.); and for *gh* perhaps *θυγαφε*: *τεύχω* (?),

¹ Additional examples: *Σίγυννες* beside *Sicani*, *λεβηρίς* beside *λέπορις*, *μαδάρεις* beside *mataris*.

though there seems to be some evidence for believing that *gh* gave *h* in Messapic (cf. *Language* 3, 1927, p. 231).

It should be observed that in a few words *v* appears in the writing instead of *b* (e.g. *valeθas* beside *baleθas*, on coins of Valesio, with Φάλανθος on the dolphin¹) which suggests a value *b̥* for the Messapic *b*, at least in some words; and this value would be (as in Germanic) the intermediate stage between *bh* and *b̥*.

(9) The sound pattern *sr* is foreign to Italic, where initially it became *fr*-, medially *-fr*- and then in Latin *-br*-, whereas in Germanic we find *str*, e.g. O. E. *strēam*: Gr. *ῥέω*, Goth. *swistar*: Lat. *sobrinus*. The initial *str*- of Raetic *strinaxe* is, therefore, perhaps worthy of note, though its origin being unknown we cannot assert that it arose from *sr*, while both Greek and Latin admit *str*- initially.

(10) This paper is concerned, and necessarily so, chiefly with matters of phonology; but in addition to the comparisons made by Sommer and Krahe (p. 142, *supr.*), and to the comparison Raetic *ist·i*- with Goth. etc. *ist*, there remain to be considered a few other forms in which Germanic and Illyrian agree in morphology or vocabulary. Torp's interpretation of Messapic *veinan* (cf. perhaps Venetic *ve·i·ne·s·?*) as 'suam,' acc. sg. fem. of the possessive adjective, and his derivation of the form from *ve* (*vei*), cf. Messapic *ve*, Gr. *φε*, and *-no*- (*I. F.*, 5, 1895, p. 200) has not, I think, been challenged. But the formation at once recalls, as Torp himself pointed out, the Germanic forms, e.g. Goth. *meina* 'mine,' *þeina* 'thine,' *seina* 'his.' Again we find in Messapic *anda* . . . *anda* 'μὲν . . . , δὲ . . . ; both . . . and . . . ' which corresponds so closely in meaning and form to Germanic *and(a)*, *und* that comparison seems justified. The Germanic form, however, stands for an I. Eu. **ant(h)á*, *nt(h)á* (or *-i*) cf. Skt. *anti*, *áttha*, Gr. *ἄντα*, *ἀντί*, Lat. *ante*. Torp's etymology (*l. c.*, p. 208) from a pronominal stem **ana-* 'ἐκεῖνος' with *-θα* as in Gr. *ἐνθα* falls to the ground inasmuch as Greek *ἐνθα* is for *ἐ-νθα*, cf. Lat. *i-nde*, *u-nde* (Boisacq, *s.v.*). In Messapic *in-θi* 'atque in' (*in-* being the preposition) *-θi* stands for *-ti*, and we have regarded *θ* as an alternant in Messapic with *t*; but if the fricative became voiced (ð) the writing *d* would be permissible, as *b* for *b̥*, and ð after a nasal might further become

¹ The type is copied from the coins of Tarentum.

a stop, exactly as in Germanic (Goth. *bindan*, cf. *πένθερος*, and compare *βρέndon*, *-ντ-ιος* above); cf. p. 151 above, *-θi* beside *-ti*, and *-da* for *-to*. Oscan *ant* 'usque ad' from **en-ti* (Brugmann, *I. F.*, 15, p. 72) would then be comparable in form and meaning to *in-θi* (*in-* for *en-*, p. 147, above). It would still be conceivable to derive Messapic *-da* from *-dh-a* instead of *-t(h)a*, with the not infrequent I. Eu. alternation of *t(h)* with *dh*, should the association of *t : θ : d* suggested prove unacceptable.

Finally, attention may be called to the Raetic *ploum* 'a kind of plough,' Plin. *N. H.*, 18. 172, where I accept Baist's emendation (*Arch. Lat. Lex.* 3, 285) *ploum Raeti* for the corrupt † *plauморати* of the mss. Observe in the first place that Pliny describes this kind of plough as a local invention, the peculiarity of which was that it had wheels added to the cross-stay above the ploughshare, an innovation natural enough in a hilly country. Servius too alludes to this peculiarity of the North Italic plough (*Geo.* 1, 174 *stiuaque, quae curros a tergo torqueat imos*, on which the comment of Servius is 'morem prouinciae suae, in qua aratra habent rotas'). Next we note that Catullus, born at Verona, which had been a Raetic city (Plin. *N. H.*, 3. 130, whose statement is confirmed by the archaeological evidence showing that Verona marked the westward limit of Venetic or Atestine influence, see Randall-MacIver, *Iron Age in Italy*, p. 58), uses (97. 5 sq.) a peculiar word *ploxenum* (*-inum*, *-enum*) said by Quintilian (1. 5. 8) to have been current 'circa Padum,' and explained by Festus (p. 260 L.) as 'capsum in cisio, capsam'ue.' The Cisalpine origin of many Latin terms relating to horse-riding and driving is well known, and it has been suggested by Walde that Latin *plostrum* may be cognate; if so *plaustrum* must be a 'hyper-polite' urban pronunciation, though the etymology which makes *plaustrum* the equivalent in meaning of the English 'growler' (i.e. a four-wheeled horse cab), cf. *plaudo*, *plōstrum* (used by Vespasian) being the rustic form, seems to me more acceptable. Be that as it may, *ploxenum* for **plōz-s-en-om* and *ploum* for **plozom* or **plohom* (Germanic **plōza-*, **plōha-*, O. N. *plōgr*, O. H. G. *phluoc*, see Meringer and van Wijk in *I. F.* 17. 107 sqq., 23. 366 sqq.) must belong together; the existence of the form **plō(ɥ)om* is confirmed by the glosses,

de plovum] . . . plovum aut aratrum, in the *Edictus Rothari* 288 (A.D. 643),

plovum: id est incibo arati (*leg. incuruum aratrum* (?), cf. Verg. *Geo.* 1, 494; or perhaps in *curuum aratrum*, *id.*, *ib.*, 1, 170?), *Gloss. Cavense* 134, and

plobum: cogum (*leg. iugum*), *Gloss. Vat.* 79; and the locality of its usage is confirmed by Tyrolese *plof*, Lombard *plo* 'plough.' The relationship between the Raetic and the Germanic forms, and their etymology, are both uncertain. Kluge, *Wtb.*, ed. 10, s.v. *pflug*, made Germanic the borrower; see, on the other side, Battisti's *Studi del Trentino* (1922) pp. 69, 91, and Meyer-Lübke, *Wtb.*, s.v. *plovum*. At first sight the *plau morati* of Pliny's text might appear attractive with its *-rati* (cf. *rota*?), but if *-rati* were genuinely Germanic the *t* would be irregular (O. H. G. *rad*, Skt. *rātha-s*) and the relationship of *a* in *plau* to *ō* in **plōza-* more problematical still. It remains certain, however, that the item is common to the Illyrian and Germanic vocabularies, whether by borrowing or not, a fact of importance to the argument of this paper, that Germanic and Illyrian have features in common which, apart from their own interest, may account for the doubt of Tacitus concerning the proper linguistic and ethnic classification of the Osi.

Addendum. Since this article was set up I have observed a few additional items of evidence which may be noted here: (1) loss of *s-*, *salix: halicem* (?), Plin. 16.177, Sicel (Illyr.?) Σέγεστα but Ἐγεστα, Σιμαλῖς but (Greek) Ἰμαλῖς, for Sicel preserved *s-*, e.g. σῦφαρ. The absence of *h-* in N. Ital. is noteworthy, contrast, e.g. Gaulish *Seno-gnatus*. Cf. *Prac.-I. D.* ii, pp. 158, 180, 193, 202. (2) *ū* from *ō*, Lep. *namu*, *remu*, and many Raetic names in *u*, as in Illyr. (cf. Kretschmer, *Einl.*, p. 251, n. 1). (3) *au* from *ou*, perhaps *taulanus*, Isid. *Et.* 18.7.7. (4) *i* from *e*, in *circius*, *aφῖρ*, *-χῖνου*, *strinaχe*, *siupiku* (i.e. 'good-ox?'), *φικυρμιες* beside *φeχe*. (8) With *precula: pergula* cf. *Porco-: Proco-bera*. (10) Correspondences in vocabulary, note Sicel (Illyr.?) ῥογός: Goth. *rikan*.

THE CALENDAR IN ANCIENT ITALY OUTSIDE ROME

By JOSHUA WHATMOUGH

A GLANCE at the articles *Fasti* and *Kalender* (griechischer) in Pauly-Wissowa, and at the relevant pages in Wissowa's *Religion und Kultus der Römer* (see his index) will reveal how little is known of the Italic calendar (or calendars) as compared with the Greek and Roman. It is not possible to restore completely the calendar of any Italic community, but there are scattered notices in inscriptions and in the literature which it may be useful to assemble. There has been no attempt to do so, if I mistake not, since 1859, when Mommsen published the second edition of his *Römische Chronologie*; there the reader may find (pp. 217-223) an appendix with the heading *die italischen Monate*. That there is now something to be added to what Mommsen wrote goes without saying.

The Etruscan calendar can be dealt with summarily. What we know of it is pitifully small; and in any event it has no claim to be considered properly Italic. The Etruscan names of seven months, from March through to October (April excepted), were made known to the learned world in a Latinized, but otherwise little corrupted, form, in 1847 by Bröcker, who extracted them from the *Elementarium* of Papias; see *Philologus* 2, (1847), pp. 246 sqq. They have often been reprinted or quoted since then (*inter alios*, see Mommsen, *l. c.*, p. 219; Corssen, *Sprache der Etrusker*, 1, (1874), p. 849; Müller-Deecke, *Die Etrusker*, ed. 2, 2, (1877), p. 307). But among the sources from which Papias compiled his *Elementarium* was a manuscript of the *Liber Glossarum* and that work has since yielded the Etruscan name for April, as well as correcting the spelling of some of the other names. Thus we have now (see the British Academy edition of the *Liber Glossarum*, ed. Lindsay-Mountford-Whatmough, 1926):

VE 87	Velcitanus (<i>v.l.</i> Velei-, Veli-)	<i>March</i>
CA 17	Cabreas	<i>April</i>
AM 311	Ampiles (<i>v.l.</i> -philes)	<i>May</i>
AC 240	Aclus	<i>June</i>

TR 108	Traneus	July
ER 207	Ermius	August
CE 230	Celius (v. l. Cael-)	September
XO 1	Xosfer (v. l. Xofer)	October

The terminations *-us*, *-eus*, *-ius* are manifestly Latin and are regularly employed as equivalent to the Etruscan *-e* (cf. Skutsch in Pauly-Wissowa, 6. 777. 30); and it is probable that several of these forms have been Latinized in termination and elsewhere. The letter *x* and the sound-pattern initial *ks-* are not Etruscan, as Corssen (*l. c.*) long ago remarked; but *xosfer* has a perfectly good Etruscan appearance and it is possible that *X* is here really the Greek (and Etruscan) χ , not the Latin *x*. On the other hand *Ermius* is certainly not Etruscan, as we shall see, but the Greek $\epsilon\rho\mu\alpha\iota\omicron\varsigma$, and Corssen's suggestion, that *X* is a misreading of an Etruscan perigram for *ut*, so that we should have (with the reading *Xofer* of Papias) *Utofer*, would imply another borrowed word, viz. Ital. **octofro-*, **ohlofro-*, cf. Lat. *October*, Osc. *ũhtavis* 'Octavius,' *-kt-* becoming *-ht-* in Osco-Umbrian. But Corssen's suggestion, otherwise attractive, seems barely admissible when confronted with the reading of at least four MSS. of the *Liber Glossarum*, including the ninth-century codices of Lorsch, Paris, and Tours, all of which have *Xosfer*, Lattes' arguments (*Rh. Mus.* 65, (1910), p. 639) in defense of *Xofer*, *Utofer* notwithstanding.

From this list of Etruscan months little is to be gleaned; it is probable, but not certain, that, since (in its restored form) it furnishes the names of the months March–October, the original list, which was the ultimate source (through how many and how various intermediate channels!) of the items destined to be preserved for us in the *Liber Glossarum*, was not only defective (lacking November–February?), but also began, as did the old Roman and Latin, if not the old Italic, calendar, with March; it may, however, have lacked perhaps only January–February, and thus may indicate a 'ten-month' year of the kind that the ancients themselves believed to have prevailed in the earliest days of Rome, and which some modern authorities believe with good reason to have been an agricultural year with a 'dead' season of two months, or thereabouts, prevalent both in early Rome and in ancient Italy (see Frazer's *Ovid, Fasti*, vol. ii, (1929), pp. 15 sqq.; H. J.

Rose in *Mnemosyne* 52, (1924), pp. 349 sqq.). At least we can now supply from other sources the Etruscan names for November and December, but not as yet for January or February.

Krall, the first editor of the Agram mummy-wrapping, recognized, besides the ritualistic character of its contents, the month-name *celi* (*Die etr. Mumienbinde*, p. 24, n., *Denkschr. d. K. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, Phil.-Hist. Kl., 41, Wien, (1892), no. 3), accompanied by a date *huθiś zaθrumiś* ('four-and-twentieth?'), evidently the *Celius* of *Lib. Gloss.* Skutsch followed in *Rh. Mus.*, 56, (1901), p. 638 with a name, from the same source, and also accompanied by a date, *eslem zaθrumiś* ('two-and-twentieth?'), viz. *acale*, which he identified with *Aclus* in *Lib. Gloss.*, a form if anything even more characteristically Etruscan in its consonant group *cl*. Further, Torp has succeeded in discovering three other month names, each with its accompanying date-number, viz. *lauχumne-ti*, which he regards as the Etruscan equivalent of November, *peθereni*, corresponding to December, and *θucte*, which fell between June and September, most probably the month next to September (*celi*), i.e. August; see Torp's paper, *Etruskische Monatsdaten* (in *Norske Vidensk.-Akad.*,¹ Oslo, *Skrifter, Hist.-filol. kl.*, (1902), no. 4), pp. 11 sqq.; cf. his *Etr. Beiträge* i, (1902), p. 78; ii, (1903), p. 31. But if August is *θucte* in Etruscan, evidently *Ermius* is not the only Etruscan name for August, if indeed it is originally Etruscan at all.

Now many Greek cities had a calendar in which a month 'Ερμαῖος appeared (see Pauly-Wissowa, 10. 1599), among others Argos, Mycenae, Trozen, Secyon, Aegina, where it was February/March; in Aetolia the same name designated a month March/April; and in Thessaly a month December/January. There is neither here nor in other occurrences of the month-name 'Ερμαῖος any exact or even approximate correspondence to August, nearest to which indeed is the Hellenistic 'Ερμαῖος in Bithynia (October/November); the 'Ερμαίων of Andros, Ceos, Myconos, Naxos, Halicarnassos and elsewhere cannot be precisely placed, it is true, but we have no ground for conjecturing that it fell in August. This month 'Ερμαίων of the Ionian cities named above more probably corresponded to the 'Ερμαῖος of the Aeolic and Dorian calendar. But in certain other Doric cities, especially Corinth

¹ Until 1925 *Vidensk.-Selskabet (Christiania)*.

and her colonies, there was a month Εὐκλειος which fell at the same time of the year as Ἑρμαῖος in the cities enumerated above, viz. February/March at Corinth, Corcyra, Ambracia, Apollonia (Aous), and Epidamnos; March/April in Byzantium (cf. *Lib. Gloss.* EI 9); and December/January at Syracuse, Taormina, Gela, and Acragas. The month name Εὐκλειος has generally been connected, no doubt rightly, for Greek cities, with the cult of Artemis Εὐκλεία. We find, however, in the Tabula Agnonensis (*Ital. Dial.* 175 a 3, 25; b 4) *euklúí*, dat. sg. masc., with which Grassmann¹ (*K.Z.* 16, (1867), p. 106) compared Εὐκλῆς, reshaped in Oscan as an *o*-stem like *hereklúí* 'Herculi,' dat. sg. masc., as a euphemistic epithet of Hermes. This South Italic *euklo*-reappears, I think, in the gloss of Hesychius

Εὐκολος· Ἑρμῆς παρὰ Μεγαποντίοις

with anaptyxis, exactly as in the gloss, also of Hesychius, Ἡρύκαλον· τὸν Ἡρακλέα, Σώφρων ὑποκοριστικῶς, again with the characteristically Oscan anaptyxis. Εὐκολος may therefore be regarded as a South Italic corruption of Εὐκλειος or Εὐκλῆς, and the former at least corresponds, as we have just seen, to Ἑρμαῖος, as a month-name in the Doric cities of Magna Graecia. On the other hand it may well be εὖ-κολος 'well-disposed' (Osc. *euklúí* in that case showing syncope) but still remains connected with Hermes. It would not be difficult to trace a sequence Ἑρμαῖος — Εὐκλειος, Εὐκλῆς — Εὐκολος (cf. Ἡρακλῆς, Ἡρύκαλος), by which the Etruscans, if from the Campanian Oscans they learnt the last member of the chain, should have ended by learning the first, and that perhaps, even as a month-name. The Etruscan name of Hermes, *turms* (which may lie concealed in *thucte*), by its superficial resemblance, perhaps made the borrowing easier. But there are other and simpler explanations to be suggested. *Ermius* (mensis) may have been nothing more to the Etruscans than 'lucky, favorable, prosperous, rich, magnificent, i.e. *augustus*.' The Roman calendar, at all events, has no festival of Mercury in any other month than May, so that August could not have been regarded as a month sacred to Hermes or Mer-

¹ Cf. the similar view expressed by Schulze in *Ἀντιδωρον* (Wackernagel *Festschrift*, 1923) p. 248 and accepted by Buck, *Gram. of Osc. and Umb., Add. and Corr.*, 1928, p. 354, as I noted after the above was written.

curius in any sense at Rome; the same is true, so far as our knowledge goes, of Italic calendars, though it cannot be proved of the Etruscan calendar. Since, however, *thucte* seems likely to have been the genuine Etruscan name for August, the *Ermius* of *Lib. Gloss.* may be a mere blunder. The original source of the items from *Lib. Gloss.* cited above (p. 157) was doubtless the same as that of other items in *Lib. Gloss.* which record month-names of the Hebrew, Syrian, Cappadocian, Egyptian, Athenian, Macedonian, Bithynian, Perinthian, Byzantine, and Hellenistic calendars. Among the Bithynian names we find, *Lib. Gloss.* (ER 205):

Ermeos (-us) Bithyniensium lingua November mensis dicitur

which is separated by only one intervening gloss from the item (ER 207)

Ermius Tuscorum lingua Augustus mensis dicitur.

I suspect therefore that in the latter *Ermius* has replaced a (corrupt?) Etruscan form in either *Lib. Gloss.* or its sources, and either before or after the alphabetical arrangement of its items was made. That *Ermius*, *Hermaeus* was the genuine Etruscan name is incredible, and unless the form was borrowed, we must accept the hypothesis of confusion or corruption in our authority.

In addition to the Etruscan *turms* 'Mercurius' we have, not from inscriptions, but from literary sources, *Camillus* 'praeminister deorum, Mercurius' (Macrob. *Sat.*, 3. 8. 6), or, in Schol. Lycophr. 162 Καδμῖλος (ὁ Ἑρμῆς παρὰ Τυρσηνοῖς), and it is possible that this word, or some derivative of it, was the one ousted by *Ermius* in *Lib. Gloss.* But other authorities (see Varro, *L.L.*, 7. 34 with the *testimonia* quoted by Goetz and Schoell) give other interpretations of *Camillus* and the tradition preserved in Macrobius (cf. Serv. *Aen.*, 11. 558) may be unsound. We cannot, therefore, confidently replace the *Ermius* of our texts by any of the alternatives *thucte*, *turm-*, *Camillo-*. Of the three the first is the most, and the last the least, plausible. The meaning 'cup-bearer,' which our ancient authorities seem to assign to *Camillus*, has in fact been recently found in 'Sabine' *cupencus*, which Danielsson attractively derives from Etr. *cupe* 'patera', cf. vulgar Latin *cuppa*, Ital.

coppa, and *-enc* 'bear' (ἐνεγκεῖν, *nanciscor*), as a hybrid word, exactly like English *cup-bearer*, see *Glotta* 16, (1928), p. 88.

Before leaving the Etruscan month-names we may observe that the Etruscan *hampeš* (deriv. *hampīscā*) has been interpreted as a divine name (see Torp, *Beiträge* 2, p. 89); it is possible, therefore, that in *Amp(h)iles* (p. 157, *supra*) we have a derivative of *hampeš*, formed with the Etr. suffix *-(a)l* ('genetivus'). Since *Amp(h)iles* is May, the 'combinatory' method of interpretation would lead us to translate *hampeš* as 'Maius (or Maia),' but this further step is unnecessary, though preferable, I think, to the comparisons of Bugge (*Amphion*, cf. *Amphialeus*), of Lattes (Lat. *campus*!), or of Goldmann ('rechts'); see Goldmann's *Beiträge* i, (1929), pp. 43 sqq.

It remains to assemble one or two other details relating to the Etruscan calendar. Torp shewed (*Monatsdaten*, p. 18) that the days were counted within the month in a single series from the beginning, and not backwards in decades from points corresponding to the Calends, Nones, and Ides. He pointed out, however, that such had been the Etruscan custom at one time and suggested that the system revealed by the Agram document was a later innovation. The same change was eventually made in the Roman method of dating; see now A. Gagnér, *Zur röm. Zeitrechnung in Strena Philolog. Upsal.*, (1922), pp. 202 sqq. That *avil* is the Etruscan for 'year' is certain; that *tiu* (pl. *tivr*) means 'mensis, luna' seems probable; but it is very doubtful, despite Varro *L.L.*, 6. 28 (cf. *Macrob. Sat.* 1. 15. 14), whether *idus* can be Etruscan, and Trombetti's account of *acalve*, which he connects with Lat. *calare*, *calendae* (*Ling. Etr.*, § 252), appears to me mistaken. As to the Etruscan custom, not unknown in other lands, of marking the passage of time by driving a nail into the wall of a temple or shrine, it will be enough here to refer to Wissowa, *Rel. und Kultus der Römer*, ed. 2, pp. 126, 288, 430.

In his reconstruction of the Roman calendar (*C.I.L.* 1, ed. 2, part i, (1893), pp. 203 sqq.) Mommsen used several ancient *fasti* found outside Rome. But these *fasti peregrini* are in no sense Italic calendars, but merely copies of the Roman calendar, or of calendars based on the Roman model, made for use in the Italian municipalities; and much of what follows, so far as it is taken from the notices either of Varro or of writers who based their remarks upon his (*Festus* — after *Verrius Flaccus*, *Ovid*, *Censorinus*, *Macrobius*, and *Augustine*), really relates

to such municipal calendars, which seem to have varied in different respects and in different localities, as compared with the Roman calendar. Nevertheless, something may be gleaned from these, and even more from other, genuinely dialectal, sources, of the calendars in use outside Rome and Latium. Of the theory that the Roman calendar of Caesar still showed clear traces of the fusion of two distinct calendars belonging to different races, (Frazer, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 502; cf. Ridgeway in *Proc. Camb. Philolog. Soc.* [*Eng.*], ciii-cv, (1916), pp. 16 sqq.) no more can be said than that the theory remains a theory for which, though attractive in itself, there is but little evidence.

Of the two possible classifications of the material collected below, geographical or chronological, the latter has been adopted as better suited to the topic of this paper; Conway's *Italic Dialects*, which I have consulted freely, gives much of the same matter in the other grouping. Of the division of the day into hours and of the night into hours or watches, or of the year into seasons, there is, so far as I can find, no evidence relating to any Italic community outside Latium; but its absence is doubtless due merely to the paucity of the dialect remains, and the analogy of all the other Indo-European speaking tribes (see Schrader-Nehring, *Reallexikon*, s.v. *Zeit-teilung*) would suggest that the Italic peoples divided day and night and year upon principles similar to those in vogue in Rome at corresponding times. Censorinus remarks (23. 3) that the Umbrians¹ were not alone in reckoning the day from noon to noon. The suggestion has been made (by Laird, *Class. Phil.* 1, (1906), pp. 336 sqq.) that Osc.-Umb. *acno-* means 'season, a quarter of a year,' but the meaning 'year,' and hence 'festival, ceremony,' is the only satisfactory one for that stem and is now generally accepted; see e.g. Buecheler, *Rh. Mus.*, 63, (1908), pp. 316 sq. Its etymology is not difficult — we have either **akno-* for **atno-* (cf. Ital. *-kl-* from I.Eu. *-tl-*), perhaps in part by contamination, Lat. *annus*, Goth. *apnam* (dat. plu.); or else **akno-* (probably for **ag-no-*) pure and simple, in the sense of 'year' from 'ceremony' (coming at annually recurring dates, Lat. *agere*). The only objection to the interpretation of *acno-* as 'year' might be the existence of a stem *os(o)-* 'year,' Umb. *ose*, *usaše* which Buecheler rendered 'anni,' 'annuae' respectively. However, Buecheler's interpretation is now generally

¹ Cf. Varro cited by Conway, *I. D.* i, p. 437.

abandoned, like his etymology of Lat. *hornus* (*Umbrica*, p. 56). The *amosio* 'annuo' of Paul. ex. Fest. p. 24 L. is too doubtful (read *annoso*?) to be summoned as testimony for an Italic **os(o)*- 'year'; but even if that form were established, we ought not to be surprised because a language shows two words, apparently synonymous, to indicate a length of time not always very strictly defined. Thus Gothic has both *aþn* and *jēr* to translate the ἐνιαυτός of Greek, which also has ἔτος (translated by *jēr*), and in most languages 'winter, summer' or the like, in such phrases as 'x (any number, say *forty*) winters, summers' mean 'year.' The etymology of Umb. *ustite*, which Conway thought Buecheler connected with the forms just cited, is altogether uncertain, and its meaning far from clear. But the phrase *sume ustite* does appear, as Buecheler saw (*Umbrica*, p. 129), to mean 'summa tempestate' and to correspond to the *suprema tempestas* of Latin (Varro, *L.L.*, 6. 5, ed. Goetz and Schoell), 'sunset.' Varro (*l. c.*, cf. 7. 77) ascribes *crepusculum* to the Sabines, perhaps rightly. Here our knowledge of the means of indicating the time of day among the Italic tribes comes to an end. But we are better informed concerning the divisions of the month and the reckoning of days within it.

The phrase *sume ustite* continues (*Tab. Ig.* II a 16), *antermenzaru ðersiaru* 'intermenstruarum feriarum'. *antermenzo-* is formed from the same stem as Lat. *mensis*, Gr. μῆν (Dor. μέis), cf. Umb. *menzne* 'mense,' N. Osc. *mesene*, *mense* (*I. D.*, pp. 259, 260). The Italic month was, therefore, lunar (**mens-* 'moon'), as indeed other indications go to shew (see below), and *antermenzo-*, like Lat. *intermenstruus*, refers to festivals celebrated at the time of the new moon in honour of a deity of the underworld, Hondus, not to intercalation, which the term might at first suggest. Indeed, it is actually stated in the following line (II a 17) that the priest may, if he so wish (*heriiei*), but only after taking the auspices (*avis anzeriates*), perform this sacrifice to Hondus, in a month which is described as *kurðlasiu* 'circulario.' Here, I think, there is a reference to intercalation. Buecheler has in general been followed in his interpretation of *kurðlasiu* as 'ultimo,' literally 'that which completes the circuit of the year' and hence 'last.' But a festival coming at the time of the new moon would most reasonably be repeated every new moon, at the end of the year as well as at the end of each month. However, a doubt might naturally arise in the

case of an intercalary month. Hence special instructions would be necessary. The meaning of *kuršlasiu* ad lit. 'circulario' (*menzne* 'mense') is appropriate enough to an intercalary month to be added at the end of each cycle of years in the Umbrian calendar. Such a month probably came after February, the year beginning as originally at Rome and elsewhere in Italy with March.

There is an unmistakable reference to the same intercalary month in the Campanian Oscan calendar in two of the *iovila*-inscriptions (*I. D.* 115 sq.), where we have the phrase, repeated with little variation in the two documents:

fīsiāis pūmperiaīs pas prai mamerttiaīs set.

That *pūmperiaīs* denotes the occasion of a festival is quite certain; more is said below of its precise meaning; *fīsiāis*, like *mamerttiaīs* (both here and in 113), is doubtless a month-name derived from that of a god (cf. Umb. *fisio*- 'Fidio-', Lat. *fīsus* for **fīd-so*), and, if I mistake not, the last ¹ month of the year, whether intercalary or not. How carefully it is defined, lest there be any error! Here by the phrase *pas prai mamerttiaīs set*, 'quae prae Martiis sunt,' in 103 by *luisarifs* (*fisiaīs eiduis*); and in 105 the same date seems to be indicated explicitly by *pumperias pūstmas*, i.e. 'postremae,' 'the last *pūmperias* of the year,' i.e. in the month before March, the regular *mensis Fisius*, — unless it happened to be intercalary, when it would be that month repeated. At Rome we have the testimony of Plutarch that in the calendar of Numa the intercalary month ² added every other year after February was called *Μερκηδῖνος* or *Μερκηδόνιος* (see Conway, *I. D.*, p. 681), a statement which the late J. S. Reid and others (see *Comp. Lat. Stud.*, ed. 2, p. 94) were pleased to characterize as 'an error of Plutarch.' But the error was not Plutarch's; in the *Fasti Anziati*, discovered in 1915 (see *N. d. Sc.*, 1921, pp. 122 sqq., Tav. 1), the editor Mancini was perhaps not justified in restoring *Mercedonius* rather than *Int[ercalaris]*, yet that the Roman workman, at any rate, called extra pay-days *mercedonios* seems certain from Paul. ex. Fest. p. 111 L.

¹ Cf. Laird, *l. c.*, p. 331, who also takes Fisius as the last month, March as the first, in the Campanian calendar.

² On intercalation in the Roman calendar see Frazer's Ovid, *Fasti*, vol. ii, (1929), pp. 35 sqq., Nillson in *Litteris* 5, (1928), p. 101, with his reference to Wissowa, *Hermes*, 58, (1923), p. 391.

The year of thirteen months at Lavinium mentioned by Augustine (*civ. dei* 15, 12) must have included an intercalary month, again doubtless before March. For it was in that month that the Latin calendar began, as Festus (p. 136 L.) states explicitly, and as Macrobius (*Sat.* 1. 15. 18) implies. Outside Latium are we to suppose that the position of March varied as Ovid records (*Fasti* 3, 87 sqq.), and that the order of the months was very different from what it was at Rome, or that Ovid is not to be believed, or that changes had taken place in those Italic calendars to which he refers, so that March had been displaced from the first position exactly as at Rome? The last seems the most probable explanation, as Mommsen saw (*Röm. Chron.*, p. 220).

Differences of another kind are alluded to by Censorinus (20, 1), who also (22, 6) records great variations in the number of days to the month at Alba and elsewhere. Month-names in Italic communities are similar to those at Rome in most cases, and in particular either they are derived for the most part from the names of festivals occurring in them, or else the months were merely numbered, as at Rome, the Greek practice of naming months for deities being less common. Varro, quoted by Censorinus (22, 10, cf. 13; *Fast. Praen.*), stated that the Roman month-names were actually of Latin origin, including January and Februrary, which were supposed to have been introduced by the Sabine Numa or by one of the Etruscan Tarquins (Unger, p. 784). It is interesting to observe in this connexion that literary remains have nothing to say concerning the position, or number of days, or other peculiarities of these two months in calendars outside Rome; March is the month which most commands their attention. The conclusion seems valid that it was or had been the initial month of the year throughout Italy.

We have no information relating to the use in Italy of *litterae nundinales* or of symbols comparable to the F, C, NP and the like of the Roman calendar, but it is likely enough that such were employed. We have many references to festivals occurring on fixed dates (see below), which must have been holidays when no business might be done. The days on which such festivals fell must have been different in character, and distinguished in the calendar, from other days. But Buecheler's idea (*Umbria*, pp. 128 sq.) that Umb. *šersiaru* indicated a point of time (something like the Roman *nundinae*) — 'partem mensis ut nundinas

ac longius spatium' — seems less probable than the usual interpretation 'festivals (celebrated with banquets).' It is just possible, as von Planta thought (*Gram.* i, pp. 493, n. 4, 497), that the term is connected with the divine name *šerfo-* 'Cerfus' (cf. Lat. *Ceres*); in that case it would be not a substantive, but an adjective, and the accompanying form *antermenzaru* would be the noun with a meaning somewhat like that of the Latin *calendae*, literally, as we have seen (p. 164), 'intermenstruarum.' On this view *šersio-* becomes an Umbrian month-name 'Cerfus, cerealis,' 'pertaining to increase, generation'; cf. Lat. *maius* (mensis)¹ — not, of course, *augustus*, though it is true that Ceres was worshipped in that month (and also in April, October, and December) at Rome. It would be tempting to call attention to the date (May 15) of the Roman *ambarualia* (the features of which recall the Iguvine *lustratio*), a date identical with that of the elevation of the 'ceri' at Gubbio (see H. M. Bower, *The Elevation and Procession of the Ceri*, Publications of the Folk-Lore Society, no. xxxix, 1897), were it not that the following *menzne kūršlasiu.* apart from certain phonetic difficulties, forbids von Planta's explanation of *šersiaru.* Everything considered, that form is best connected with *šers-* as in *še(r)sna* 'cena,' the festival being named from the banquet that went with it, as perhaps the festivals called (gen. plu.) *urnasiaru* were named 'ab urnis ac potu' (Buecheler), an etymology which has stood long, though it may now be in need of revision.

That the 'nine-day' period *inter nundinum* (eight days) existed independently outside Rome is not certain from the mere mention of *rustici* in the extract of Rutilius quoted by Macrobius (*Sat.* i. 16. 34). We find the Ides mentioned in dialect inscriptions, but not the Nones occurring eight days before them. Even if *pumperias* is rightly interpreted 'Nones' (as by Conway), i.e. the *fifth* day of the month, these Nones did not necessarily fall eight days before the Ides, but must have been reckoned from the beginning of the month. A seven-day period indicated by the *litterae nundinales* A–G (engraved in the column in front of the usual A–H) in the *fasti Sabini* cannot be taken to imply an old Sabine seven-day week, but is doubtless a late innovation, nothing more or less than the Christian week (*C.I.L.* I, ed. 2, p. 285).

¹ Observe, however, that a constant epithet of *Šerfo-* is *martier* i.e. 'Martio-'.

The method of reckoning forwards (i.e. after) instead of backwards (i.e. before) from a fixed point seems to have been at least non-Roman, if indeed it was really old (cf. Gagnér, *l. c.*, pp. 202, 204). It led to a notable misunderstanding of *quinquatrus* which found its way even into the pages of Ovid (*Fasti*, 3, 809, with Frazer's note). At Tusculum dates respectively two, five, and six days after the Ides are said to have been called *triatrus*, *sexatrus*, and *septematrus*, and at Falerii similarly there was a date *decimatrus*. The Latin *quinquatrus* is evidently to be reckoned in the same way. Festus¹ (p. 304 L.), who cites these terms, adds that they were formed 'exemplo multorum populorum Italicorum,' and the source seems really to have been Italic, despite Verrius Flaccus's *in Latio* (true so far as it goes) of the *fasti Praenestini* (a. d. XIV Kal. Apr.). The *quingu(e)-* of *quinquatrus* must indeed be Latin or Latinian, not dialectal, but not so *-atru-*. The explanation of *-atru-* offered by Charisius (1. 81, 20, K.), 'idus, quas *atrus*² antiqui dicebant' fails because it is untrue. Besides, the reckoning *triatrus* and so forth could also be made after the Calends or Nones (Wissowa, *Ges. Abh.*, p. 166); to Gellius (2. 21. 7) *atrus* meant 'nihil'! In modern times several suggestions have been made; Gruppe (*Hermes* 15, (1880), p. 624; cf. Wissowa, *l. c.*, and in Pauly-Wissowa, s.v. *ater dies*) connected it with Latin *ater* 'postriduanus,' and this last Warren convincingly explained (*Trans. Am. Phil. Assoc.*, 32, (1901), pp. 116 sqq.) as standing for *alter*; cf. Osc. *atrud*, Umb. *muta* 'multa.' Ribezzo's **quinque-quatrus* (*Riv. I.G.I.*, 10, (1926), p. 100) is highly improbable, Stolz's **quinqu-atu-s* (*Hist. Gram.*, i, (1894-95), p. 549) little better, and the attempts of Deecke (*Falisker*, 1888, p. 90; cf. Müller-Deecke, *Etrusker*, ii, (1877), p. 47) and Pauli (*Etr. Forsch. u. Stud.* 3, (1882), p. 125) to find an Etruscan origin for *-(a)tru-* mistaken. To see in *-atru-* nothing more than *āter* 'black,' as Wackernagel does (*Arch. f. Religionswissenschaft*, 22, (1923-24), pp. 215 sq.), seems inadequate.

As for the Ides, we have not only three inscriptions, *fsiais eiduis luisarifs* (*I. D.*, 101), *eiduis ma[merttiais]* (104), *eidūts mamertt[iais]*

¹ Cf. Varro *L.L.*, 6. 14.

² A corruption of *itus*, hence the misunderstanding of Charisius? An interpretation suggested by Ellis (*A. J. P.*, 13, (1892), p. 347), following the glossographers, is untenable.

(1113), all from S. Maria di Capua Vetere, but also the testimony of Varro (*L.L.*, 6. 28) that the same term (*idus*) was used by the Sabines in the same sense as at Rome. Varro in the same passage (cf. Macrobius, *Sat.* 1. 15. 14 sqq.) also makes the word Etruscan, in the form *itus*; but if he was right, the word must have been borrowed not from the Etruscans, but by them, with the usual representation of *d* by *t*. The etymology of *idus* is disputed, but it does not assist us to regard the word as Etruscan (Kretschmer in Gercke-Norden, *Einl.*, ed. 3, vol. 1, (1923), p. 112). The Oscan spelling (*ei-*) makes the old connexion with *aedes*, *αἶθω* impossible, and perhaps the best suggestion is still that of Meyer-Lübke (*Z. f. Ö. Gymn.*, 46, (1895), p. 617), who compared O. Ir. *ēsce* (for **eid-skiom*) 'luna, mensis.' Since, in any event, the Ides properly marked the full moon, we may conclude that for the Sabines and Oscans, as well as for the Romans, the month was lunar.

The Calends are not mentioned at all in dialect inscriptions (cf. p. 167, *supra*), and Conway's interpretation of *pumperias*, which is both Oscan (*pumperias pustum[as]*, *I. D.* 105 a, b; *pumper faleniaas*, 107, cf. *pumpe faler*, 106; *pumperiais sull*, 114; *fistiais pumperiais pas prai mamertiais set*, 115, 116; *pumperi mam* 123) and Umbrian (*tekvias famedias pumpedias XII*, *Tab. Iguv.* II b 2) as 'Nones' (*I. D.*, p. 650, cf. *Dial. Ital. Ex. Sel.*, pp. 15, 27) has not won acceptance. The term would appear to mean not 'fifth day of the month,' but rather 'a group of five officials,' who changed from month to month, like the Attic prytanes (cf. Laird, *Cl. Philol.*, 1, (1906), p. 333), and hence the occasion on which they met, viz. in the last month of the year (*pustmas*), in the twelfth month (*XII*), in March (*mamertiais*), every month (*sull*), in the month 'Falernius' — these being the occasions actually mentioned in extant inscriptions — or whatever the month appropriate to a particular ceremony or festival might be. 'Calends' and 'Ides' were perhaps the only two points fixed at first, 'new moon' and 'full moon,' the 'Nones' being a later subdivision. But it would be unjustifiable to conclude *ex silentio* that the dialect-speaking peoples never made such a subdivision themselves, but learnt it only when Latinized.

From the order of the months January through to December adopted below I would not have it assumed that January (or the month corresponding thereto) is taken to have been the first month of the year.

March is perhaps more likely to have had that position. The order January–December is followed simply as being more useful for purposes of reference or comparison.

1. *January*. The tradition that this month was added to the Roman calendar (by the Sabine Numa?) is negligible. The New Year's celebration (January or March?) by a gift called *strena* seems to have been Sabine as well as Latin (Lyd. *de mens.*, 4. 4; Symmach. *Epist.*, 10. 35).

2. *February*. If February was the last month of the year, certain of the notices entered below under *December* properly apply here.

Again we meet the tradition that February was an addition to an old ten-month year and hence last of all in the year, and as such a month of purification. It does indeed seem likely that the name of this month was non-Latin, Sabine according to Varro (*L.L.*, 6. 13; cf. *uit. pop. Rom.* i, quoted by Non. Marc. 114. 17 M., where a Sabine ceremony of purification — in February? — is described), certainly not Etruscan as Lydus (*de mens.* 4. 20) would have it. If, as Walde suggests (*Lat. Et. Wtb.*, s.v.), **febros-* stands for **dhues-ro-*, the form is phonetically beyond reproach as pure Latin (dial. *-fr-* from *-sr-*), but that the word was unusual and required explanation is apparent from Ovid, *fasti*, ii. 19 sqq. The narrowness of meaning in *februare*, no synonym of *purgare* or even of *lustrare*, suggests borrowing, an importation which never had a place in the popular language. As Ernout well remarks (*Élém. dial.*, 1909, p. 162): '*februm* et *februare* sont des termes religieux empruntés par les Romains au rituel sabin, et qui n'ont jamais eu accès dans la langue littéraire ou parlée; seul *februarius* qui désignait un mois a survécu en latin et jusque dans les langues romanes.'

Since the meeting of the *pumperias* in the month before March is described by the adjective *fīstiais* (*I. D.* 115, 116), such may have been the Oscan name for February, or for the additional month, a kind of second February intercalated between February and March. But this final month of the year 'Fisius' is also described (*op. cit.*, 101) by another adjective — *fisiais eiduis luisarifs*. *luisarifs* has been explained as connected with Latin *ludus*, i.e. 'celebrated with games,' and also (Schulze, *Eigenn.*, 485; cf. von Planta, *Gram.* i, p. 420) with the family name *Loesius*, common in Campania. But the etymology which compares Umb. *disleralinsust*, Lat. *lira*, *de-lirare* seems preferable; *luisarifs*

would then mean 'of the ploughing month,' which is very appropriate for February, and finds a parallel in the Locrian and Epidaurian month names 'Αράρυος and Παπαράρυος, though here there seems to be a reference to winter wheat, if the ploughing was done in November or December (E. Schwyzer, *Glotta*, 12, (1922-23), pp. 1 sqq.). 'Fisius' can hardly have been the last month as December, though *luisarifs* interpreted 'lusoriis' suggests the Saturnalia, unless March occupied a position in the Campanian calendar quite different from that which it had at Rome.

The occasion of each of the three ceremonies referred to in the inscriptions cited above was the dedication, or renewal of the dedication of a *iovila*, that is a family offering, perhaps in honour of Juno (cf. *C.Q.*, 16, (1922), pp. 181 sqq.). If February was the last month, then *pumperias pustum[as]* (**quincuniae postremae*) in 105 *a*, *b*, also belongs here.¹ But other months (see § 4 March, § 7 June, § 14 Monthly throughout the year, § 15 Uncertain months) were marked by such ceremonies, March notably so. I have set forth elsewhere (*C.Q.*, *l. c.*) my view that the *iovila*-dedications were associated with Juno as *Lucina* or *Februata*. Now *Lucina* was worshipped at Rome on March first, and *Februata* is clearly associated with *mensis Februarius*; indeed some authorities (see, e.g., Wissowa, *Rel. u. Kultus der Römer*, ed. 2, 1912, p. 185) have seen a hint of Juno in the Lupercalia (February 15); similarly *Sospita* of Lanuvium was worshipped on February first. It is, therefore, perhaps no accident that many of the extant *iovila*-inscriptions (not less than one third) prescribe ceremonies in those two months.

3. *Mensis intercalaris*. See above, p. 165 (Umb. *kurslasin*, Osc. *prai mamertthais*).

4. *March*. Many Italic communities had a month dedicated to Mars, but, if we may trust Ovid (*fasti*, 3. 87 sqq.), its position in the calendar varied considerably, standing fourth in order among the Sabines (at Cures) and Paeligni, fifth at Lavinium and Falerii, sixth among the Hernici, tenth among the Aequi, and third (as eventually at Rome) at Tusculum, Alba, and Aricia. At Alba it is said by Censorinus (22. 6) to have been thirty-six days long. We have the tes-

¹ Cf. § 13 (December) *infra*.

timony of Verrius Flaccus (*fast. Praen.*, cf. *Fest.*, p. 136 L.) to the importance of the month in Latium, as well as at Rome, and also to its original position as the first month of the year in the old Roman calendar. We have already seen that it may have occupied the same position also among the Oscans (see p. 171; cf. Laird, *l. c.*, p. 331). *Iovila*-celebrations dated on the Ides of March are recorded in two inscriptions from S. Maria di Capua Vetere (*I. D.*, 104, 113), on the *pumperias*-day of that month in another (123), and either on one of those dates, or on some other date in March in four (five?) others (124, 126 sq., 129, cf. 100?). The month-name itself shows the Oscan form *mamers* (*I. D.*, p. 219). Von Planta's suggestion that Umb. *antermenzaru ñersiaru* stands for 'calendarum *Cerfiarum,' i.e. possibly 'Martiarum,' has been noted above, p. 167. Setting that suggestion aside, however, we must still recognize the importance of 'mensis Martius' in the Italic calendar generally. Ovid was quite right in calling attention to its importance.

5. *April*. I see no reason for accepting Laird's suggestion (*l. c.*, p. 337) that the festival-date *fiuusasiais* at Agnone (*I. D.* 175 a 20) fell in April (the Roman Floralia). Dialect evidence points rather to July, as is indicated in § 8 below.

The Roman *Fordicidia* (April 15) may have been a Sabine importation into the Roman calendar (*C.Q.* 15, (1921), p. 108).¹

6. *May*. Festus (Paul. ex. *Fest.* p. 121 L.) has recorded the Oscan month-name corresponding to the Latin *Maius*, viz. *Maesius*, while Censorinus (22, 6) tells us that at Alba this month numbered only twenty-two days. There is even a tradition, preserved by Macrobius (*Sat.* 1. 12. 17), that the month was introduced into the Roman calendar from Tusculum where Jupiter was known as *Maius*.²

We have seen that there is some reason to suppose that the Umbrian *lustratio* (called *puplum aferum* 'populum circumferre, i.e. lustrare') at Gubbio may have fallen in May, even though *ñersio* may not refer to that month (p. 167). But if an inscription found at Capua, now unfortunately lost (*I. D.* 119), was really a *iovila*-stone, it is pos-

¹ It may be useful to call attention to the Jewish custom, not unlike that of the *Fordicidia*, described by M. Gaster in Hastings, *E.R.E.*, vol. ii, p. 656.

² Cf. *Maesia silva*, Liv. 1. 33, Plin. *N.H.* 8. 225? But hardly the 'rusticus Mesius pappus' of Varro *L.L.*, 7. 96.

sible that in the damaged *miia n. ssimas* of ll. 5 sq., there is a reference to a date (like the *iūviais messimais* or *iūviass messimass*, *I. D.* 113). The original being lost, it is impossible to verify the reading which depends upon an eighteenth-century copy, and Buecheler (*Rh. Mus.* 45, (1890), p. 163) proposed to write *messimas* in l. 6, with which the name of a festival (write *m[a]iia[s]?*) would certainly be expected. On the other hand *nessimas* 'proximae' occurs elsewhere as a local designation (*I. D.* 109) and affords a closer parallel.

From a gloss of Festus (Paul. ex. Fest. p. 60 L.) it appears that a festival to Bona Dea (*Damia*, her priestess being called *damiatrix*, and apparently the goddess herself *cubrar matrer*, gen. sg., in Umbrian, *I. D.* 354) was known as *damium*, or (Hesychius) δάμεια. Hesychius (s.v.) places this festival at Tarentum, perhaps rightly; but the word would appear to be Oscan, or at least South Italic, rather than Messapic or Greek, and reappears to describe some kind of offering or festival — probably fertility-rites — in two *iovila*-dedications, *damuse* [*I. D.* 103 a, b), *damsennias* (117 a, b), as Buck saw (*Gram.* p. 251).¹ The latter term is defined in the words *pas fiet pūstreī² iūkleī eehiianasūm* 'quae fiunt postero die (?) emittendarum,' which evidently refer to a sacrificial hunt such as is described in the Iguvine Tables (I b 40 sqq., VII a 51 sqq.) and perhaps resembled the Sabine *ludi taurei* (Serv. auct., *Aen.* 2. 140) or the Roman Poplifugia. The Greek Δαμία shared most of the attributes of Demeter who at Heraclea was called πάμπανον (Hesych.). Since to the Italic tribes Demeter was identified with Ceres, it is tempting to see in πάμπανον a reduplication of the Messapic πανός 'bread' (Athenaeus 3, p. 111 c.),³ especially since we learn from Servius (*Geo.* 1. 7) that the Sabines called Ceres by the name *Panis*. Now the *bona dea* was a sort of female *duonus cerus* (cf. Wissowa, *Rel. u. Kult.*, ed. 2, pp. 216, 192), a goddess of the fields, identified with Maia, Ops, Fauna, and Fatua; the likeness between the appellations *bona dea* and *duonus cerus* gives us a link, through *ceres* (cf. Osc. *kerrī*, *kerrīo-*, *Cerfum*, Umb. *serfo-*), *Demeter*, and *damia*, which justifies the interpretation of *damsennias* as festivals pertaining to fertility whether

¹ *damia* [in *I. D.* 130 a 2, which Buck renders 'damnum,' is better kept apart; von Planta, however, took it as the divine name *Damia*.

² Cf. *pustrei* *I. D.* 102 (i), which must be incomplete.

³ Cf. Schol. Vallicell. *Isid. Etym.* 20. 2. 15; Cassiodorus *Var.* 6. 18 (p. 699 Migne); Opp. *Hal.*, 3. 463.

of the land and beasts or of man. If they coincided in date with the Roman celebrations in honour of Bona Dea and Maia, they must have fallen on May 1 (Ovid, *fasti*, 5. 148; Macrobian *Sat.* 1. 12. 21); if of Ceres, then perhaps they came a little earlier, that is to say in April.

7. *June*. There was a month corresponding to the Latin *Iunius*, but called *Iunonius* or *Iunonalis* in the calendars of Aricia, Laurentum, Lanuvium, Tibur, and Praeneste, alluded to by Ovid, *fasti*, 6. 59 sqq., Macrobian *Sat.* 1. 12. 30; cf. Paul. ex. Fest. p. 92 L. But here positive knowledge ends. When did the *iúviats messímais*¹ 'Iouíis medioximis, i.e. maxime mediis' (rather than 'maximis'), the midmost Jupiter-festivals, with which the *iovila*-celebrations of the Tanternaii family were somehow connected (*I. D.* 113), fall? In June, as the middle (or nearly middle) month of the year? And in the middle of that month? Compare, then, perhaps the *feriae Iovi* of June 13 at Rome, which, besides being one of the regular monthly festivals of Jupiter (to whom all the Ides were sacred), also coincided with the worship of Jupiter *O.M. in Capitolio*. But if the year began not with January but with March, August would correspond to June; and in any case July is as near the middle of the year as June; finally, there is explicit mention of the Ides of March in this very same inscription.

This difficulty pertains to the month-name implied in the *nomen*, n. sg. masc., *sehśímbríis* '*Sexembrius, i.e. perhaps mense sexto natus,' the sixth month at Pompeii (*I. D.* 63) being called **Sehśímber*, a formation with which Conway aptly compared O. Fr. *Octembre*, *Witembre*. But what was the sixth month at Pompeii, June or August? Again the Umbrian ceremony which took place *sume ustite sestentasiaru urnasiaru* (Tab. Iguv. III 1-3) 'summa tempestate sextantariarum ordinariarum,'² as contrasted with *plenasier urnasier* (V a 2) 'plenariis ordinariis,' cannot be accurately dated. The latter presumably took place at the end of the year (i.e. December or February?), but if in *sestentasiaru* we see a reference to the 'sixth month' (and not to a

¹ *v.l.* -ass ('Iouias medioximas'); but it is no matter.

² For this interpretation of Umb. *urnasio*- 'ordinarius' i.e. 'regular (session)' see Linde, *Glotta* 3, (1911), p. 170. It ends the old controversy whether in *plenasier* and *sestentasiaru* there was a reference to measure, i.e. capacity of the 'urns' (cf., in connexion with *sume ustite* 'sunset,' Hor. *Od.* 3. 19. 9: *lunae . . . nouae, . . . noctis mediae . . . , tribus aut nouem . . . cyathis?*), or to the time of year at which the ceremony took place.

'sixth part' of the year, or to an occurrence repeated bi-monthly, i.e. at the end of each 'sixth part' of the year), we still cannot definitely assign the ceremony to June rather than to August.

8. *July*. There is no doubt, however, that July, originally the fifth month at Rome and also (Censorinus 22. 13) in Latium, a month stated to have had thirty-six days at Tusculum (*id.*, 22. 6), was called by the Vestini of the Aternus valley, *mensis Flusaris* 'Floralis.' For we have not only an offering (or decree?) made *mesene flusare* (*I. D.* 248), but also a dedication of a temple *Iouis liberi* made *mense flusare* which is further defined in the same document (*C.I.L.* I, ed. 2, 756) by the Latin dating *a. d. III idus Quinctileis*. Mommsen's conjecture¹ that the following *comula-teis* is the name of some day in the month, presumably July 13, is too uncertain to add to our information concerning the Vestinian calendar, and the term is still unexplained. But the festival designated *fluusasiais* (for *fl-*) at Agnone (*I. D.* 175 a 20) 'floralibus' is surely to be allotted to July, rather than to April, the month of the Floralia at Rome, on the ground of the month-name, 'mensis Flusaris.' For the Osc. *messímaís* see above, p. 174.²

9. *August*. This month is stated by Censorinus (22. 6) to have had the very small number of eighteen days at Alba. That Osc. *sehsímbríís* and Umb. *sestentasiaru* refer to August is just possible; see above, p. 174 (*June*). At Agnone *dekmanniúís* (*I. D.* 175 b 22) probably implies a festival on which tithes were offered to Hercules (see my note in *Language* 3 (1927), p. 106; cf. Kent, *ibid.*, p. 187). Buck (*Gram.* p. 255) also understood the term to indicate the occasion, not the

¹ *C.I.L.* 9. 3513.

² The Latin ceremony (Varro *L.L.*, 6. 18) in honour of Juno Caprotina which took place on the Nonae Caprotinae ended in a *uitulatio*, and both may have been originally pure Latin and not Roman. As to *uitulatio*, I would add to my note on the etymology of that word (*Class. Philol.*, 18, (1923), p. 350) that the difficulty which it involves of forming a diminutive in *-lo-* from an *i*-stem may be overcome by supposing that there was an Old Latin or Latinian **uito-* beside *uitis* (cf. *forum: fores, sacro-: sacres, manus: manes*, not to mention the regular *i*-stem of compound adjectives, e.g. *annus: tri-ennis*, etc.). So in Umbrian we have *fontlire, fundlere* '*fontulo-' beside Lat. *fons* (*i*-stem), *fonticulus*. Even in Latin *stīps*, which gives *stīpula, stīpulari* (Walde, *s.v.*) cannot be definitely classed as a consonant stem (gen. plu. *-ium* and *-um*). Or was **uitula* (*-tio*) a retro-formate from *uitulor, -āri*? Cf. *ambulāre*. And see now *Gloss. Lat.* iv, (1930), p. 460.

recipient, of the offerings, but assumed that it fell in December, presumably interpreting *dekmānio-* to give the month-name. But there is nothing in the inscription of Agnone itself to connect the festivals with December, and so far as I can ascertain, no Roman or Italic festival was so designated from the name of the month in which it occurred, when that month-name was itself merely numerical. There is, however, good reason, as I pointed out in 1927 (*Language*, l. c.) for connecting the ceremonies of Agnone with the worship of the rustic Hercules and the tithes offered to him. Accordingly, I suggest that this festival may have fallen in August, the month in which Hercules *uictor*, *inuictus* and *magnus custos*, to whom also tithes were offered (see Wissowa, p. 272), was worshipped at Rome.

10. *September*. This month is said to have lasted but sixteen days at Alba (Censorinus 22. 6).

11. *October* had thirty-two days at Tusculum, thirty-nine days at Aricia (*id.*, *ibid.*).

12. *November*. There are no dialect notices extant which can be referred to November.

13. *December*. Macrobius (1. 15. 18) implies that the calendar of Laurentum had a month December, though if March was the fifth month there (*v. supra*, p. 171), the interval between March and December must have been shorter than at Rome.

The *pumpedias XII* of *Tab. Iguv.* II b 2 may be noted here, since *XII* means most probably 'mensis duodecimi,' though it is of course uncertain whether the Umbrian, or rather Iguvine, month corresponding to the Roman December occupied the twelfth position in the year, especially since that Roman month itself was originally the tenth. A similar doubt pertains to the following somewhat vague (to us) indications of date:

Umb. *plenasier urnasier* (*Tab. Iguv.* V a 2, 14 sq.; cf. p. 174, *supra*) 'plenariis ordinariis,' i.e. 'regular sessions held in the fullness of the year (?)' (cf. Buck, *Gram.*, p. 301).

Umb. *menzne kušlasiu* 'mense circulario,' probably not 'ultimo' but rather 'intercalario' (p. 164, *supra*) in intercalary years, 'Februario (?)' in other years.

Osc. *pumperias pustmas* — December or February? Cf. p. 164.

Osc. *dekmanniūtis* — December (Buck) or August? Cf. p. 176.

Osc. *eiduis luisarifs* — probably February, not December, see p. 171, *supra*.

14. Ceremonies (in honour of Juno?) recurring every month of the year are prescribed by a *iovila*-inscription *pūmperiaīs sūll[aiīs]* (I. D. 114) ‘*quincuriis omnibus,’ just as at Rome Juno was honoured every month (on the Calends), and Jupiter (on the Ides); while at Iguvium the phrase *antermenzaru šersiaru*, if rightly interpreted (p. 167) ‘intermenstruarum *cenariarum,’ implies the monthly performance of new-moon sacrifices to Hondus.

15. There remain a number of dialect notices indicating occasions the precise dates of which cannot be fixed, either because the terms in which they are defined are themselves too vague, or else because we are unable to interpret them completely and accurately. Thus (1) in the *iovila*-inscriptions we have *pūmper[iaīs] faleniaas* (I. D. 107, cf. 106, with *faler[iaīs]*, either a more accurate spelling -*r[n]*-, or an older form, -*r*- tending to disappear before -*n*-). Here there is implied a month ‘Falernius,’ as Laird saw (*l. c.*, p. 331), but we know neither its position in the year, nor how it came to be so designated.

(2) *ve.na[iaīs]* (118 a), probably for *verna[iaīs]* (or *venna[iaīs]*, cf. *falen-* above?) recalls the gloss of Festus (Paul. ex. Fest., p. 520 L.) *verniserā*: mensalia (mens- Aug.) auguria, and may therefore imply a harvest (not a monthly?) festival. But it has to be admitted that *verniserā* is itself unexplained. The evidence of Festus (p. 510 L.) has been interpreted to mean that *verna* ‘slave’ was a dialect (Sabine) word, presumably with original I. Eu. *r*, since Sabine did not rhotacize I. Eu. intervocalic *s* (cf. Osc. *uero-* ‘door,’ Walde, s.v. *verna*), and *ve[r]na[iaīs]* might refer to a slaves’ holiday (cf. the Saturnalia), perhaps in December. Yet a third possible explanation would be ‘spring-time festivals’; cf. Lat. *uer*, *uernus* (I. Eu. **uēr* from **uēs*r, — -*sr*- would give -*fr*- in the dialects, -*br*- in Latin).

(3) *vesu(l)liaīs* (109, cf. 110, 111, 120, 121, and perhaps also 122, if *deiv* in 122 be a reference to the same ceremony as that implied in *vesuliaīs deivinaīs* in 110), if loc. plu. (and not dat.), as seems certain from the analogy of the other *iovila*-inscriptions, refers to ‘fertility-festivals’ (see my paper in *C.Q.*, 16, (1922), p. 186), actually so de-

scribed *fertalis* (109). But the date or dates on which such festivals fell there is no means of establishing.¹

(4) *sehmenier dequrier* 'sementivis decuriis' (*Tab. Iguv.* V b. 11, cf. 16, II b 1), i.e. 'seed-time festivals of the decuries' may have fallen in the spring. But the date of the *sementivae feriae* mentioned by Varro (*R.R.* 1. 2. 1) fell in January (Ovid *fasti*, i. 658); they were celebrated in the temple of Tellus, of which the *natalis* fell on December 13 (*Fasti Praenestini*, *Fasti Antiates*); and a pig was a regular part of the offering to Tellus and Ceres (e.g., Varro ap. Non. p. 163). Similarly, the sacrifice of a pig and a goat marked the *semenies tekuries* at Iguvium. Perhaps, therefore, they fell in winter, though *dequrier* cannot by any device be connected with *december*; *seemun*[*ariss*?] (*I. D.* 168) is too uncertain in form and reading to be interpreted with confidence.

(5) The *res deina annua* of Spolegium (*C.I.L.* 11. 4766) is undated; and also the (annual?) festival in honour of Jupiter and an associated goddess (Iouia Pia Regina Ceres) celebrated by the Marrucini (*I. D.* 243), where 'Iouia Pia Ceres' has the epithet *regina* which at Rome belonged to Juno. Nor can the *ludi Taurei*, said to have been Sabine (Serv. auct., *Aen.* 2, 140), be assigned to a fixed date, or the Faliscan *struppearia* (Fest., p. 410 L.). The curious prescription of a biennial festival is made in the Tabula Agnonesis (*I. D.* 175, a 18, b 21) *alltrei pūtereipid akenei* 'altero quoque anno'; for *akenei* must be 'year' (see p. 163, *supra*) not 'festival,' still less 'season.' The phrase *posti acnu* 'in singulos annos, quotannis' in the Iguvine Tables (V b 8, 12, 14, 17) occurs in connexion with the *sementivae feriae* already discussed, clearly an annual festival, but not to be precisely dated; but the Umb. *peracni-*, *seuacni-* (*Tab. Iguv.*, *saepe*), like the Latin *sollemnis*, seem to have discarded their original meaning 'annual' in favour of 'sacrificial, solemn.'

(6) There are two Venetic terms which may reasonably be interpreted as loc. plu., denoting the occasion of offerings, though again precise dates cannot be indicated, viz. *·o·poosφo·s* 'operibus' (*Prae-Ital. Dial.* 1) and *·u·zeroφo·s* 'uberibus' (*ib.*, 31 d). In Latin we have

¹ The derivative personal name *vesullia*s 'Vesulliaeus' gives no help, any more than the frequent gentile *Falerius* throws light on *faler*[(106). But *Iunius* (mensis) may be called by a family name, and some of the Etruscan month-names wear a gentile look (cf. *luisarifs*: *Loesii*?).

operari used constantly in religious language in the sense of 'perform sacrifices, *opfern*,' and in Umbrian *usàse* (Tab. Iguv. II a 44, I b 45) '*operaciae' may have a ritual connotation. Both *·o·posoφo·s·* and *·u·zerzφo·s·* (cf. Lat. *uber* in the sense of 'fruitfulness, fertility') may be rendered '(ex) primitiis, primitiarum festo',¹ and it is conceivable that there is a reference to harvest-festivals, both in the first-fruits (*·u·zeroφo·s·*) and in the sacrifice of first-fruits (*·o·posoφo·s·*), or even, the latter term being used more widely, in the operations, the toil and labour, attending the harvest.

¹ See, for a somewhat different view, my paper in *Journ. Roy. Anthropol. Inst.*, 52, (1922), p. 225, n. 9. I take this opportunity of supplementing that paper in one or two matters of detail.

P. 213. Giles, *Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc. [Eng.]*, 1915, p. 14 offers an interesting derivation of ἀκείομαι from ἀκμή 'point, pin' (cf. Lat. *acies*), lit. 'to pin a wound together' (as is still done about Mt. Eglon), which is important in view of the repeated *akeo* of the Venetic tablets and my explanation of the so-called 'nails' as *pins*.

Rhys, *Celtae and Galli*, p. 45, (cf. *Welsh and Manx Folklore*, pp. 315, 360), has interesting examples of the use of pins in magic.

I have observed numerous Arabic quasi-inscribed pins in the Museum at Cairo which at least furnish a parallel to the Venetic specimens; inscribed *fibulae* are by no means unknown. The famous Praenestine brooch will occur to every reader; cf. *C. Q.* 18, (1924), p. 168.

SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS FOR THE DEGREE OF PH.D., 1930-31

RICHARD KNOWLES. — *Phonetic Tendency in the Romance Languages*

IT HAS long been apparent to laymen and corroborated by scholars that the Romance languages show certain traits not inherent in Latin, but inherent in the pre-Latin languages of the Roman Empire. The assumption that the repetition of these traits is due to direct inheritance from the pre-Latin languages cannot be sustained, because they were obliterated by thorough latinisation. The repetition is, therefore, evidence of tendencies that have held over. These tendencies were variously influenced in the different parts of the Empire by the extent of the contacts with Rome in trade, education, and military service, but, above all, by the pervasiveness of the Roman administrative machinery. It is essential to recognise that the Romans as colonists did not have that numerical preponderance which might have obscured the native habits of speech past recognition. Just as the Romans were outnumbered in Italy by tribes which did not speak Latin, so at a later period Italian colonists are shown by the painstaking investigations of specialists to have formed but a small minority in the Provinces. Latin was acquired for its practical value in trade, in securing civil or military offices, and in dealing with officials.

Granted a definite set of speech habits in a conquered people and the imposition of a foreign tongue by an upper caste of administrators like the Romans, it is clear that the ultimate result of the fusion of the two will not immediately be reached. Thus, in all the Romance languages, there has been developed a set of new sounds, largely from the assibilation of palatals and dentals, starting with the early days of the Empire and not completed by the sixteenth century. Contact with literary Latin and ecclesiastical Latin tended to retard this development, but the speech of later invaders influenced it only in detail, even in Spain, where the Moors were possessed of a set of palatal sibilants in their own language. It must be regarded as a process of phonetic "drift" or tendency of which the direction is determined by a combination of the speech tendencies of the conquered peoples and the contacts with Latin, spoken and written, informal and official.

GRAVES HAYDON THOMPSON. — *Quo modo mythis Graeci in rebus publicis gerendis usi sint*

IT IS a well-known fact that the Greeks made frequent use of myths in their public life. In my treatment of the subject I intended generally to exclude from consideration those instances in which myths were used solely for panegyrical purposes, as well as those myths which the dramatic poets set forth with political intent. My sources, therefore, were chiefly the Greek historians and political orators.

The subject fell into two divisions: the use of myths in political practice, and the use of myths in political theory. Of the first, the instances extended from the seventh century (and there was one even in Homer) well down into the Roman period. To cite a few examples, there was the contention advanced by the Athenians, in the dispute with the Megarians concerning Salamis, that their own claim was supported by the authority of Homer, who reported that Ajax had stationed his Salaminian forces beside those of the Athenians at Troy; the Tegean and Athenian arguments as to the command of the left wing at Plataea were based largely on myths; Cimon undoubtedly had some political purpose in mind in recovering the bones of Theseus from Scyros; in the fourth century Callias urged that peace be made between the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians partly on the basis of the benefits which had been bestowed on the ancestors of the former by Triptolemus; Hyperides, speaking in support of Athens' claim to the temple at Delos, mentioned the passage of the pregnant Leto from Zoster in Attica to Delos to show the close relationship between Delos and Athens; and as the Greeks and the Romans began to come into contact, the Trojan descent of the latter was brought into play in various ways.

In the field of what I have called political theory may be included the naming of the ten Clisthenian tribes from as many Attic heroes, whereby the sanction of the past was secured for the reforms of the present and a feeling of kinship aroused among members of the same tribe; the emulation of Dionysus and some heroes by Alexander as a means of strengthening his own personal prestige; the claim to descent from Dionysus by the Ptolemies for the purpose of consolidating the country; and the claims to descent from Apollo and Dionysus by the Seleucids and Attalids respectively as a means of enhancing their prestige.

In the examination of single cases, it becomes apparent that myths were put to a more serious use in the orators and historians than as mere rhetorical ornament. Aeschines in his speech before King Philip in support of the Athenian claim to Amphipolis was certainly in earnest; yet he based that claim partly on a myth. Isocrates desired nothing more eagerly than to see Greece united and attacking Persia; yet both in his *Panegyricus* and in his appeal to Philip, myths constituted an important part of his argument in support of such action. And there are other cases.

From what the orators themselves said in regard to the subject, it is clear that they perceived a distinction between myths and what we consider history. But that distinction seems to have been merely a matter of time elapsed: myths were events that had happened a long time before, and there was therefore more cause for hesitation in introducing them, as being less pertinent, into a speech than in introducing more recent events. But even recent events, with the lapse of time, would come into the category of myths.

It is especially to be noted that in the myths which were used in this way the divine element played a very small part. There were very few in which the gods appeared; the rest were myths of heroes, that is, of men, and as such were inherently possible, so that the Greek orators appealed, not to the superstition of their hearers, but to their knowledge of historical precedent. In this light, the use of myths could not have been affected by any change in religious beliefs. How historical these myths must have seemed is further evident from the number of those in which the actors were ancestors of the persons before whom the myth was related; for no one wishes to believe that his ancestors are "mythical," and not historical.

It may be said, then, that here, too, the Greeks displayed much prudence, in that they preferred to restrict their use of myths for political purposes to such as could have aroused little scepticism in their hearers.

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